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OCTOBER, 1855.

ARTICLE I.—STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES CENSUS. 1850.

COMPENDIUM OF THE UNITED STATES CENSUS. BY J. D.
B. DE BOW. 1854.

THERE is no obligation more imperative upon the educated people of a country, than a definite understanding of its actual condition and resources. Upon such knowledge depends the proper government of its internal policy, and, oftentimes, of its foreign affairs. Yet, strange as it may seem, there is a great public disinclination to such studies. Men shrink from tedious columns of figures, and from the dry details which such researches involve, and are content to take, at second-hand, the deductions which are the results of the labors of the few. And, as it happens usually that such inquiries are made by those who have favorite theories to advocate, or inimical propositions to oppose, those most inclined to adopt the course which may be right, become, without knowing it, mere factionists or partisans.

Indeed, there is no subject of human inquiry upon which more errors are likely to occur, than those theories, which we base upon the statistics of a nation, even when we are most resolved upon a fair course of reasoning. In entering upon a brief notice of some of the features, which the last census presents, we are fully sensible of this danger. We shall, therefore, discuss the topics which it suggests, with great diffidence, leaving our observations

to the careful examination of the reader. It will well content us, if our inquiry enables any man to estimate more properly than he has done, his relations to the country in which he lives, and his duty with regard to any question which may be made the subject of popular discussion.

As territory, and the capacity of that territory to afford the means of subsistence to those who inhabit it, constitute the basis of all national prosperity, it is well to examine, at the outset, the extent of our landed possessions, as a people. These, as it is well known, have increased greatly since the revolutionary war. The area of the United States was, at the close of that struggle, 820,680 square miles. That this space was, in itself, sufficient to accommodate a large population, we know by calling to our minds the fact that Austria, to-day, contains only 257,368 square miles—that Great Britain contains only 121,912—that Prussia contains only 107,921—and that France contains only 207,145; in all, a space less than the colonial territory which we possessed when peace was concluded with Great Britain in 1783. We have added, since that time, 2,115,486 square miles to our territory. Of this sum, the purchase of Louisiana added 899,579 square miles,—the treaty of Florida added 66,900 square miles,—the annexation of Texas added 318,000 square miles,—the Oregon treaty added, definitely, 308,052,—and the treaty with Mexico added 522,955 square miles. This addition is an increase nearly equal to the present territory of Russia in Europe, which is 2,120,397 square miles.

Without detailing here the figures which indicate the population of the foreign States, whose aggregate territorial limits we have compared with our own, it is sufficient to have shown that our present limits can contain and subsist as large a population as now inhabits Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia in Europe. Indeed we should be correct in allowing for a larger ratio, because there are not as many extensive tracts in our country, unfitted for dense population, as are to be found in Russia at this day. It is sufficient to observe that, adopting France as a standard,—the population there being only 172 to the square mile, while in England it is 332 to the square mile,—

we may estimate the convenient capacity of our whole territorial space for population at 505,020,552 souls.

Indeed, looking merely at the physical conformation of our country, it is eminently adapted to the sustenance of this large population. No other land can exhibit valleys of such magnitude, drained by streams of equal capacity for internal navigation. The valley of the Ohio contains 200,000 square miles,—the valley of the Mississippi proper 180,000 square miles,—the valley of the Missouri 500,000 square miles, and the valley of the lower Mississippi 330,000 square miles; in all, 1,210,000 square miles. The shore line of the United States is 12,609 miles, and is studded with harbors sufficient for the requirements of all the commerce which would be carried on by the myriads by whom its territories may hereafter be populated.

Let us consider the States in another point of view, at which they exhibit themselves at this time. The non-slaveholding States, which are not territories, contain 612,927 square miles. The slaveholding States, not territories, contain 851,508 square miles. The territories contain 1,472,061 square miles. The non-slaveholding States contain a gross population of 13,434,922. The slaveholding States contain a gross population of 9,664,656. The number of whites in the non-slaveholding States in 1850 was 13,330,650. In the same year, in the slaveholding States, it was 6,222,418. The ratio of the per centage of the increase of the white population since 1800, has been largely in favor of the non-slaveholding States.

It is from all the States, slaveholding and non-slaveholding, that the population will be supplied, which shall give a character to the institutions, which will ultimately prevail in the 1,472,061 square miles of territory, which are now accounted the property of the United States; and which territory will, in its turn, be divided into States, and admitted into the Union. Keeping this truth in our minds, there are one or two conclusions to be drawn from the figures already given, which are so obvious, that we make no apology for presenting them to our readers. The slaveholding States, with a territory more than two hundred thousand square miles greater in extent than that of the non-

slaveholding States, contain a population of four millions less in number. In *white* population the slaveholding States have seven millions less than the non-slaveholding States. In the immense tract of territory, which is yet to be made into States, it is from the slave and non-slaveholding States, as we have before said, that the population must come. These territories contained, in 1850, a population of 92,298 only. It is the white population which will enter into these vacant tracts, and give to their institutions the shape which they will finally assume. From what quarter of the Union will the majority of these settlers come? The statistics, which we have given, demonstrate that the non-slaveholding States, with a smaller area of territory, have a surplus of seven millions of white population. This fact furnishes a sufficient reply.

What avail is there, we ask, for Southern men to demand, with an earnestness that cannot be mistaken, the right of each State, entering the Union, to appear with such Constitution as its people may elect to adopt, so long as they shall contend against the inevitable working of this excess of population in the non-slaveholding States? That the ratio of this excess in favor of non-slaveholding States increases, will be seen by the following table, showing the per centage of increase of white population in the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States :

	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.	1850.
Present slaveholding States,	33.94	29.70	28.2	29.35	26.54	34.26
Present non-slaveholding States,	36.85	40.73	37.70	36.67	39.10	39.42

We can also see what difference this ratio of increase of white population has made in the relative place of the States, so far as their population and positive power is concerned. In 1790 Virginia stood second on the roll of States in the number of its white population. In 1850 that State is sixth. New York was then fourth. It is now first. Pennsylvania was then third. It is now second. North Carolina was then fifth. It is now twelfth. South Carolina was then tenth. It is now twenty-third. Maryland was then seventh. It is now sixteenth. We will not continue the catalogue of changes. We have said enough. But one word more. In 1844 the whole vote of Vir-

ginia was 95,473. In 1848 it was 92,012. In 1852 it was 129,545, and this last increase was mainly due to a change effected in the elective franchise by the new Constitution of that State. In New York, in 1844, the whole vote was 485,882. In 1848 it was 453,399. In 1852 it was 522,294. The white population of Virginia in 1840, was 740,858. In 1850 it was 894,800. In New York in 1840, it was 2,378,890. In 1850, it was 3,048,325. We need not put ourselves to the trouble of demonstrating the effect which this increasing ratio, thus shown to be in favor of the non-slaveholding States, generally, and especially in the instance given of the relative increase of New York and Virginia, has upon the problem of the destiny of those States yet to be created out of our common territory by the population of all the States.

If we would know what causes have so largely contributed to the preponderance of the non-slaveholding States over the slave States in population, let us survey the point from which both classes of States began, so to speak, their advance in population. The number of whites in the slaveholding States in 1790, was 1,271,478. In the non-slaveholding States, it was 1,900,976. Climate, soil, facilities for labor,—all circumstances which ordinarily favor the increase of a population, exist in the slaveholding States to as great an extent as in the non-slaveholding States. In many of them, as for instance in Virginia, the advantages of climate are upon the side of the slaveholding States. Yet, as we have said, the present immense preponderance of white population exists in the non-slaveholding States. To what is this preponderance due? We are answered, if we turn to the tables which indicate the per centage of persons of foreign birth in the population of the several States of the Union. For instance, in New York there is 21.49 per cent.,—in Ohio 11.15 per cent.,—in Pennsylvania 13.42 per cent.,—in Virginia 2.56 per cent.,—in South Carolina 3.10 per cent.,—in North Carolina 0.46 per cent.,—in Tennessee 0.74 per cent. We might give the tables at length, but these results suffice our purpose.

They show conclusively that the rapid increase attained by the non-slaveholding States is due to the large accession of foreign-

born population which they receive, and they show, also, that this ratio is steadily on the increase. Let us pause at this point and boldly survey the ground. It has been commonly agreed by most writers that they have made a point in favor of Southern rights, and against emigration, when they have demonstrated that a large portion of the excess of the power of the non-slaveholding States is due to emigration. We are not considering the question in any of the aspects in which it now presents itself to the notice of partisans. We are looking at it as Southern men, and we mean to show the fallacy of the conclusions which are drawn from the fact. It is true that the accession of population derived to the non-slaveholding States proceeded in a great degree from emigration. Was there ever any power to prevent it? If the first generation of those arriving had not become citizens, would not the States in which they settled have attained, by means of their children, precisely the same relative rank in population which they now hold in the second generation? The life of States is not as the life of a man. In determining the question of the ultimate relative preponderance of the non-slaveholding or slaveholding States, it matters little whether the father or the son casts the first vote,—whether the balance is weighed down in 1860, or in 1870. From the tables, which we have shown, it is evident that the ultimate result must be the same, whether the political power be in the hands of the settler in his life-time, or whether it be given only to his child. The aggregate of the *vote* of the non-slaveholding State receives its sure increment at last. The political bearing of the population, which is in excess at the North, is more and more definitely established. The proportionate entrance of that excess of population into the territories occurs; and those territories are moulded into States, after the type of those States from which the large proportion of their population has come.

Will any Southern man deny that this result has been working out itself ever since the North-western and Western territories were first peopled? How will the most earnest among us resolve to prevent it? Shall we stop emigration altogether? We cannot do it. Shall we pass stringent laws against the introduction

of paupers? This we may and should do, but such legislation will affect only in an insignificant degree the number of those who arrive upon our shores, and, though it may relieve the States from taxation to some extent for their support, will not change in any material respect the political result following upon the increase from foreign sources of the population of the Northern States. We need only state the figures with regard to foreign pauperism to show that questions relating to it have not sufficient importance to justify their discussion as parts of a national theory of government. There were, by the census of 1850, 22,240,535 white persons in the United States. The whole number of paupers, supported in whole or in part by the public, in the year ending June 1st, 1850, was 134,972, of whom 68,538, a little more than one-half, were foreign-born. Now, we ask, in all sincerity, what proportion can be reasonably said to exist between the evil entailed upon us by the necessity of supporting 68,538 foreign-born paupers, compared with the positive addition made to the labor and prosperity of the country by the remaining 2,171,997 foreigners, who are not paupers, but who live, as all live, by the exercise of such callings as secure to them their daily bread? Moreover, the examination of the statistics shows how little the slaveholding States suffer from this course. Their fears are certainly of their own creation. Alabama has 11 foreign paupers,—Arkansas 8,—Florida 12,—Georgia 58,—Kentucky 155,—Louisiana 290,—Maryland, owing to the existence of a large sea-port within its limits, 1,903,—Mississippi 12,—North Carolina 18,—S. Carolina 329,—Tennessee 11,—Virginia 185. For these figures the reader can see DE BOW'S Compendium, page 163.

There can be no doubt that the far larger part of the emigration which comes to this country is healthful in its natural effect upon our prosperity. Not only do the 2,171,997, who are not paupers, maintain themselves at this day by their own labor, and thus add to the positive resources of the country, but the average specie per man, as far as can be ascertained by the scanty reports, brought by men into the country, has been from fifty to sixty dollars, at a low rate of computation. Taking it at fifty dollars a

head, the emigration of the year 1845 brought into this country near six millions of dollars,—the emigration of the year 1847 brought upwards of eleven millions,—the emigration of the year 1852 brought upwards of nineteen millions into the country. These figures, which are certainly rather below than above the mark, show that, whatever else may be said of emigration, it adds to the positive resources of the United States, both in men and money.

If we cannot check emigration of this character, which is not only not pauper emigration, but which brings with it direct accession both of capital and labor to our country, and if its present tendency is to increase to the extent of that capital and labor the preponderance of Northern individual interest, and to the extent of population Northern political power, what is to be done? This is the plain question, which the inquirer must meet. He cannot escape from it by saying that he will legislate to prevent this emigration. As long as this country is more free and more prosperous than the countries of the old world, it will attract emigration. Nor is it possible, nor has any party, or power, ever dreamed of excluding it, if it contains elements capable of labor, or blessed with property. If it must come, and its tendency is to the non-slaveholding States, how shall we remedy the evils which may grow out of too large a preponderance of population in the non-slaveholding States?

The only remedy is to divert to the slaveholding States so much of the current of healthful emigration as can be turned aside from the non-slaveholding States. Nor is there any political danger in this. There is no greater mistake than to suppose that European opinion is so far adverse to slavery, that there would be any risk in introducing foreigners more largely into our midst. It is slavery, as they hear of it at the North, which they oppose—not slavery, as they would see it at the South. We ask Southern men to consider the ready adaptation of all foreign-born citizens to our peculiar domestic institutions, and they will perceive that we are correct. Many become slaveholders, and those who do not are always found in hearty unison of opinion and policy with those who do. Opinion, on this and all sectional questions,

is bred of habit. In South Carolina, out of a population of 668,507, there are only 25,596 who are not slave owners. But is the opinion of the remainder of its population unsound for that reason? The moral power, which can be exercised by Southern sentiment, increases with every man who makes his dwelling within the limits of a slave State, wherever he is found. We may go farther, and say that the complete identification of opinion with the institutions of a slave State is easier with a naturalized citizen, than with one born at the North. To the latter, a Southern home is too often but the mere workshop in which he toils for the accumulation of fortune. He looks to close his days in affluence among the New England hills, or in the fertile plains of western New York. But the foreigner, who makes America his home, casts no look behind him. He has moved, once and for ever, his household gods.

If the opinion of the foreign population be sound upon the question which most concerns us, it is idle to say that its mere labor competes injuriously with that which we commonly employ. There can be no competition in the great majority of the Southern States between slave and white labor, whether the latter be foreign or domestic. Nature has settled that question in a manner too decided to admit of argument. White labor in the Southern States must find channels of industry, other than the manual culture of the soil. The great staples must be gathered by the hands that now harvest them. But there is no lack of other pathways for the industry of a far larger white population than we possess. Our resources can be infinitely increased, and we can add to that positive element of political power which consists in the accession of numbers to our white population. We can train and educate in the school of our social sympathies those who are to be the settlers of those sister western States, on whose conduct towards us, in years to come, our relation to, or perspective place in the Union, will altogether depend. Men are like grains of wheat. They yield for him in whose fields they are sown. If the seeds of foreign emigration are scattered broadcast in Northern furrows, there will grow up a class which will have no sympathies at all with the South. If they are sown in Southern

fields, there will arise a generation in whom we and our children can place implicit trust. They will be of ourselves. Let us see whether there are not statistical facts to show that we are correct in this idea.

There are now residing in slaveholding States 378,205 persons who were born in foreign countries, and in the non-slaveholding States, 1,886,397 of the same class. Why do we dread the influence of this large mass of men at the North, and remain wholly free from alarm as to the opinion of the considerable number at the South? The answer is obvious. *It is because they are at the North.* It is because they are receiving, day by day, Northern training, and being acclimated into Northern industrial theories. If they were all at the South, they would be of us, as the 378,205 are of us, and their children would be united to our children in the strong bonds of a common interest, and we would present to the next generation a very different phalanx from that which our numbers shall exhibit when this vast increase of population, then converted into a native population, takes its root upon the side of the North and its interests.

We say at this point to those who may regard these remarks as approaching too nearly to a support of one of the existing party divisions of the day, that their minds need not be troubled.—*They* argue upon the evils of existing foreign population. *We* pass over this phase of the question, and ask them to regard the position of the Southern country, in which they and we were born, when this population becomes in its turn native. Our inquiry is not as to the manner in which we shall demean ourselves to the foreign-born population, but how we shall best increase our native-born white population in the Southern States? The true question is not whether we like *acorns*, but whether *oaks* are needful to us? If they are, we can dispense with our objections to acorns, if we have any. If Southern men can discover any mode of equaling the stride made by the North in physical power, except by taking means to provide for a rapid increase of population in their several States, we are at a loss to know how it can be done. We must look this question boldly in the face. If we imagine that we need population to insure our equality

in that territory which is the property of the North and South alike, *we must have population*. If children enough are not born to us, we must adopt them into our Southern republican families of States. If, on the other hand, we believe that we shall be content to see the territories supplied from the excess of Northern population, native or emigrant, we can do no better than advocate the haughty policy of the exclusion of the foreign-born citizens from among us. For can there be any thing more certain than, if the majority of settlers in the territories are from the non-slaveholding States, that the States which are formed from them will apply for admission as non-slaveholding States?

So strongly are we impressed by the results which are effected by the mere principle of association, that we believe that the whole character of the institutions of the States to be created in the western territories, would be changed if the tide of emigration from foreign lands flowed through the slave States, instead of through the non-slaveholding States. It is for this reason that we deprecate that immediate transfer of those colonies at once to the wilderness from the vessels in which they have arrived. If there is any evil in emigration, it is manifested when we convert it into a plan of colonization. And yet we are prone to encourage this system, without considering that persons so situated carry with them habits and theories of labor which may, in the end, militate against the results which our political safety obliges us to provide for. We are apt to think that we have done wisely, when we allow the stream to pass through the slave States, as through a barrier of rock, whose hard outlines it cannot change, to pour itself out upon the broad plains of the West. We should act more wisely to turn it into our own soil, if we desire it to bear into the land whither it flows, something of the elements of that soil and of the structure of our system.

If we do not take this course, the result is inevitable. The slave States will be hemmed in on every side, before fifty years have gone, with a cordon of non-slaveholding States. There will be no avenue left open in the country, no dwelling for him whose property consists of blacks. Fanaticism will attain a more fearful development from this vast aggregation of opinion in the

majority of the States. Those rights, which we have hitherto barely maintained, will be legislated out of existence, or set at defiance by the uncontrolled public opinion of surrounding States. We will be left to maintain, as we may, the safety of our domestic institutions, against fanatical outcries and dangerous emissaries. We shall endure that oppression which the indirect means of financial legislation can bring upon us, as effectually as the enactment of laws designed for that end.

Yet it may be that the most liberal policy, which we, as a Southern people, can adopt, will not change the ratio in population between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States, which has subsisted since the formation of the government. We are bound, however, to say that the importance of this so-called foreign element in our people has been vastly over-rated in political dissensions, necessary as it is to consider it. Estimating the survivors in 1850 of all the emigrants who have arrived in this country since 1790, and their descendants, and the whole number scattered through the States and territories of the Union, does not exceed, 3,050,000, or 3,200,000. We shall not repeat here the lucid analysis of De Bow. The reader is referred for it to his compendium of the census. But it is certain, from the census, that the per centage existing in the various sections of the State, does not afford the least reason for apprehension on the part of those who most desire to retain, unimpaired, the unity of the American character, and the integrity of the American system. The foreign population is only 12 per cent. of the population of the Eastern States. It is only 19 per cent. of the population of the middle States, where it has principally centred. It is only one per cent. and a fraction of the population of the Southern States. It is only five per cent. and a fraction of the population of the South-western States. It is only twelve per cent. and a fraction of the population of the North-western States and territories. In all the States, to express its relation in the precise figures, the foreign population is to the nation in the proportion of 12:85.

We may, if we please, and with great propriety, take pains to enforce the exclusion from this emigration, in future, of all who

are a mere charge on the body politic, whether their numbers be considerable or inconsiderable. We may complain, justly, of the laxity of legislation in past time upon this subject. But when we hear arguments, based upon the idea that this per centage of population is fraught with any danger to our institutions, we can but smile at the fear which such a method of argument would endeavor to excite. For our own part, we are disposed to take a broader and more comprehensive view. We feel that the 2,244,648 of foreign birth, who are now living upon this soil, are not here without rendering substantial return in the cultivation of the soil, and in the progress of our whole industrial career. We feel that we are, to the extent of that addition to our number, physically stronger. We feel that we are at a point of relative power at which, except for this accession to our numerical strength, we should not stand. If there is any advantage in physical power, let us not put away the means by which we have, in any degree, attained it. The nations of Europe have not stood still since 1790, but certainly it is a matter of just pride with us that we have far outstripped their progress. Let us remember that we have grown strong, in part, at their expense. Russia, Great Britain, France, and Austria yet outmeasure our resources in men—who are the true treasures of a State. There will be time enough to close the gates when we are as strong within our borders as those nations are within their own. If Prussia tells us, with pride, that her population increased from 1786 until 1849, from 6,000,000 to 16,331,187,—if Russia shows an increase from 27,400,000 in 1783, to 62,080,000 in 1850,—if Great Britain is content with advancing from 15,800,000 in 1801, to 27,475,271 in 1851,—if Austria is satisfied with a progress from 23,500,000 in 1792, to 36,514,397 in 1851,—if France enters, with cheerfulness, upon exhausting wars, because her population has increased from 21,769,000 in 1763, to 35,783,170 in 1851, what may we not say where population has increased from 3,929,827 in 1790, to 23,191,877 in 1840? Our per centage of increase per annum is 8.17. That of Prussia, the next highest, has been only 2.73. That of Russia has been 1.89. That of Great Britain has been 1.48. That of Austria

has been 0.94. That of France has been 0.72. Shall we not take a pride in this superior increase of our own people? Let us rather consider that, in the year 1950, if the rate of our increase of population progress at the average of annual increase since 1790, we shall number 450,000,000 of souls. A child that is now born may see that day, but notwithstanding the magnificent ideal which we evoke when we consider such a spectacle, we doubt if it ever is witnessed. The world has never seen such multitudes gathered together under one peaceful rule; and we do not believe it ever will. The child is doubtless born who will see, with dim eyes, what manner of earth it will be one hundred years from hence; but it is expecting more than the heart of man dares to hope for to believe that he will behold so many millions of freemen gathered together under the shelter of one republican government. We may utter our "*esto perpetua*," but it is a vain prayer.

If these figures, and all the estimates of De Bow, as to the greatness which our population may attain in the next hundred years, alarm any inquirer, and he be disposed to fear the results of emigration in so far as it shall add to this enormous mass of people, let us consider what course a man of sound worldly prudence would take to prevent probable evils. We cannot prevent the coming of emigrants if they are of good character and able to take care of themselves, and if they become amenable to our laws. Congress could not restrain the entrance of such into our domain if it would, and it would not, we trust, if it could. Since we must receive them, how shall we demean ourselves towards them? Will we prosper most if we isolate ourselves from them by withholding in all their life-time, or during the greater part of their lives, all political privileges, or if we admit them, after due probation, into political communion and fellowship with us? To our mind, the answer is easy. Unless we desire that we should have among ourselves a large class, whose only sympathy with our government is the mere protection which it affords to their property,—unless we are content to see a generation of fathers, aliens to the end of their days, the instructors of their children, who are to share with us the government of the land,—we will

not enter upon any radical alteration of the present system. The great alteration, as we repeat, which we should endeavor to bring about, is in the relative population of the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States. It may be well said that our children, grown more secure in their tenure of a just share in the possessions of their common country, because the Southern States have grown more potent in physical strength, will thank us if we add to their numbers the children of other fathers, born in distant lands, but whose bones repose beside our own.

ARTICLE II.—*The History of Napoleon Bonaparte.* By JOHN S. C. ABBOTT. With maps and illustrations. 2 vols. Harper & Brothers, 1855.

A MODERN book is a very complex affair, and the review of it a complicated operation. It consists primarily of matter and mode: of thoughts or things to be communicated, and the vehicle through which the communication is sought to be effected. Of these grand components it is not easy to decide which is the most important to the composition. At first sight we might suppose that the value of a book depends upon what is written by the author, and doubtless this has a great deal to do with it, but upon a little reflection we are led to question whether, regarding the practical usefulness of the publication, the other element of the work is not equally important. A book may be fairly considered useless, if people cannot read it, and not less so, if when read, they cannot understand it. Nor is the real value much enhanced, when, the reading being possible, and the matter intelligible, people will not read it. Books may then be classified somewhat after the following fashion. Those that people cannot read, of which we have innumerable specimens, in the cheap yellow-covered literature of the day, which vagrant multitudes stare at in railroad cars and equine vehicles, or through the orange-colored flicker of tallow candles, in the upper chambers where young America gorges itself with the forbidden fruit, under the auspices of the old, yet far from superannuated serpent. The intense effort of optical concentra-

tion, by which only and uncertainly one overcomes the obstruction which the inhuman publishers of this sort of book throw between the author and the gazer, cannot be called reading. Among this class too we must place the miniature editions, when a chapter is concentrated upon a page, and perusal elevated to a feat of microscopy. Here too we must assign a place for those books which serve to enlighten us upon nothing but our ignorance, concealing all that the reader wishes to decipher under French and Italian quotations. These last are an utter abomination. If a man expects us to read his book, the least he can be expected to do is to address us in our own language. To take it for granted that we have a universal knowledge of foreign tongues, is expecting rather too much. Few of us understand any language but one, and not many of us are proficient in that. It is monstrous to tantalize our awakened appetite with successive encounters of all Babeldom. Even supposing that we can comprehend all the civilized languages, and are perfect in Greek and Latin, why too are we expected to be skillful in Syriac and Gipsev?

A second class may be made of books that people can read but cannot understand. Of these we may make two subdivisions consisting respectively of those which the author does not understand himself, and of such as through obscurity of revelation are not intelligible to others. The former subdivision embraces most of the works on metaphysics, including a large component of theology, and the latter comprehends a very considerable part of those publications vulgarly called "scientific," the language of which is not yet determined by lexicographers, and goes by the name of "technical." This subdivision, however, is exceedingly large, and embraces varieties far too numerous to mention.

Then we have books which people will not read. Many of these are excellent in matter and perspicuous in manner, but they are not adapted to the present exiguity of human life and the possibilities of reading opportunity, or if not too long, they are too heavy. Solid aliment is very desirable, but it is not, in a state of nature, palatable. If we wished to seduce a child from confectionery to beef, we would not set him down to a raw quarter. Good food requires cooking and flavoring and serving. So with

aliment for the mind. Bulky knowledge must be minced and spiced. It must be attractive as well as nutritious; digestible as well as solid. There are volumes of close, concentrated wisdom, which an ordinary man would no more sit down to consume, than he would a whole cheese.

There are a great many books which people ought not to read. We cannot attempt to specify these. They include all those after the reading of which a man is nothing the better in body, soul or spirit. Books frivolous, books sensual, books devilish.

There are books which men ought to read. Books which instruct in arts and sciences; which convey knowledge of men and things; which innocently entertain and amuse; which enlighten the mind, or make better the heart. There are many, very many of these, and their number increases daily; faster indeed than men can read them. If we are not wise in our generation, it is not because we have not the means of knowledge.

But to what class of works must we assign the History of Bonaparte, by John S. C. Abbott? A lawyer once, to a query as to the character of his client, replied that "it was rather miscellaneous." A description which we may apply to Mr. Abbott's book. It is rather "miscellaneous." A good history it certainly is not. We doubt whether it can properly be considered a history at all. It is a collection of matters concerning Napoleon Bonaparte, gathered from indiscriminate sources, and assorted into eulogistic annals, with just as much remark by the author as will serve as mortar for cementing or daubing it over. Of the calmness of the historian we find nothing in the book, of the zeal of the ardent admirer we find abundance. Of philosophy there is none; of sincerity, amiability and generous sympathy, a great deal.

While, however, we are obliged to assign Mr. Abbott a place among historians, lower than that occupied by Thucydides and Tacitus, Gibbon and Hume, we are by no means disposed to deny him considerable merit. We are indebted to him for the best book about Bonaparte that has ever been written. Take it altogether, one can get more truth out of it than out of the partisan volumes of Scott or Alison, or any of the French who have written upon the acts of Napoleon. Mr. Abbott had not a country to defend,

nor an enemy to traduce. He was at liberty to make up his own opinion of Bonaparte from the facts and pleadings familiar to the world. Long arraigned at the bar of opinion, accused of all crimes, denied all virtues, the illustrious prisoner of vindictive kings took a last appeal to history, and died. Time has been given for the production of all testimony that could bear upon the case. It is plain that no more evidence is to be obtained, and now history will, as he prophesied, do Bonaparte justice. Mr. Abbott's book is an essay towards it, and the favor with which it has been received by the American public is an evidence that in the minds of the only people who can exercise a candid judgment, Bonaparte has already been acquitted of the gross charges laid against him. We do not hesitate to say that reading and reflective men think better of Napoleon now than they ever did before; and this book, after making full allowances for its imperfections, will exercise, and properly exercise, a wide and permanent influence in fixing the just position of the great Emperor among the heroes of history.

The book is well printed. It can be read without torture. It is furnished with a number of little maps as good as the publisher could afford, which help the reader to form some wrong notions of the geography of campaigns. But wrong notions are better than none. They enable us at any rate to get rid of the battalions confusedly wheeling through our heads, and transfer them to some objective arena. The illustrations, for the beauty of which the author returns thanks to the artist, are certainly extraordinary, both in design and execution. Their value to the publishers will undoubtedly prove considerable, from their remarkable scope of adaptedness. They can be used for any book which it may be desirable to decorate with hind quarters of horses, fur-faced men, two women and a baby. They will do for all battles, victories and retreats. The artist has so carefully kept out of view any thing which could give a local character to the pictures, that they would be equally "beautiful" any where. At present we are only apprised of their meaning by the words printed below; change the words, and we would be equally satisfied with the illustration. The storming of the Tuilleries shows a long building, surrounded

by a thick cane-brake, through which quite a number of people and the upper part of a horse are endeavoring to penetrate; an operation contemplated by a man lounging against a lamp-post, who, we understand, is Napoleon, and a little boy who has comfortably impaled himself on the railing. Napoleon ascending the Alps is illustrated by some snowy peaks and two pine bushes. In front of these we have a consumptive-looking man, mounted on a mule, which, judging from the harness, he has just taken from a cart. A little in advance, and to one side, we are startled by one of the strangest figures ever put on canvas. It seems to consist of the upper part of a man, resting on the legs of some hairy beast, which bear to each other the most extraordinary position known in natural history. One of them seems fixed, while the other is capable of a revolving motion around it. The straddle, as presented in the "illustration," would be alarming, were we looking at a man. "Marmont arresting the return of the troops," suggests no idea except that of a mounted officer giving orders. The only remarkable thing in it is the marshal's horse, which seems, like Baron Munchausen's, to have become a conduit for water, a jet of which has taken the place of his tail. The bombardment of Copenhagen is represented by a building knocked to pieces, a woman supinate, and half a man pronate, with the dim outline of a ship in the distance. The "sun of Austerlitz" looks like a horse-race in the dark of the evening. A "charge of cavalry" is indescribable. We never knew before that in the onset it was customary for the men to hide themselves in their helmets and present nothing but crests and horse tails. The only battle scene which gives us some notion of a real fight, is the fisticuff between Caulaincourt and Abbe de Pradt. This is fully within the powers of the artist, and he has presented it with spirit. It moves the feelings far more than the passage of Tagliamento, where the army seems to be taking a foot bath with boots on, or the bridge of Lodi, where a number of ugly fellows with muskets seem to be chasing a long-legged scamp who is running off with a flag, and endeavoring to protect his rear with a sword which he holds by the blade. Of all things we should suppose it most easy to delineate a ruined castle. Any child's drawing book would

furnish a pattern, but "The Ruins of Dierstein" are represented after a fashion entirely unique in this line. The "illustration" consists of two prominent figures on two prominent horses, with cavalry hieroglyphics behind. The horses are the most remarkable animals of the kind, except Marshal Marmont's, that we have ever examined. One of them seems to be making an effort to hand up his left foot to the other, while he scornfully turns his head away. He has in the meantime so disposed his own legs as to make room for an artillery wagon, if necessary, to pass between them. On the left is seen a post and rail fence of two bars' height. Beyond this, in the distance, is a dim outline of most amorphous magnitude. All the lower part consists of a smear with an oval hole in it. Out of this has sprouted an upright, sustaining, after a manner unknown to builders, a mass of masonry with another hole in it, and from this is projected a tolerable chimney. Here we have a beautiful illustration of a "Gothic ruin."

Now it may be said in defence of the artist that it is impossible for any man to represent great military operations on a few square inches of paper; that it is impossible to depict battles at all, and that as to the things that could have been depicted, the cost of plates properly designed and executed would have been too great for such a publication as this. Very well, but why then attempt to "illustrate" at all? Why compel the purchaser to pay for such delineations as only degrade the subjects attempted to be displayed? Why make a child's toy-book of the history of Napoleon? We are heartily tired of these catch-penny "illustrations." They are the disgrace of modern book-making. They are bitter sarcasms upon the purchasers of books, and the most of it is we are obliged to pay for them. If Messrs. Harpers "calculated" that people would buy these books for the sake of the "pictures," they certainly catered for infantile intellects.

As to the style of Mr. Abbott, it belongs to the *modern intense*. Upon the whole it is not bad of its kind. The reader can always understand what Mr. Abbott means, and this we consider worthy of particular mention to his credit. There is rather more poetry than is necessary, considering the bulk of the volume, but then

Mr. Abbott is constitutionally sentimental, and sentiment sells well. There is a good deal more describing than description, painting than pictures. Of military operations Mr. Abbott evidently has no more definite idea than ourselves. His notion of battles is decidedly Homeric, making allowance for the noise and confusion of modern warfare. The description of one is in all essentials the description of all. "Guns, trumpets, blunderbusses, drums and thunder," are the staple elements. We look in vain for the intellectual of the fight. We are abundantly satisfied that in any given case the men fired muskets and cannon; ran at one another with bayonets, and rode at each other with sabres. We are convinced that, as the result of such proceedings, blood was shed, men and horses maimed and killed, and that at the conclusion the survivors on both sides were very tired and hungry. So much is clearly made out, and abundantly enforced by the use of all the available adjectives in the language. In these respects all battles are much alike; and the essentials of the description would not much differ whether the combatants be dogs or men. But the battles of men are contests of mind, to which animal strife is merely accident. With Mr. Abbott all is "booming" and "galloping." The battle of Austerlitz was certainly won by the superior generalship of Napoleon, and coming to the narrative of it, the reader naturally expects to learn something about the manœuvres by which the victory was achieved. But Mr. Abbott merely informs him that "every officer knew the part he was to perform," for which assurance we are duly thankful. He informs us also that the "stars were in their appointed place in the sky," so that *their* position is intelligible enough, but where any of the divisions of the army were placed, except that Soult's was "in the bottom of a valley," we are not told. Things being thus satisfactorily arranged, the artillery began "booming;" "the marshals galloped in *all* directions to head their respective corps," the position of which we may now begin to suppose was rather universal. Napoleon "plunged his spurs into his steed," and "galloped" too. In ten lines the battle is won. "With resistless impetuosity the solid columns of the French pierced the weakened centre of the allies. The conflict was desperate and

most sanguinary, but nothing could resist the headlong valor of the assailants. The allied army was pierced and cut entirely in twain. Horsemen and footmen were trampled beneath the tread of the proud victors. The field was filled with a rabble of fugitives flying in wild dismay, as the cavalry of the imperial guard rode over them and sabred them mercilessly. Napoleon, leaving a few battalions to prevent the right wing from coming to the rescue of the left, turned with nearly his whole force upon the left and destroyed it. He then directed the terrible onset upon the right wing of the allies, and it was no more." This settlement with the right wing beats "*Veni, vidi, vici*" all hollow! It was "boomed" and "galloped" into nonentity. So much for *Austerlitz*. Strip the narrative of its verbiage, and it amounts to this. The Russians marching to outflank Napoleon weakened their centre. The French charged and broke through it and successively beat the separated wings. Whether they did this by "booming" or "galloping" is immaterial. This is really all that Mr. Abbott tells us about the battle. The battle of *Castiglione* seems to have been won by Napoleon's horsemanship after the following fashion. Long before the morning dawned, the French army was again in motion. Napoleon, urging his horse to the very utmost of his speed, rode in every direction to accelerate the movement of his troops. The peril was too imminent to allow him to trust any one else with the execution of his all-important orders. Five horses successively sank dead beneath him from utter exhaustion. Napoleon was every where, observing all things, directing all things, animating all things, (except horses.) The whole army was inspired with the indomitable energy and ardor of their young leader. Soon the two hostile hosts were facing each other in the dim and misty haze of the early dawn, ere the sun had risen to look down upon the awful scene of man's depravity about to ensue. A sanguinary and decisive conflict, renowned in history as the battle of *Castiglione*, inflicted the final blow upon the Austrians. They were routed with terrible slaughter. We are told that such amazing victories were to be attributed entirely to the "genius of the conqueror," but really it would be interesting to see that genius doing something else in the matter than "gallop-

ing every where," killing horses, giving orders and "executing" them himself.

Other battles are disposed of after the same fashion, and we will not weary our readers with more specimens than we have given. To an intellectual man there may be gratification and advantage in contemplating the wise plans, the instinctive decisions and superior conduct of great generals. We may therefore properly seek for all available information upon such subjects, and to this end the narrative of campaigns and descriptions of battles should mainly be directed. Unless this kind of information be afforded by the historian, the less he says about battles the better. They are the disgrace of mankind, and present spectacles which, if seen aright, must cause unmitigated disgust. Mr. Abbott expresses proper sentiments upon this subject, and so far he is worthy of commendation. He frequently calls attention to the horrors of war, and attempts to paint its frightful scenes in proper colors. As a specimen of his feelings and teachings on this subject, we give the following comment on the battle of Marengo.

"If war has its chivalry and its pageantry, it has its revolting hideousness and demoniac woe. The young, the noble, the sanguine were writhing there in agony. Bullets respect not beauty. They tear out the eye and shatter the jaw, and rend the cheek and transform the human face divine into an aspect upon which one cannot gaze but with horror. From the field of Marengo many a young man returned to his home so mutilated as no longer to be recognized by friends, and passed a weary life in repulsive deformity. Mercy abandons the arena of battle. The frantic war-horse with iron hoof tramples upon the mangled face, the throbbing and inflamed wounds, the splintered bones, and heeds not the shriek of torture. Crushed into the bloody mire by the ponderous wheels of heavy artillery, the victim of barbaric war thinks of mother and father and sister and home, and shrieks and moans, and dies. His body is stripped by the vagabonds who follow the camp: his naked, mangled corpse is covered with a few shovelfuls of earth and left as food for vultures and for dogs, and he is forgotten for ever, and it is called *glory*. He who loves war for the sake of its excitements, its pageantry and its fancied glory, is the most eminent of all the dupes of folly and sin."

This is true enough and a great deal more of the same kind of truth may be gathered from the scenes of march and battle, victory and retreat. We wish that Mr. Abbott himself had forgotten all the nonsense about the "chivalry and pageantry" of war, and only remembered its "revolting hideousness and demoniac woe." His book would be all the better for the absence of his melo-dramatic descriptions of battles. It is true that they may be attractive to big boys and little men, and the book may sell the better for Mr. Abbott's martial word-painting, "galloping" and "booming." But all this sort of uninstrucive grandiloquence fans the "military ardor," as it is called, of young readers; a kind of ardor which seldom ends in much good to any body. War should be exhibited as it really is, stripped of all its "fuss and feathers." We would not allow it a helmet nor a horse-tail. Officers should ride horses, not "steeds," and they should use their spurs without "plunging." Artillery should never "boom" if we could help it, and not a particle of sun or moon or stars should be bestowed on an army more than would barely suffice to do their butcherly work by. It is time for sober men to destroy the fatal fascination of soldiering which has so long dazzled the fancy of the young, and made war popular in the earth. An army going forth to war marches with the deliberate purpose of breaking every law which subjects men to God and relates them to one another. Except in the clearest case of necessary defence, war is utterly abominable, and when, through the ungovernable wickedness of others, men are compelled to leave pursuits, properly human, to engage in deadly conflict, they should do so with humiliation and sorrow. Fields of battle should be as abhorrent as places of execution, and battle itself, if described at all, should be described under the influence of profound disgust. Mr. Abbott deserves no more blame for his manner of recounting battles than others; we wish that he had so written as to deserve much less. Napoleon and the Archduke Charles might have taught him better. It is true that Mr. Abbott often remarks upon the horrors of war, but we are sorry that he did not strip it of all but its horrors, for this is all that is essential to it. The very courage of the combatants is horrid. Recklessness of life displays an utter ignorance or disregard of its nature, pur-

poses and end. It is a complete abandonment of the intellectual and the moral to the brutal. For a man, fully aware of the importance of his present being, to surrender it for wise and useful purposes, is gloriously heroic, but to throw life away in pursuit of "blood, brandy and free quarters," or to risk it in hope of worldly distinction, is the extreme of folly and wickedness. Why dueling between two men should be so abhorrent to the moral sense, and fighting between nations so gratifying to beholders, it is difficult to ascertain. Yet would Mr. Abbott describe a duel in which the bowels of one man were torn out, and a limb of the other fractured, with any thing of the same spirit with which he tells us of Eckmuhl or Marengo?

Yet why decorate the shambles where men slaughter men without the excuse, wretched as it is, of personal animosity, and pour out unmeasured contempt and indignation upon individual combats? Is it because in the one instance the combatants wear showy uniforms, and march to the music of regimental bands, and do their horrid work with "booming" and "galloping" and "spur-plunging," while in the other they go to the place of meeting in a hackney coach, and strip off their coats and use fire-arms of small calibre, which kill without any "booming?" What an incurable baby is man, after time and teaching have done their best for him! We do not mean to deal harshly with Mr. Abbott; he has exhibited, as we have already shown, a great deal of good sense and good feeling on the subject of war. Perhaps, as he wrote to the order of a publisher, and for a market, he could not have done otherwise than he did. We regret that he did not pursue another plan of publication which would have permitted entire independence in the construction of his work.

In judging of this book, however, the test question is whether the author has formed and presented to his readers a correct idea of Napoleon. Our decision must be a mixed verdict. In most respects we think that Mr. Abbott has formed a correct opinion of the character and qualities of the great emperor, in some respects we think he has erred. Mr. Abbott's estimate can more easily be expressed than understood. He thinks that Napoleon was perfect in mind, body and spirit. The necessary conditions of humanity

being given, required to find a perfect specimen. This was the problem which Mr. Abbott has patiently and zealously attempted to work out through thirteen hundred pages, and he evidently is satisfied that he has found the result in Napoleon Bonaparte. Now we confess that we are *almost* of the same opinion as Mr. Abbott, but not quite. Intellectually we fully agree with him, that Napoleon has exhibited the highest human excellence. We have looked in vain over the records of the great to find any at all comparable to the Corsican, in mental activity and force. We estimate mind by its capacity to do ; for we value nothing that does nothing. There have been many who, in some mental qualities, have surpassed Napoleon, but greatness does not consist in the magnitude of one faculty, but the full and equable development of all. In many remarkable instances of extraordinary intellectual endowment, one power seems to have grown at the expense of the rest, and the whole mind to have been crippled and deformed by the drawing of all the intelligence to one organ. Great dreamers have proved in action great drivellers. Mathematicians have become mere animated slates and pencils. Personally they are often as helpless as infants. We knew one of them to climb over a half-opened gate. Great poets are notoriously good for nothing in active life. When they do come down from the realms of fancy, they put on "plum-colored coats," like Goldsmith, or encounter desperadoes with rhetoric, like Lamartine. The verdict of the world upon them was well expressed in the reply of one of the Parisian mob to the latter, when he was opposing them by high-flown eloquence. "Thou art but a lyre—go and sing." Brave men may want judgment, as they did. Cool men, whose judgment is always right, may want the personal courage necessary to make their decisions effective. Men admirably endowed with all the qualities which combine to make great generals, have often been found utterly incapable of conducting civil affairs. Their minds need settling by the sound of a drum, and without it they are confused and uncertain in their operations. Great statesmen often want the qualities which only can give their measures popularity. Many know *things*, but are ignorant of men, and defeat their own objects by the selection of wrong in-

struments of action. It is exceedingly unusual for the highest qualities of body and mind to be united in one person, and the chances of organization become almost infinitesimal, when it is required that corresponding moral conditions shall accompany such rare mental and physical endowments.

The world has seen but very few of such men. In modern history we can name but two, and both have been, from the necessity of things, great military leaders, and what historians call usurpers. In both of these men, the working qualities of mind and body were wonderfully combined. In both the moral qualities were very similar and very good. Cromwell was in many respects a Napoleon; subjected to a different training, and living under different circumstances. He possessed a similar gravity of mind, clearness of judgment, resoluteness of purpose, self-reliance in action, bodily endurance and physical courage. As a soldier, he was not inferior, at least upon the scale on which he fought. As a statesman, he was wiser, because more moderate. As a man, he was better, because the powerful influences of a realizing faith, never entirely quiescent, were commonly paramount in the control and direction of his life. Bonaparte acted upon a wider sphere, and under far less favorable circumstances. Cromwell was but the exponent of the serious and resolute mind of the true English nation; Bonaparte was himself the mind of France, and all its intellectual and material power was but his exponent. Out of himself there was nothing upon which he could rely. There was no reason by which his own erroneous calculations could be rectified; there was no moral sense by which his deviations from rectitude could be corrected; no fixed principles of government by which supreme power could be restrained or directed; no resolute and certain virtue upon which he could rely for co-operation or defence. Bonaparte found France a national and moral wreck, of which not only the fragments had been separated, but of which the very material was rotten. Like the Jewish state, in the days of Isaiah, "The whole head was sick and the whole heart faint. From the sole of the foot, even unto the head, there was no soundness in it." There was left only appetite and passion and want and power. The Frenchman of that day had no God but instinct, no heaven

beyond the Palais Royal, no law but necessity. The nation consisted of many millions of men like this, and among them all the regenerator of the State sought in vain for coadjutors upon whom he could safely rely. Where selfishness reigned supreme and universal, it was useless to seek for true patriotism or personal fidelity. He who came to renew this dead France, came alone with only the power God had given him. He dwelt solitary in his awful ascendancy. He toiled to raise the shattered fragments around him, knowing that the mighty levers with which he worked had their counter pressure on rottenness. All about his throne was hollow. Insincerity and treachery were the honors of his court, ambition and covetousness and jealousy were the uniforms of his marshals. He could not know that the wife of his bosom was true to his confidence; he did know that his ministers were not. Man cannot endure absolute isolation of heart, and Bonaparte did trust. Some of his chosen friends were taken from him in the days of his prosperity. In the honor of human nature we claim the benefit of charity, and suppose that had they lived to be tempted as others, they would have been more faithful than they, but there is little in the history of the dark time to confirm the supposition. Never before in the annals of ingratitude was recorded such shameless desertion as the abandonment of Napoleon by those on whose fealty he had rested. Civilians and soldiers, statesmen and household domestics struggled with each other in the hurry to desert him. The worst of all was that Napoleon had never been taught to seek help from God. He knew nothing of the only "rock" upon which his feet might have rested in confidence. He had never been led to form a dependence upon that Friend who never deserts the man who trusts in him. His reason never leaned on the Great Jehovah. His conscience was not formed under the eye of the Searcher of hearts. His hopes had never been allured to the eternal and sufficient good. He knew of nothing better than the world around him. Deceitful as he knew it to be, he built upon it. As man never built before, he builded. Patiently, and carefully, and resolutely, and laboriously he reared a structure of glory and power, such as never before grew up under the hand of an architect of empire, and then the storm came, and it all went down, and left

not a "rack behind." The great Napoleon failed, only because it is not given to man to create good out of evil. Out of moral corruption even he could not educe national strength and enduring government. Others have tried since his day, others are trying and others will try again, and the result will be the same. Individual virtue is the only security for national prosperity, and an open Bible and free conscience are the only immovable cornerstones of governmental superstructure. That Bonaparte did not perceive this truth, is one of the facts which show that even his judgment was imperfect, or rather that personal ambition clouded his understanding. Bonaparte wished to reign supreme. Endowed as he was, could he have continued for ever, there was no wrong to France in this purpose. But he not only would reign supreme himself, but he desired to found a dynasty which should inherit and maintain his supremacy. To be human is to be inconsistent; and in none is folly so glaring as when exhibited by the wise. A much inferior man to Bonaparte might have discerned and escaped this folly. Of great men even the mistakes are great. To him it could not matter, though the freest institutions had been given to France. He must have ruled it, from the necessity of its wants and the prerogative of his superior nature. There was no need of despotism to make him despotic. No other man in his presence would have presumed to equality, much less to authority. But free christianity is incompatible with all those schemes of masterhood which enable common men to domineer over the multitudes they cannot govern, and Bonaparte saw that he could not bequeath his throne to his family and the Bible to his people. He preferred to bequeath a throne, and the God whom he thus mocked cast him out of it before his time. Others have followed since, and strangely enough they have severally committed the same error, and met the same fate. The present occupant is the most absurd of all, and may be reserved for the most signal rebuke.

It is true that Bonaparte defended himself upon the ground that the religion of Rome was so strong in the heart of the people that even he durst not encounter it, farther than he did. To this we have only to reply that all the facts of history are against the belief

of it. The revolutionary government found the ancient faith no obstacle to the pillage and murder of its priests. Bonaparte found it offer no defence to the person and royalties of the Pope. It is plain enough that Napoleon was successfully tempted to perpetuate the exclusiveness of the Romish church, by his estimate of the advantages to be derived from it, in the maintenance of his dynasty. He sold the religious liberty of his people for the vain hope of a "mess of pottage" to be eaten by his son, but which was actually handed to Charles the 10th and Louis Philippe, both of which amiable Bourbons, thank heaven, scalded their mouths with it, as Napoleon the little is likely to do.

But though we utterly condemn the conduct of Bonaparte in this awful act of soul robbery, and in every other part of his grand transgression,—the scheme and work for a dynasty,—we would not draw hasty conclusions from it, against his character as a man. Bonaparte, like other men, must be judged by a standard relative, not absolute. We must never forget the circumstances when we would estimate the character. Mr. Abbott expresses himself on this point forcibly enough in his prose ballad style. At that time he had few thoughts of any glory but military glory. Young men were taught that the only path to renown was to be found through fields of blood. All the peaceful arts of life which tend to embellish the world with competence and refinement were despised. He only was the chivalric gentleman whose career was marked by conflagrations and smouldering ruins, by the despair of the maiden, the tears and woe of widows and orphans, and by the shrieking of the wounded and the dying. Such was the school in which Napoleon was trained. The writings of Voltaire and Rousseau had taught France that the religion of Jesus Christ was but a fable; that the idea of accountability at the bar of God was a foolish superstition; that death was a sleep from which there was no waking; that life itself was so worthless a thing, that it was a matter of the most trivial importance how soon its vapor should pass away.

These peculiarities in the education of Napoleon must be taken into account in forming a correct estimate of his character. It could hardly be said that he was educated in a christian land.

France renounced christianity and plunged into the blackest of pagan darkness, without any religion, and without a God. Though the altars of religion were not, at the time, entirely swept away, they were thoroughly undermined by the torrent of infidelity which in crested billows was surging over the land. Napoleon had but little regard for the lives of others, and still less for his own. He never commanded the meanest soldier to go where he was not willing to lead him. Having never been taught any correct ideas of probation or retribution, the question whether a few thousand illiterate peasants should eat, drink and sleep for a few years, more or less, was in his view of little importance, compared with those great measures of political wisdom which should meliorate the condition of Europe for ages.

It is Christianity alone which stamps importance upon each individual life, and which invests the apparent trivialities of time with the sublimities of eternity. It is indeed strange that Napoleon, graduating at the schools of infidelity and of war, should have cherished so much of the spirit of humanity, and should have formed so many just conceptions of right and wrong. It is indeed strange that, surrounded by so many allurements to entice him to voluptuous indulgence and self-abandonment, he should have retained a character so immeasurably superior, in all moral worth, to that of nearly all the crowned heads who occupied the thrones around him. This is all true enough, as to the sentiment, and is not far wrong as to the fact. We would have liked it better if Mr. Abbott could have stopped for a little while the "shrieking" of his "wounded," who seem to do an unnecessary amount of it. If he had put out the "conflagration" and dismissed his "widows and orphans," it would have been gratifying. Our sensibilities will not endure such eternal screaming and sobbing. Will Mr. Abbott also do us the favor to leave the "crested billows" out of the next edition; they are entirely supernumeraries to a "torrent" which can do its "surging," if it must do it, without these time-honored appendages of oceans.

We think that Mr. Abbott has rather exhibited Napoleon here in a worse character than is strictly just. We do not think that even as a soldier he was reckless of life. He was charged with it

by the British, it is true, and so he was with every thing else that is evil. But it cannot be shown that Napoleon ever threw away his troops on mad adventures. However daring his movements, the fact that they were generally successful, is the best evidence that they were prudent. The number slain in the most desperate charge is small, compared to the waste of life in protracted operations. The conquest of Italy cost far less to the French than the unprofitable siege of Sebastopol has already cost the British. The bridge of Lodi, with all its important consequences, cost at the most three or four thousand men; about as many as the "allies" recently lost in the unsuccessful assault of a single tower of Sebastopol. Bonaparte was too wise to attempt to make war on humane principles. The contest of nations is an awful calamity involving death and devastation. The "sharper the war, the sooner the peace." The more frequent and destructive the battle, the less moral and physical rottenness of the camp. We know of no general who uniformly exhibited such disgust at slaughter as Napoleon did. Familiar as he was with blood; often as he had given the order for movements which must inevitably cause enormous destruction of life; calmly as he could follow columns in their march of death, Bonaparte could never look upon a dead soldier without emotion. The singular rule which he imposed upon himself to ride over the field of battle, immediately after an engagement, was apparently designed to keep up in his mind that sentiment of humanity which the trade of war so commonly extinguishes in the breast of the mere soldier. On such occasions we find Napoleon always grave, and often sad. However splendid the victory; however brilliant the result, the inspection of the field of blood was never attended with aught of exultation. The presence of the dead seemed to awe the great mind of the man, and repress the personal triumph of the victor. This retrospect of battle was a painful penance to ambition; that it was salutary we cannot doubt, for it was self-inflicted, and the continuance of the usage showed that the feeling which suggested it was preserved. When, after the battle of Austerlitz, Prince John of Austria sought the victor to ask his mercy, he found him upon the field of battle, superintending the removal of the wounded. With his own hand

he was ministering to their comfort, unwrapping the dead to cover the shivering bodies of the dying, administering cordials to the faint, and encouraging the desponding with words of hope and commendation. Worn down with the herculean exertions of preceding days; oppressed with the overwhelming cares of his vast dominion, and the special demands of the extraordinary exigency, what man but Napoleon would have spent the night of Austerlitz in the personal service of humanity? The thoughtful kindness of his nation is abundantly manifested too in the letters of sympathy which he took time to write, immediately after battles, and when pressed beyond the endurance of any other man by the demands upon his highest qualities. From the field of Arcola he wrote to the widow of a slain officer, "You have lost a husband who was dear to you, and I am bereft of a friend to whom I have long been attached; but our country has suffered more than we both. If it lies within the scope of my ability to yield assistance to yourself or your infant, I beseech you to reckon upon my utmost exertions." Such and many such were the tributes paid to humanity by this terrible chief in the midst of the fatigues and horrors of war. The deep and tender feeling of Napoleon is as well attested as his superiority of genius. His letters to Josephine, alone, are sufficient to exhibit the exquisite sensibility of his heart, while his generosity to rivals in fame, and to enemies of his state and person, has never been surpassed, if equaled, in the history of the great. We could forgive all Mr. Abbott's cotton-lace decoration, on account of his indignant protests against the abominable aspersions of Napoleon's moral character. It is too bad that the British press should so long have been permitted to vilify the great man, whom they hated because they feared him. There is scarcely a conceivable crime with which Bonaparte was not charged, and charged gravely and perseveringly. He was declared to be utterly devoid of conscience or humanity. He was accused of lewdness, not only excessive, but of the most atrocious kind. He was accused of murder in the secret prisons; of poisoning his sick soldiers; of utter hypocrisy and falsehood; of boundless ambition and lust for conquests; of every kind of bitterness that could degrade a man. The whole British people were taught to curse him as an incarnate demon, a mischievous devil, whom it was the

bounden duty of allied nations to beleaguer and circumvent, and chain and kill and damn, with all possible effort and expedition. Incapable of any good, resolute and prolific in all evil, the only question in any given case of conduct was to determine the degree and extent of its iniquity. They watched him with similar candor to that with which the scribes watched our Lord, and, like those ingenious worthies, they argued from his good deeds "that he had a devil."

It is in vain that the British writers have endeavored to perpetuate these falsehoods. While engaged in actual hostilities and suffering the privations and losses incident to war, it was easy to persuade so gullible a people as dwell in the British isles that their enemy was the horned devil, come to torment them before their time; but now that passion has subsided, and the truth has been elicited, the character of the great traduced is daily brightening, while the unjust and selfish conduct of his too successful enemies is assuming its proper aspect.

Bonaparte, though educated in a school which permitted the widest license in the pursuit of pleasure, was, to an extraordinary extent for monarchs, a faithful husband. Kings have long claimed exemption from the strict requirements of matrimonial obligation, and the public opinion of capitals and court circles has always acquiesced in the royal prerogative of adultery. While the British were with all the indignation of outraged virtue accusing Bonaparte of incontinence, their own monarch, George the Fourth, was exhibiting before the world a life, in this respect, unusually scandalous. The conduct of this gracious sovereign, whom the same press that vilified Napoleon delighted to honor, was base, gross and unfeeling, as well as openly indecent and immoral. Wellington was certainly not immaculate in purity, and Nelson carried a mistress with him, in the flag-ship of a British fleet. While Bonaparte was accused of cruelty and perfidy, Nelson and his courtesan were outraging all humanity and decency in the bay of Naples. In profound peace Great Britain bombarded Copenhagen and robbed Denmark of her fleet. In spite of the requirements of a solemn treaty, she refused to surrender Malta. Unquestionably it was the government of Great Britain that made the European war continuous. After all her hypocrit-

ical outcry against the restless ambition and military passion of Napoleon, it is now as clear as noon-day that in all the war against France, England was the aggressor. But for her Europe would have enjoyed the blessings of peace for a great part of the twenty years in which the continent was a camp, and war the occupation of civilized man. It is in vain that the writers and orators of England have so pertinaciously flung upon Napoleon during half a century the onus of the horrible wickedness of this most persevering and ruinous hostility. Even in the midst of the struggle there were Englishmen who could see the truth and declare it. A pamphlet now lies before us, entitled "Considerations on the causes, objects and consequences of the present war, by William Roscoe," published in London, 1808, in which the writer forcibly states the true position of England in her controversy with France. It was the dread of republican sentiments spreading into England and disturbing the serene happiness of the aristocracy, that made Mr. Pitt and his coroneted legislature the inappeasable foes of France. Even in Napoleon, the emperor, they saw a man of the people; a monarch from the commons, and they hated him as much as they feared them. The lust for colonial possessions and the fear of commercial rivalry from peaceful and prosperous France, blinded the merchants and manufacturers of England to the iniquity and ruinous cost of the crusade of the nobles against Napoleon. It was a mean and selfish war; a war for merely material interests, and against the cause of religious and civil liberty. After an expenditure of men which made every cabin in the islands a house of mourning, and a waste of money which to this day, and prospectively for all coming time, has shortened by one-half the loaf on the laborer's table, England ceased from slaughter and contemplated her work. Civil and religious liberty were vanquished in France; the hope of her brave people was trampled out, and an obese Bourbon, fit representative of immovable oppression, was placed on the throne. Germany was given over to the military rule of legitimate sovereigns, without a stipulation in behalf of the confiding millions whom idle promises had roused against the only monarch in Europe who cared aught for mankind. Italy, which had begun to enjoy the blessings of good government, was consigned to the tender mer-

cies of Metternich. A deep darkness settled down over the whole continent. The hope of good was withered for a century. The sword of England had hewn down and cast into the fire every goodly tree blossoming with promise. Her work was done. France was robbed of her ships and colonies, and the nobility of England were delivered from their terror of democracy. Lord Hawkesbury in his speech, delivered in 1801, said, "The great object of the war was to prevent the introduction of pernicious principles then prevalent in France." What those "pernicious principles" were is plain enough. They were the principles of human rights against the traditional prerogative; the principles of government which make all the strength of England, and which are her continual boast. These the titled gentlemen of Britain did not desire to see developed any further than was compatible with their quiet possession of their castles and estates and dignities. They have much better reason to wage perpetual war against us, and were the Atlantic no wider than the channel, they would do it. The aristocracy found a suitable minister in Mr. Pitt. Mr. Roscoe says of him, "Mr. Pitt's education was founded on too narrow a basis and aimed too directly at its object. A cultivated mind and a humane disposition will render their possessor truly polite; sound principles and a real love of mankind, truly patriotic; but without these neither the politeness nor the patriotism are any thing more than a whitened sepulchre. The system, however, was successful; the young orator began his career in a manner the best calculated to display his powers. As he spoke the hopes, of freedom revived; corruption shrank from his glance, and the nation hailed him as her deliverer; but no sooner was the prize within his grasp than he seized it with an eagerness and retained it with a tenacity which all the efforts of his opponents could neither impede nor relax. Having thus obtained the supreme power, the talents which had acquired it were employed with equal success to preserve it. The correction of abuses, the removal of peculation and corruption, the reform of the representation, the extension of civil and religious liberty were now no longer the objects in view; or were only recalled at stated periods, to show with what dexterity the minister could blast his promise without breaking his faith. His grand defect

was a total insensibility to the feelings of mankind, and a thorough ignorance of the leading principles of human nature. A powerful nation, whose slavery had for ages been its reproach, threw off its shackles, and attempted to form for itself a limited monarchy. It was Mr. Pitt's first misfortune to be insensible to the grandeur of so glorious a struggle. The first act of France was to hold out her emancipated hands to the free states of England and America; but the coldness of the minister soon convinced her that in this government she was not to expect a friend. That coldness soon degenerated into enmity and abhorrence, and through every change of circumstances and situation, through all the evolutions and forms of her government, whether monarchical, republican, aristocratical or despotic, she found in him a decided and inflexible enemy. * * * * The breach of the treaty of Amiens, incited chiefly by the cry of the war party in England, and which was ventured upon for no assignable object except the possession of the island of Malta, occasioned the greatest disaster which the established order of things in Europe has experienced in modern times. The speeches of the opposition in Parliament exhibit clearly the false pretences of the government of that country in her refusal to make peace with Bonaparte. Whether the war was wise or not, one thing is certain, it was not a war of aggression by Bonaparte. England was the aggressor, first and last and always; and she was the aggressor merely for the sake of plunder and power. Napoleon was not fond of war. He had early gained a military reputation which could not be increased, but which the loss of a single battle might tarnish. No one knew better than he the uncertainty of war. He understood perfectly well the influence of accidents and unforeseen contingencies upon the result of the wisest schemes of campaign. He foresaw what at length occurred in Spain and at Waterloo, that he would sooner or later be defeated, if not by mistakes of his own, yet through the deficient conduct of others. He had nothing to gain by war, and he felt himself fully equal to the duties of peace. Sincerely desirous to elevate the French nation in civilization and national prosperity, he longed for peace as the greatest possible good. No victorious general ever made such sacrifices for it. From England he condescended to implore it.

But England saw in peace the beginning of commercial prosperity in France; and with the narrow insular views peculiar to her statesmen, she anticipated that prosperity in France must be as so much good subtracted from herself. The doctrine of balance of power,—which consists in the principle that while England may extend her domains without check, and even claim the seas as her empire, other nations shall be contented with the boundaries long since assigned them,—was made then, as it is now made, the justification for devastating other countries, until they should be ruined down to a safe point for England. Within the last hundred years, for every square mile added to Russia, aggressive as she is, England has added three. Yet to-day she is invading Russia in defence of the ‘balance of power;’ and, strange to say, France whose commercial marine she periodically destroys, whose colonies she has appropriated, and whose navy she has transferred to her own service; France, against whose most glorious hope of prosperity, England organized a European opposition, and whose chosen government she overthrew by marching a million of armed men upon her blood-soaked territory; France, under the regime of a man bearing the name of Bonaparte, sides with her.”

Mr. Abbott suggests that the judgment the reader will form of the emperor will depend upon the answer he gives to the following questions:

1. Did Napoleon usurp the sovereignty of France?
2. Having attained the supreme power, was he a tyrant devoting that power to the promotion of his own selfish aggrandizement?
3. Were the wars in which he was incessantly engaged provoked by his arrogance?

With regard to the first question, we entirely acquit Napoleon. We acknowledge no right to the sovereignty of a people but their own choice, and that Napoleon held his power by public consent is indubitable. He shed no blood upon the steps of his throne. He assumed the government of France because it was apparent to all that he was the ablest man in the country, and perhaps the most patriotic: “I did not usurp the crown,” said he, “I picked it out of the gutter!” To talk of usurpation under circumstances like these is folly. They are usurpers who govern people

without their consent. The third query we have already answered. There was a time when it admitted of controversy, but time has dispelled all misrepresentations on this subject, and by the admission of his enemies Bonaparte is acquitted. The blood of the millions slaughtered in his wars, is not on his soul. In all his earlier campaigns he was the soldier of revolutionized France fighting for independence. However ambitious of distinction he may have been, his ambition had nothing to do with the battles he was fighting. After he became the governing mind of France, we invariably find him seeking peace, by frank overture when ready for war, by moderate demands when victorious, by personal applications to sovereigns, by argument and persuasion and entreaty. Of all his enemies, England only, secure in her insular position and confident in her floating armies, was inexorable. Even the invasion of Spain was justifiable, if we can think it justifiable to rescue a people from anarchy and endow them with liberal institutions. In estimating the good or evil of an action we have only to ask how we would have wished to be done to in the premises. Tried by this rule, we suppose that no Spaniard, capable of forming an opinion with regard to the welfare of his country, could have seen in the intervention of Napoleon any thing but a deliverance and blessing. If we admit that Spain belonged to the imbecile and profligate family who had, under the name of government, done all that rulers could to degrade and ruin the nation; if we can bring ourselves to believe that Spaniards had no rights nor interests in Spain; that the inhabitants of the Peninsula had no claims to consideration in their misery; that the strong owe no duty to the weak; the prosperous to the miserable; man to his fellow; then indeed we may question the propriety of Napoleon's intervention in Spain. But if the contrary of all this be true, then we cannot doubt that it was the bounden duty of France to interfere, when a fair occasion was presented. The king was an old fool, who entirely neglected all the duties of a sovereign. The queen was an utterly profligate woman, who lived in open shame with a life-guardsmen, to whom she persuaded the king to commit the absolute sovereignty of the kingdom. The heir apparent was, by the declaration of his mother, "ille-

gitimate;" and by nature constituted with "a mule's head and a tiger's heart." Between the son and father a bitter quarrel had resulted in the forcible abdication of the latter, who was yet, according to legitimacy, the true king. In revenge he transferred his right to Napoleon—who then, according to legitimate rules, was the rightful king of Spain? Evidently there was none, unless Napoleon be so considered, though we do not regard his title as worth a straw. The Spaniards were without legitimate government. Ferdinand was a usurper and utterly unfit to reign, were he the legitimate king. The dethronement of the Spanish Bourbons was not without reason, even as an act of justice from France. Without provocation they had secretly allied themselves to England against Napoleon. Allison admits that "A convention was secretly concluded at Madrid between the Spanish government and the Russian ambassador, to which the court of Lisbon was also a party, by which it was agreed that as soon as the favorable opportunity was arrived by the French armies being advanced on the road to Berlin, the Spanish government should commence hostilities in the Pyrenees and invite the English to co-operate." This convention was not so secret but that Napoleon was immediately informed of it. Great Britain bombarded Copenhagen and seized the Danish fleet for fear that Napoleon might do it. They plead the necessity of self-defence even against dangerous possibilities. Had Denmark entered into a secret convention to stab England whenever her side should be uncovered, none would have blamed her for anticipating the blow. Napier exonerates Napoleon from blame in this matter, though he thinks he acted unwisely in not first stirring up a popular revolution in Spain.

That Bonaparte intended to regenerate Spain and make it the most glorious monument of his reconstructive genius is certain; that he could have done so is equally plain. Nor would his military occupation of the country have been attended with the horrors of war, but for the British. They stirred up the strife. They incited the fanatic peasantry to arms. They sided with the bigoted and selfish priesthood of the country to resist any infusion of liberty into the dismal code of Spanish law. They succeeded at length in expelling the French. They happily re-established on

the throne the child of shame, with his "mule's head and tiger's heart." They riveted upon Spain the chains of superstition. They procured for fifty years to come a bad government, and a ruined State. To this day the Spaniards are reaping the bitter harvest of British intervention. Whatever Spain is now, England has caused her to be, and England did it knowingly. She interfered with the certain anticipation of the evil to follow to the Peninsula. A Protestant government, she knew that she was fighting for the perpetual intolerance of the Protestant faith. Boasting of her own liberty, she knew that she was fastening chains upon an enslaved people. Rich through commerce and manufactures, she knew that she was barring the way to industrial activity to a whole nation for a century to come. England knew all this, yet she did it, merely from a selfish jealousy of the power of France. That Bonaparte availed himself of the opportunity to carry out the magnificent folly which he cherished, of surrounding himself with a circle of dependent monarchies, the thrones of which should be filled with little Bonapartes, all radiant satellites of himself, the central sun, is true. Here was his mistake and his wrong doing. He should have permitted the Spaniards to find a ruler for themselves. Collecting the ablest men in the country, as he did, he should have protected them with his armies until they had organized and established an effective government of their own. He chose to treat the Spaniards as children, and for the sake of bringing one throne more into his family, he lost all the moral advantages of his really beneficent interference with Spain. The only thing that never has degenerated in Spain is pride. It seems to be the imperishable nucleus of Iberian character. We can conceive of a Spaniard without every thing else but this: but rob him of his only garment, turn him out of his dilapidated house, let him steal a clove of garlic, and then stop him when running from an alguazil, and you will find him as full of national pride as Charles the Fifth. Bonaparte ought to have respected this peculiarity of Spaniards, and not set up Joseph to be a continual mortification to so fierce a people.

The second query is whether, "Having attained to supreme power, was he a tyrant devoting that power to the promotion of his own selfish aggrandizement?"

The answer to this will depend somewhat upon the meaning attached to the word "tyrant." If we mean by it a monarch who governs only by his own will, then there never was a more thorough tyrant than Napoleon. He allowed no opposition—tolerated no difference of opinion. He was the state, in the fullest sense of that comprehensive assumption. He made war and concluded peace; he regulated commerce; he levied taxes; he raised armies; he dictated laws; he appointed officials. He meddled with every thing and controlled every body. Nero himself was not more positive, and interfered far less with the prerogatives of the human understanding. But if by a "tyrant" we mean a monarch who uses his power to oppress and harass his people, who in the indulgence of pride, and passion, and appetite, abuses his high office, and makes it a curse to the nation, then Napoleon was no such tyrant. Selfish as he was, he contrived to gratify his selfishness in the unwearied effort to advance the prosperity of France. If he made his own will the only law, yet he willed to do what he thought would most enhance the happiness of those about him. He was ambitious, but his ambition was of a lofty nature. He would be a really great and glorious personage, whose fame should rest upon abiding benefits to France and to mankind. It was a pity that his selfishness could so blind his understanding as to hide the fact that in the concentration of all the cares of government in himself, he was reducing France to childhood. He was aiming to make a nation of fat and sleek dependants upon the throne. Refusing them the exercise of thought on political affairs, he was making them unfit to think upon them. In fact, he reared a generation only qualified to follow a leader. Such are the French people to this day. When they have achieved liberty to think, they have not known what to do with it. Thinking bewilders them, and they felt very happy to surrender the privilege to the present emperor.

It is strange, indeed, that such a man as Napoleon should have been in secret a worshiper of royalty; of kings personally, as he had intimate knowledge, he had the most profound contempt. From his early life, he was a republican in opinion, and had never been enslaved by education to superstitious reverence for royalties. He saw that the long genealogies of princes were but records of

shame and folly, and that royal blood was the worst blood in Europe. Yet Bonaparte in secret sighed to be a king. All his material power and personal fame did not satisfy him while excluded from the charmed circle of legitimacy. It was this morbid craving to be admitted among the ruling class of Europe as one of them, which bega his follies and procured his ruin. He was not contented to be first of emperors; he must be last of kings. He was not satisfied to be the regenerator of France, he must be the founder of a dynasty; the head of a succession, in after years to produce its Charleses and Ferdinands and Fredericks; its "mule heads" and "tiger hearts," like the glorious Bourbons and Guelphs around him. And for this Napoleon sinned and suffered. For this he sacrificed the best affections of his nature; for this he inflicted the most cruel of possible suffering upon the only being in the world whose love to him was pure and constant. The repudiation of Josephine is the ineffaceable blot upon the fame of Bonaparte. All his own suffering in the act, whether much or little, does not at all mitigate its barbarity and wickedness. To us it would be inconceivable how a man of his sensibility to affection, and attached as he once was to his wife, could have gone through with this abominable deed, did we not know the deteriorating nature of prosperity. Had he been born a prince, and had he married as princes marry, we could have understood that a connection, to which the heart was no party, might be dissolved as readily as any other compact of merely verbal obligation. But Bonaparte married a woman of his heart. With her he lived on terms of more than ordinary affection. She was in the fullest sense his wife. She had risen with him from obscurity; she had shared all the anxieties of his course; she had shed the lustre of her love upon every step of his progress. To his union with her he owed the command of the army of Italy; the opportunity without which his abilities might have been inactive, and himself unknown. To cast her off in his prosperity; to thrust her away to make room for an unknown girl; to give her place as a wife and queen to another, and that without even the pretence of wrong on her part, it was treachery, and cruelty and injustice, which deserved all the consequences that ensued. The story of the divorce, as told by Mr. Abbott, is very touching.

In all history we know of nothing more pathetic. We wept over it, and expect to weep whenever we shall read it again. But our tears were for the victim, not for the tyrant. We cannot but believe that in much of the feeling he exhibited, Bonaparte was a hypocrite. He felt it painful to witness the misery of his wife. Doubtless he felt ashamed of his treachery to her, but secretly he gloated in the expected possession of a real princess, of the daughter of an emperor. He exulted in the admission to be administered to him, through her, into the privileged families of Europe, and the heart of Josephine was to him a trifle to be paid for such a glorious thing as this. Bonaparte had become hard of heart. Prosperity and the habit of domination had done their work upon him. He was now fit to be a king. He was worthy to mate with an Austrian, for he was proud, and cold, and cruel. The man was lost in the sovereign. He did not separate himself from a wife until he was unworthy to have one. From this time his glory departed. His connection with Austria ruined him, and Maria Louisa covered him with shame. The son of this wicked connection was a child of sorrow, and died without reputation. The whole scheme, wicked as it was, proved equally unwise. Retribution followed speedily, and while we read of the treachery and cruelty that were visited on Napoleon; while we hear his moanings from St. Helena, and read the melancholy story of his sufferings and death, our sympathy is mitigated to a degree which we can endure with entire equanimity, when we remember that the victim is the husband of Josephine, paying for his Austrian wife. The man who could sacrifice so noble a woman as God had given him, to the childish vanity of being son-in-law to a legitimate king, deserved to go to St. Helena as the nearest place to perdition. Mr. Abbott does the best he can to exhibit Napoleon in attractive colors during what he calls the "sublime tragedy of the divorce." Sublime tragedy! It was a contemptible farce! Napoleon was a capital actor, and he never acted better than in this delicate matter. That he cared little for the marriage tie and for the rights and feelings of wives, is evident from his conduct in the case of the first marriage of Jerome; in thwarting the love of Louis; in his continued efforts to divorce Lucien; in his making the marriages of his relatives mere matters of convenience.

To Josephine he originally had a tender attachment, but he had been much separated from her. In Egypt he had formed another connection, and so he had in Poland. Gradually his passion for Josephine had been cooled, and there was left only esteem. When she became an obstacle to the accomplishment of his ambitious schemes, he put her away. He did it with as much decency as he could, for in all things he was a decorous man. He did all that the circumstances would permit to soothe her feelings and make her humiliation tolerable. All this was well enough, but Abbott and the Duke of Rovigo, and Bonaparte himself can never excuse this outrage upon a deserving and confiding woman.

This is the only historical act of Napoleon for which we will not listen to excuse. It was the only action of his life in which he exhibited himself at once unwise, unjust, selfish and cruel.

As to the execution of the Duke d'Enghein, we do not perceive any reasonable objection to it, as against Bonaparte. It is quite possible that the prince was innocent, but it is quite certain that Napoleon thought otherwise. Much allowance is to be made for a man who lives among conspiracies and is compelled to watch against assassins. The British writers all admit that Bonaparte was not blood-thirsty. His own defence of the matter is satisfactory, and we have the most solemn assurance that man can give, of his conviction of the propriety of the act, in the codicil to his will, written a few days before his death, wherein he assumes the responsibility of the transaction, and declares that under similar circumstances he would do the same again. Men do not write thus of assassinations. That Bonaparte, after a deliberate review of his conduct, thought himself justifiable is certain, and it is also certain that he was better acquainted with the facts in the case than any one else. The life of the Duke d'Enghein was no more precious than the life of any other man. While the English utter such a perpetual shriek over the fate of this one victim of their unprincipled war against Bonaparte, they seem to forget that every one of the hundreds of thousands slaughtered at their instance had a life which it was as cruel to deprive him of. Had the Danes slain in defence of Copenhagen no feeling to pain and no aversion to death? If it was wrong in Bonaparte to sacrifice one victim to his preservation, was it right in England to sacri-

fice thousands to appease the foolish dread of future danger? If it was ferocious in Bonaparte to immolate one victim to the love of life, was it less so in England to immolate hecatombs to the love of trade? The truth is, that the "love of money is the root of all evil." There is no passion so destructive to the moral sense as avarice. As gold is found native in desolation, and inclosed in fissures of silicious rock, so the love of it makes a desolation in the soul, and fills the fissures of a flinty heart. Where avarice reigns, the understanding is perverted; the tender sensibilities wither and die. A nation is but an assemblage of individuals, and a government, under the influence of the public mind, is but the exponent of the opinions and feelings, the virtues and vices of the multitude. The government of England is an aristocracy, whose existence depends upon the mercantile prosperity of England. The fundamental principle of the government, therefore, is that the trade of the country must be preserved and extended, at whatever cost to the rest of the world. No moral consideration is ever permitted to interfere with this grand and paramount purpose. England has not hesitated to commit the most flagrant outrages in order to accomplish her mercantile designs. A port was needed on the Red Sea. England tricked the Arabs into an offence by purposely wrecking on their coast a vessel loaded with tempting articles, and then refusing all accommodation, seized the coveted port at the cost of some hundreds of lives. Opium sells well in China and grows well in India, and therefore England violates the laws of China, and in spite of the pathetic remonstrances of that helpless government, persists in sending that fatal drug to their people. England does this, fully knowing the poverty and misery and death that are the necessary consequences of this conduct, and yet in the face of the world, she utters a cry of indignation whenever she remembers the death of D'Enghein. If this young prince had been an opium eater, without reason enough to control his appetite; had his father forbidden him to purchase the drug, and all persons to sell it to him; and had Napoleon nevertheless, for the sake of a few dollars, smuggled it to him, and sent his soldiers to beat and bind the father when he interfered to save the son; had the Duke died from the fatal indulgence, then indeed would Napoleon have been infamous. The scorn

of the whole world would for ever have dwelt upon his memory as that of a mean and inhuman monster; a vampire feeding on blood; a disgrace and abhorrence; a hissing and a curse to his species for ever and ever. Every man, and woman, and child in England would have howled over the villainy as long as history should have perpetuated its remembrance. Yet England does this every day to many thousands of d'Engheims in China.

Mr. Abbott devotes considerable space to the history of the captivity of Napoleon, with which the world has been made so familiar by the works of Las Casas, O'Meara and Montholon. It is unnecessary to pain our readers with a recapitulation of the sad story. The conduct of England in this matter was a proper finale to all that had preceded it. It was unjust, ungenerous, cruel and mean. It forms a page of her history which every Englishman would be glad to expunge, but it will remain for ever an indelible reproach. The greatest mistake of Napoleon's life, except the divorce of Josephine, was his surrender to the British, in preference to Alexander. It would have been more wise to throw himself into a squadron of Cossacks. They would not have disposed of him upon mercantile principles. Among barbarians there is at least hospitality and admiration of courage; and it may well be doubted whether even in Siberia Napoleon could have found a Sir Hudson Lowe.

On the other hand, Napoleon exhibited at St. Helena little of the dignity of a great man enduring adversity. He was petulant and childish. He could not reconcile himself to his inevitable fate. He endured the discomforts of his situation with far less equanimity than did his companions who shared them for his sake. His squabbles with the miserable governor were altogether unbecoming to Napoleon. What did it matter to him whether he should be addressed as emperor or general? He could well have laughed at the ridiculous importance with which his address was prescribed by the British government. He ought to have set poor Sir Hudson's mind at ease, by assurances that he would not attempt to escape. He should have pitied the poor man who really had a difficult and disagreeable duty to perform. It was little in Napoleon to abuse Sir Hudson as he did, and we can hardly wonder that a man of the governor's mental calibre should have retalia-

ted. Bonaparte made himself and all about him unhappy. He inflicted unnecessary suffering upon himself and his household, and probably shortened his days, which might have been spent in winning back the good opinion of the world. But Bonaparte had been spoiled by prosperity. Pomp and luxury and adulation had become necessary to him. It is almost impossible to recognize the First Consul in the captive of St. Helena. Who would have believed that the conqueror of Italy could be reduced to depend for comfort upon the luxury of plate? Yet Montholon tells us that, as part of Napoleon's generalship in his manœuvres against Rome, he ordered his silver plate to be broken up and sold, a measure, by the by, which was a paltry trick to annoy the garrison and get sympathy. Montholon was shrewd enough to obey only in part, reserving Napoleon's table service. The order however being imperative, a china service was bought and the emperor's dinner served upon it. "The physical effect upon him was such that he ate nothing, and said to me (Montholon) it must be allowed that we are all great children. Can you conceive that I could not conquer my disgust at this badly served dinner? I who when I was young, ate from black dishes. I am ashamed of myself." His joy was infantine when Marchand brought him his soup in a little silver gilt bowl! If Napoleon had examined himself deeper he would have found that the change in him extended much farther than his taste for silver dishes and "soup a la Reine."

Mr. Abbott dwells much upon Napoleon's religious views, and indeed his conversations upon Christianity are remarkable. His strong mind perceived the evidences of the supernatural in the revelation from God, and he forcibly contended for the divinity of our Lord. How far he was able, without a guide and amidst the unfavorable circumstances of his later life, to avail himself of the comforts and prospective blessings of the Christian's faith, we cannot determine. We may charitably hope that the "stirring of the eagle's nest" may have induced the noble bird to pitch his flight towards a higher and safer rock, and that when his mighty spirit escaped from his earthly foes it found refuge "where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest."

ART. II.—THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.*

“Quid non audeat humana temeritas, cum in sententiam nefandi precipitatur erroris, quam relinquere propter vanitatem pudet, et defendere contra veritatem non pudet.”—*August, Contra Cresc. lib. 4, c. 38.*

AN article in the last number of this Review commenced with the assertion that, “of all the religious orders, the Jesuits have been the most slandered and the most praised, the most studied and yet the most difficult to be understood.” If the writer had added that this difficulty has arisen from a superficial and one-sided investigation of the subject, he would have rendered his statement much more intelligible, and thrown a flood of light upon his subsequent observations. We would not intimate that his sketch of the society of Jesus, however injurious to that illustrious body was dictated by a narrow bigotry or willful partiality, much less by a spirit of wanton hostility. From the tone of his remarks we would judge him to be a man of refined sentiments, and upright intentions, capable of appreciating what is noble and generous, and willing to bestow upon virtue and merit their just commendation. But, in awarding to him these honorable qualities, we are compelled to charge him with lamentable deficiencies and aberrations; and if we do not impeach his honesty, we are bound to expose his want of knowledge, and the erroneous and unjust conclusions into which it has betrayed him.

“In presenting this subject,” he says, “where there is so much material for any side we should choose to take, we shall not degrade it by fancying prejudices, or enumerating individual vices—vices deplored by none more sincerely than by many of the Jesuits themselves. But we shall seek to develop the system—to show its principles and spirit, and all these we must view in the light of truths which will be eternally the same, or what we deem to be unchanging. Nor can there ever be a perfect agreement among men in their opinions respecting the Jesuits, so long as they disagree in reference to such points as the supreme authority of

* In our last number we published an article on the Jesuits in which they were regarded from a Protestant point of view. We are not in the habit of encouraging controversy, but having always entertained a favorable opinion of the old maxim, “*audi alteram partem*,” we think it right to give place to the present paper.—EDITOR.

the Scriptures in all matters of faith ; as the superiority of reason to authority as a guide in ecclesiastical matters ; and as the duty of the humblest individual to follow the dictates of his own conscience alone, whatever opposition may be made by his political and religious teachers. So long as there is an irreconcilable difference of opinion on these points, there is no common standard by which to estimate the sons of Ignatius Loyola.”—p. 15.

If there are any eternal “truths” by which the system of the Jesuits is to be appreciated, how can the writer affirm that there is “no common standard” which will enable us to estimate it? If we must always adopt, as the standard of our judgments in regard to right and wrong, truths “eternally the same,” independently of the conflicting speculations of human opinion, why has the writer set aside these truths to follow the uncertain views of men? If the principles of certain christian sects in regard to the exclusive authority of Scripture as a rule of faith, or the fancied duty of the humblest individual to obey the dictates of his conscience alone, in opposition to his political and religious teachers, or the vagaries of some historical theorists of modern times, have no claim whatever to the appellation of truths, since the vast majority of the christian world reject them as errors, and even their own adherents consider them nothing more than opinions, why has the writer based all his conclusions upon these sectarian or unsettled premises, thus completely begging the question, and resolving the whole inquiry into catholicity or non-catholicity, which he explicitly disavows? (p. 30.) Amid the mass of panegyric and denunciation which has fallen from his pen, we look in vain for any definite or certain law by which he has attempted to estimate the principles and labors of the Society of Jesus. He informs us, indeed, that “it is only in conformity with the eternal laws of mind that great results are ever obtained by man. The history of society shows that no man, nor body of men, ever obtained a permanent and wide-spread ascendancy over their fellow men—never secured their homage and veneration, except by the exercise of remarkable qualities of mind and heart. Industry produces its fruits. Genius, learning and piety also have their natural effects. We only honor what is good or great. Hypocrisy and fraud necessarily excite hatred and disgust, as soon as they are de-

tected. No enduring reputation is ever based upon falsehood. Men are anxious to honor only that which extorts their admiration and esteem. Sincerity and earnestness alone create enthusiasm. Prejudices are only disarmed by truth. Men are loved only in proportion as they themselves love. They are obeyed only as they obey the laws of spiritual life. There is a bright and shining light in virtue which the most perverted can [perceive, and the most selfish can appreciate . . . Sages have bled as martyrs, but they were martyrs because the light of their genius and virtues was seen, and because the enemies of truth could not endure that light," &c., p. 20.

If in all this the writer means that the most favorable results are obtained, when men of virtue, learning and zeal are welcomed by their fellow beings with a disposition to be guided by their intellectual and moral superiority, his doctrine is true; but if he wishes to say that genius and virtue will always command a willing attention on the part of those to whom they address themselves, he enunciates a very unsound principle. There is no eternal law of mind which necessarily obtains for truth and virtue their merited honor and influence among men. This is the result of accidental qualities, not of any fixed laws of the human mind. It is witnessed only when men are predisposed, in the natural or supernatural order, to accept the truth presented to them; in short, it depends entirely upon the good or bad use they choose to make of that free-will with which they have been endowed by the Creator. Why did the apostles and martyrs, so worthy of honor and veneration, become the victims of persecution, but because one portion of mankind loved darkness rather than the light? Why on the other hand did they rally under the banner of the cross a multitude of devoted followers, but because another portion were willing to accept the saving truths which they heralded by their preaching and example? The influence therefore of remarkable qualities of mind and heart, and the success they obtain among men, are an evidence indeed of the disposition of men to be governed by them for the time being; but they form no adequate standard by which to measure the intrinsic worth of the qualities themselves. This question is to be determined, not by the widespread success they may achieve, but by its accord or disagree-

ment with those immutable principles of the divine law, either natural or revealed, which are independent of man, and form the essential basis of all moral character and excellence.

If the writer in the last number of this Review had attended to these principles, only so far as they are recognized by all Christian denominations, he would have arrived at very different conclusions respecting the character and influence of the company of Jesus. His article on the subject would not have been marked by such glaring contradiction and confusion of ideas. In short, he would not have ventured to denounce that illustrious order as an embodiment of satanic art, a system of ambition and duplicity, and hostile to every species of human freedom.

That we are to judge of men by their actions is a rule dictated by the light of reason itself, and emphatically corroborated by the Divine Founder of Christianity: "By their fruits you shall know them; men do not gather grapes of thorns nor figs of thistles." It is unphilosophical, therefore, as well as unchristian, to assume the evil character of a man, and to pass sentence upon his actions accordingly. It was upon this false principle that the Pharisees, blinded by prejudice, could see nothing holy or admirable in the conduct of Christ, and finally resolved upon his destruction. In vain did he appeal to the works which he performed as an evidence of his claim to their respect and submission. They ceased not their hatred and their projects of revenge. "We know," they exclaimed, "that this man hath a devil." So is it in the case of the Jesuits. The object and influence of their institute have been pictured in such hideous colors to the popular mind by the unceasing efforts of their enemies, that among a large class of persons the very name of Jesuit is sufficient to conjure up ideas of every thing horrible and atrocious. It is synonymous with the most refined, the most gigantic wickedness, and consequently, as in a former age no good could "come out of Nazareth," so in modern times nothing honorable or praiseworthy can emanate from the Society of Jesus. This preconceived idea of the order prejudges every case, and thus the infallible rule prescribed by divine authority, and recognized by the common sense of mankind, is completely inverted. Instead of estimating the Jesuits by their good works; by their vast achievements in education and

literature, in the cause of humanity and civilization, in the promotion of virtue and religion; some people have the justice to pronounce all this, without examination, but a dark scheme of ambition and avarice, because, according to the notions imbibed from their infancy and carefully nurtured by their spiritual guides, a Jesuit is but the personification of low and criminal intrigue.

Another principle equally violated in regard to the Society of Jesus, is that axiom of jurisprudence universally admitted, but not always observed, that no man should be condemned upon the mere testimony of his enemies. The trial by jury supposes this principle, without which the ends of justice could not be attained. To illustrate this point by the example already adduced, the Founder of Christianity was sentenced to death by the mere influence of his enemies. The Roman judge at whose bar he had been cited, declared that he could find no cause of condemnation in the case, but such was the clamoring of the Scribes and Pharisees who had conspired against him, that Pilate at length yielded to their wishes, and delivered him to an ignominious crucifixion. By a similar proceeding do the Jesuits become objects of hatred and opposition among men. If they are allowed a trial at the bar of opinion, the testimony is but too frequently all one-sided and passionate. They are not permitted to defend themselves. Their principles and acts are examined only in the writings of those who have been their sworn enemies. Every thing favorable to their cause, however necessary for a full and impartial consideration of the subject, is set aside as having no bearing upon the question. Of the millions in this country who have formed an adverse opinion respecting the Society of Jesus, how many have ever taken the pains to read any thing in its vindication? Whence did they derive their information? We venture to say that there has been no candid and dispassionate inquiry into the subject. The odious calumnies originally hatched by the hatred and jealousy of parties, are received and transmitted without investigating the source from which they sprang, and men continue to abhor and to slander a numerous and illustrious body of Christians, as if God had never issued the command, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor."

We hope to prove, in the course of these observations, that the

writer on the Jesuits has grossly violated the two fundamental principles which we have mentioned; has been guilty of a crying injustice against his fellow-men, and instead of serving the cause of truth, so essential to the promotion of harmony and peace in society, has contributed by the propagation of the vilest calumnies, to swell and embitter the prejudices already too rife amongst us. So far as we have been able to analyze the discordant statements and vague reflections which he has strung together, they refer chiefly to the organization, the history and the influence of the Company of Jesus. In our strictures upon his remarks we shall consider successively these different branches of the subject.

"The organization of the Society of Jesus," he tells us, "was somewhat peculiar. The form which it assumed was purely monarchical. There was a reality in the fact that the supreme command was invested in a general. The old orders had generals, and yet in them the aristocratic principle prevailed. The head of a monastery was almost supreme. The lord abbot was obedient only to the pope; but he was not wholly devoted to the pope's interests—he sought the interests of the monastery chiefly, forgetting in a measure both his order and the pope.

"Not so with the order of the Jesuits. All the members were controlled by a single will—all were passive instruments in his hands. His power was irresponsible and for life. He appointed presidents of colleges and religious houses—he admitted and dismissed, pardoned and punished at his pleasure. All, from the highest to the lowest, obeyed most implicitly his orders, and beheld in him the representative of Divine Providence. From his will there was no appeal. Complaint was sin, and resistance ruin. All his officers were mere passive instruments. There were among them many gradations in rank, but each gradation was a gradation in slavery. And all the members of the society, while they were bound to the will of their general, were also mutual spies, in order that their obedience might be secured and their compact rendered firm. No man was allowed to have any mind of his own—any will of his own. The Dominican monk was not bound to obey the abbot of a neighboring monastery. The Jesuit was bound to obey any one, even his own servant, if required by the general of the Order. In all monastic institutions obedience was required in the most unconditional manner; but among the Jesuits alone was this blind obedience rendered to a single will. . . . One soul swayed the vast mass, and every pin and every cog in the machinery consented with its whole power to every movement of the one central conscience. So perfect a despotism the world never before saw—a despotism such

as a tyrant like Tiberius would never have attempted, or such a pope as Hildebrand could hardly have conceived. It was the perfection of satanic ingenuity; it was making slaves and machines of human beings so effectually that no eye could see the degradation—no power could break the bond. It was a slavery which was voluntary, and in which the victim gloried, and against which he never rebelled.”—pp. 25–27.

Here is an ugly picture, and well calculated to shock our American sense of liberty and independence. But upon what authority does the writer assert all this? Did he derive this odious description of the Jesuits from the constitutions of the Society? We pronounce it a shameful caricature from beginning to end. It is but one of the old hobgoblins dressed up to excite a pious horror among the orthodox for the abominations of popery. What should we think of the truth and candor of a man, who would tell us of a well-regulated family, in which the parent rules with a mild and affectionate, yet absolute sway over his children and servants; where the latter, from a feeling of respect and love, obey cheerfully and without hesitation, his commands and even the slightest intimation of his will, that this is a despotism by which the inferior members are held in a state of fearful degradation? What must we think of the mental calibre or cultivation of a writer who tells us of a strictly disciplined army, where the commander-in-chief has only to form his plans and issue his orders, and they are executed without the least demurring, nay, with ardor on the part of his troops; where “one soul sways the vast mass, and every pin and cog in the machinery consents with its whole power to every movement of the one central conscience;” what must we think of a writer who deliberately tells us that this is a despotism, such as a tyrant like Tiberius would never have attempted? Now all this *can* be said with much greater truth of a gallant army that hastens with one common aspiration to the field of victory, or of a family that presents a scene of unalloyed peace and happiness, than of the Society of Jesus, in which the relations between the head and his inferiors have been so strangely travestied by our writer.

It is true that the supreme command is vested in a general of the Company, whose orders are to be obeyed; but what association can exist or successfully pursue its ends without a due subordina-

tion to the chief authority? Is not this the case in all political, commercial, philanthropic, and other institutions that are properly organized? It is likewise true that in the company of Jesus the members consider the superior-general as being in their regard the representative of God; because this is the principle of all christian obedience. The child, the soldier, the citizen, are also bound to respect in general the commands of parental, military, municipal authority, as the orders of heaven; for St. Paul teaches: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God, therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God."* It does not follow, however, from this, nor is it true that the Jesuits are or ever were "mere passive instruments" in the hands of their superior-general; that to complain of his orders "was sin, and resistance ruin;" that they were "mutual spies;" or that "no man was allowed to have any mind or any will of his own." All these assertions are but the clap-trap expressions of ignorance, (we do not say of malice,) and show that the author of them never read the Constitutions of the Jesuits. If he had consulted this document, the only legitimate source of information, instead of retailing the foul aspersions of their enemies, he would have saved himself the responsibility of this wholesale injustice.

What then is the nature of that obedience which the Society of Jesus demands from those who belong to it? We shall learn this from the language of the institute itself, and to give the evidence additional weight, we shall present it in conjunction with the remarks of Mr. Dallas, a distinguished name in the literary world, and a staunch member of the Anglican church.

"'Their blind obedience! To be as unresisting as a dead body, or as tractable as a stick in the hands of an old man.' This language, taken disjointly, is among the bugbears held up by the new conspirators against the Jesuits. It must surely be allowed that obedience is necessary in every institution where training the mind is an object, and the institute is not reprehensible for excluding willful argumentation, while it allows every one the use of his reason. Blind obedience is not required for the commission of a crime, but in duties known to be pious and moral, in actions

* Romans, ch. xiii; Coloss. ch. 3.

evidently laudable. Nor is the expression of the text *cæca obedientia*, but *cæca quadam obedientia*.* The rule is for the better training of the young and inexperienced; and what school does not proceed upon it to the extent required by the institute, which excepts whatever is criminal or morally wrong? It literally prescribes that this *kind* of blind obedience shall, nevertheless, be conformable to justice and to charity; *omnibus in rebus, ad quas potest cum charitate se obedientia extendere*.† Nay, the order of the superior is not only to be examined, to see that it is free from a capital sin, but from any sin whatever; *in omnibus quæ a superiore disponuntur, ubi definiri non possit (quemadmodum dictum est) aliquod peccati genus intercedere*.‡ In a word, discussion is not forbidden by the institute, but in cases where it is evident that there is no sin; *ubi non cerneretur peccatum*; § a doctrine continually repeated on this head, *quemadmodum dictum est*, that is, *in quibus nullum manifestum est peccatum*.|| Where now is the horror of this obedience? It will seem a paradox to say that the rigor of it arises from the mildness of the Jesuit government; but it is not less the fact; for, as all violent measures and corporal punishments are excluded from the society, a prompt moral obedience is absolutely necessary to its existence. It thus becomes an amiable, as well as an indispensable law.

“But the despotism of the general! The obedience which the Jesuits owe their general, is the same as that which they pay to their ordinary superiors. It flows from the same source, and tends to the same end. Having demonstrated the slavery of it to be a chimera, the despotism of the general naturally vanishes with it. The nature of this society required that it should be under a single chief; to have given to separate houses independent chiefs, would have destroyed the great objects depending upon a union of councils. It was no cenobitical order devoted chiefly to working out their own salvation; but one whose members were to be spread over the whole world, to promote the glory of God and the good of man. The institute, however, takes great care that the chief should not be a despot; it gives him no slaves, nor even

* Instit. vol. 2, p. 408, Prague ed.

† Ibid. vol. 1, p. 408. § Ibid. vol. 1, p. 373.

† Ibid. vol. 1, p. 407.

|| Ibid. vol. 1, p. 408.

subjects, but friends, children, and counsellors;* mildness is the sceptre it bestows upon him, and charity the throne;† it equally prohibits the superior to govern by violence and the inferior to obey through fear.‡ The general is elected by the whole society, who first swear to choose only him whom they believe to be the most worthy of the office.§ There is nothing arbitrary or changeable in the authority of the general; it is subjected by the institute to stable and invariable laws, and his duties are minutely prescribed. If he deviates from them, it provides for his removal.|| Far from being a despot, he is not even exempted from the superintendence of a monitor chosen by the society, who observes his conduct, tells him of his faults, points out his duties, and is consequently compelled not to excuse him in any point.¶ In spiritual affairs, the general is subject to the pope; in temporal matters, to the government under which he lives; and, in what concerns himself personally, or the society solely, to a general meeting of the order.** Though elected for life, he may be deposed for several reasons stated in the institute, and the same hands that clothed him with power may strip him of it.†† It has been said that the motive for appointing a single chief was the facility it offers for promoting more certainly the ends of ambition. The institute strongly condemns ambition in individuals, and still more strongly in the general.”‡‡

* “Filiis suis, ut convenit., compati noverit.” *Constit.* pars 9, vol. 2, ch. 1.

“Conferet secum viros, qui consilio polleant, habere, quorum opera in iis quæ statuenda sunt . . . uti possit.” *Ibid.* vol. 1, p. 425.

† “Vir sit (generalis) . . . in omni virtutum genere exemplum . . . ac præcipue in eo splendor charitatis sit conspicuus.” *Ibid.* vol. 1, p. 135.

“Advertendum quod primo in charitate ac dulcedine, qui peccant, sunt admonendi.” *Vol.* 1, p. 375.

‡ “Conferet etiam, circumspecte et ordinate præcipere . . . ita ut subdite se potius ad dilectionem majorem quam ad timorem suorum superiorum possint componere.” *Vol.* 1, p. 426.

§ “Ut in spiritu amoris et non cum perturbatione timoris procedatur, curandum est.” *Vol.* 1, p. 407.

|| “Juret unusquisque, priusquam det (suffragium) quod eum nominat, quem sentit in Domino magis idoneum.” *Ibid.* vol. 1, p. 431.

¶ “Sic acciderit ut valde negligens vel remissus esset, &c., . . . tunc enim coadjutor vel vicarius qui generalis officio fungatur, est eligendus.” *Ibid.* p. 439.

¶ “Habet ergo societas cum præposito generali, (et idem cum inferioribus fieri posset) aliquem qui accedens ad Deum in oratione, postquam divinam bonitatem consuluerit et æquum esse id judicaverit, cum modestia debita ac humilitate, quid sentiat in ipso præposito requiri ad majus obsequium et gloriam Dei, admonere teneatur.” *Ibid.* pars 9, ch. 4, p. 439.

** See part 9th, ch. 4, of the Constitutions.

†† *Ibid.*

‡‡ “Erit etiam summi momenti, ut perpetuo felix societatis status conservetur,

We may add to this candid exposition of the subject by Mr. Dallas, that the board of six counselors who aid the general in his deliberations, are chosen from different parts of the world, in a general assembly, the delegates to which are elected by the members of the company at large. This board is a consultative body, having a watchful eye to the observance of the rules, and to its sentiments the general is bound to defer. How is all this to be conciliated with the assertion of the writer, that the power of the general is *irresponsible*, and that the members of the society are servilely submissive to a single will? What single will do the Jesuits obey, but that which is an expression of the constitution and regulations, by which they themselves wish to be governed? If in this sense they are obedient to a single will, is it not an evidence of the wisdom that characterizes their organization and of the proper spirit that animates its members? Do not we, as citizens of the United States, profess in the same way to be governed by a single will? Is the president of the republic or the governor of a state a mere puppet, or is he to be obeyed when he appears before the people in his supreme executive capacity? It were well indeed if this obedience to a single will were a little more faithfully observed amongst us. Who can deny that the peace and prosperity of the country would be materially promoted, if the people on all occasions would quietly submit to the action of the laws, as embodied in the chief officers of our national, state and municipal governments? Whence proceed the disgraceful riots in our cities, the barbarous doings of judge Lynch, the fanatical resistance to the fugitive slave law, but from the want of that obedience to a single will which our institutions absolutely demand? Far from being true, then, that the world never saw such a despotism as that of the Society of Jesus, there is nothing in the world more common. We see it and feel it every day; we live in the midst of it, nay, we glory in it. If it is "the perfection of satanic art, making slaves and machines of human beings," then must we all consent, the writer himself included,

diligentissime ambitionem, malorum omnium in quavis republica vel congregatione matrem submovere." Vol. 1, p. 446. "Qui autem de ambitione hujusmodi convictus esset, activo et passivo suffragio privetur, ut inhabilis ad eligendum alium (generalem,) et ut eligatur." P. 430. Dallas, *New Conspiracy against the Jesuits detected and exposed*, &c., London, 1815. The author says that he has examined the subject "with sincerity and disinterestedness," as he proves by his reference to original authorities.

to be accounted abject slaves and machines of our political system ; for there is not a particle of difference between the obedience which we pay to our laws, and that of the Jesuit to the rules of his society, except that the latter is more willing, more pure, more noble, and more capable of accomplishing every thing great and generous for the glory of God and the benefit of man.

In this country, living as we do under a republican form of government, which guarantees the largest amount of liberty that is perhaps compatible with the present state of society, and where the preservation as well as a proper estimate of these blessings depends essentially upon the intelligence and virtue of the people, it is all-important that every American should understand the meaning of the words *despotism* and *slavery*, because the ideas which they imply are decidedly opposed to that civil and religious freedom of which he boasts. If, through the ignorance or recklessness of the press, the people are taught to consider as despotism and slavery those normal relations which should exist between the governing and the governed under all political systems, how can social order be secured or the ends of legislation attained? How can we guard successfully the precious boon of freedom, if instead of warring against its enemies, we strike only at its friends? It cannot be denied that there exists a lamentable vagueness of idea or looseness of principle on this subject, which is aided in no small degree by certain lecturers, editors and orators, who for reasons best known to themselves, would rather pander to the prejudices of the vulgar than follow the dictates of a pure and enlightened patriotism, and earn for themselves the lofty character of having deserved well of their country. Without imputing to the writer on the Jesuits any unworthy motives, we are compelled to think that his notions of slavery and despotism must have been very imperfectly defined, or that he was altogether unacquainted with the organization and spirit of the society of Jesus, when he undertook to write on the subject. To say that the power of the superior general is a despotism, "such as a tyrant like Tiberius would never have attempted," or any despotism at all, when in reality it is a most paternal sway, and in every respect conformable to the wishes of the governed; to assert that it makes "slaves and machines of human beings so effectually that no eye could

see the degradation," or makes any slaves of them at all, when in reality it is the free and beloved object of their choice, which they prefer to all the treasures, honors and enjoyments of the world, can be qualified in no milder terms than a most shocking abuse of language ; which, after the explanations and citations we have given, must appear to the candid reader as fraught with misrepresentation and absurdity, and betraying either gross ignorance of the question under discussion, or of the fundamental principles of all government.

The writer has erred not less in designating the form than the spirit of the organization adopted by the Jesuits. He terms it "purely monarchical." How can it be a pure or absolute monarchy, when he who holds the supreme power is elected by the body whom he governs ; when he is surrounded by a council, also chosen by the body through its electors ; when he has no power to make laws, much less to abrogate them ; when he has no revenue and receives no salary ; when, in short, his person, his household, his attendants are all indicative of the utmost simplicity and self-denial, and exhibit him as an officer devoted only to the exalted objects of the society over which he presides ? If there is any thing of monarchy in all this, it is certainly of the most limited description ; it may be said to bear a closer resemblance to the republican system, embracing as it does, with the most salutary checks to authority, the right of suffrage, as far as consistent with the essential unity of a body whose various labors extend to every portion of the globe. When we reflect, moreover, that the government of the order is founded essentially upon that great principle of republicanism, necessary to its very existence, we mean the aristocracy of talent, virtue and merit, and that this principle, from the nature itself of the pure and sublime objects contemplated by the society, is not liable to be overlooked or sacrificed to selfish or partisan views, as in merely political or other temporal organizations, we are compelled to infer that the constitution of the Jesuits is characterized by the highest possible wisdom, and is unsurpassed, if indeed equaled, by any other system of government in point of rational liberty and effective operation. But let us examine the working of the Jesuit system ; this will lead us to the second branch of our subject.

The writer seems to have drawn a wide distinction between the earlier and later periods of its history. He says :

“ It will be found that no body of men, except in very degraded states of society, have juggled themselves into respect, influence and love. They gained a good name, because they worked for it, with much sacrifice, amid many sorrows, against much opposition, yet with true zeal, and firm faith in the God who rules by natural laws.

“ And this is the simple reason why the Jesuits prospered. There is no mystery in their success. The same causes would produce the same results again. When Catholic Europe saw young men, born to honor, wealth and worldly aggrandizement, voluntarily surrendering their rank and goods, devoting themselves to religious duties, spending their days in hospitals and schools, urging their companions and friends to a religious life ; wandering as preachers amid much self-denial in obscure and lonely places, going out as missionaries to proclaim salvation to idolatrous nations, encountering all sorts of peril and fatigue, with fresh and intrepid enthusiasm, and finally yielding up their lives as martyrs among savages and enemies, it believed them to be sincere. It believed them to be religious and heroic—and it honored them in consequence. When parents throughout Europe saw that the Jesuits entered heart and soul into the work of education ; bestowing upon their children the most indefatigable attention and labor, winning their young hearts by condescension and kindness, watching their tempers and moods that they might direct their minds to studies agreeable to them, inspiring them with generous sentiments, training them to self-discipline, exciting them to noble exertions, and infusing into their hearts the love of virtue and fear of God ; they did not stop to inquire into their motives, they did not feel inclined to mistrust their honesty, but unsuspectingly and eagerly surrendered them to their instruction. Universities, too, when they discovered the superior acquirements of educated Jesuits,—that they were neither sensual nor idle, but patient, laborious scholars, outstripping all their associates in learning, beating them all in dialectical controversies, familiar with the fathers and the school-men, making discoveries in science, and shedding a light wherever they went by their genius and erudition,—very naturally appointed them to their vacant chairs of theology, philosophy, and classic literature.

“ The people, likewise, when they saw them unstained by vulgar vices, earnest, enthusiastic, eloquent, learned and religious, of course, invited them to become their preachers, or flocked to hear them whenever they were sent among them. . . . The world was astonished at their intrepidity and zeal. They

blazed forth as new stars in the religious horizon, and at a period, too, when the heavens were hung with gloomy clouds. They were stars of hope—stars of light—to direct and control. The virtues of their hearts were unquestioned in the age in which they appeared—not often questioned in our own. The early Jesuits were far different people from the later ones. They were given to no intrigue. They were not worldly-minded. They cared but little for honor or wealth. They were hardly ambitious, but simple-hearted and fervent from inward experiences, resolute from firm convictions, seeking the salvation of souls—loving their society, indeed, but still more what they considered the glory of God; ‘*Ad majorem Dei gloriam*’ was the motto emblazoned on their standard, when they went forth as a company of christian warriors to overcome the heresies of christendom and the superstition of idolaters. * * * *

“We believe no men ever lived more worthy of our esteem, so far as sincerity and fervor and talent are concerned, than the early members of the society. The great captain and author himself (*Ignatius Loyola*) was one of the least selfish, and one of the most earnest and honest men that we read of in the history of reform. After three centuries, in spite of all the detraction and odium heaped on his institution, his integrity, morality, and self-devotion are unimpeached and unimpeachable. A man would now be deemed a slanderer to say any thing against the character of this great founder of the Jesuits,” pp. 21-24.

This glowing description of the benefits conferred upon mankind by the Jesuits, is far from being exaggerated. It is the honorable testimony which history bears to the society at every period of its existence. Why then does the writer suddenly whirl round, to exhibit it as a vast scheme of ambition, hypocrisy and immorality? What a change has come over the spirit of his dream!

“As soon as the Jesuits, by their early virtues and their wonderful constitution, had gained an ascendancy in Europe—as soon as they became wide-spread, powerful, and wealthy, they, that is, the superior ones, became corrupt. Then, if not before, they commenced a systematic attempt to subjugate the reason and consciences of mankind—then did they mingle in all sorts of intrigues, and practice all sorts of arts to perpetuate the influence they had gained, and gratify their thirst for wealth and power. Ambition became their master passion. This absorbed all vulgar vices. They were not especially lukewarm, or lazy, or profligate; they continued learned, intrepid, and zealous; but they concentrated all the energies of their minds upon devising means to pervert education, to abuse the confessional privilege, and to corrupt

moral and political philosophy, and to do these things with a view of making youth and manhood—women, teachers and rulers—their blind and willing slaves.” p. 29.

The circle of slavery is here complete; the Jesuits having become slaves themselves, are to enslave mankind. Before we examine in detail the various agencies by which this wonderful transformation in their character and influence was effected, let us see whether, according to the statements of the writer himself, this change could have been possible. The superior Jesuits, that is, they who held authority, directed all their efforts to the unholy purposes of ambition and avarice throughout the world, to the perversion of education, and the corruption of moral and political philosophy. But here is a difficulty: if they accomplished this at all, it must have been through the medium of the inferior members; but how could the inferior members co-operate in such schemes, when, as the writer admits, they were good men, men of sincerity and morality? However paradoxical this may appear, he does not shrink from the solution of the mystery. He tells us that the inferior Jesuits were mere tools of their superiors, and knew nothing of what was going on in high places, (p. 28.) But the question still presents itself, how could the superiors pervert education and corrupt morality, except through the speaking, teaching and preaching of the inferiors? and if the vast majority of the latter were intelligent, learned and good men, as the writer acknowledges, how could they be ignorant of such designs, or knowingly connive at them? Moreover, how could the superiors and inferiors combined have hoodwinked mankind at large in reference to plans of corruption which could only be accomplished in broad day-light, and have so led them by the nose as to maintain for two hundred and thirty-three years all their credit and employments? By what eternal laws of mind will the writer clear up this difficulty? Vainly would he attempt it, for the simple reason that no man can make any thing consistent out of a downright absurdity. If the writer had estimated the designs of the Jesuits by their actions, instead of supposing their intentions bad, merely upon the authority of their enemies, he would not have committed this egregious blunder, as little flattering to his mental acuteness as honorable to his sense of justice.

But let us penetrate a little more deeply into the Jesuit scheme of perverting the world, which the writer very meekly terms their "satanic art—the source of all their iniquities." He informs us that this was carried on through the confessional, the instruction of youth, and the missions.

"They made sin, moreover, to consist in willfulness, and willfulness in the perfect knowledge of the nature of sin; according to which doctrine, the more blinded by the passions was the sinner, and, therefore, forgetful of his obligation, the greater his hope of pardon; because the conception of sin was the least clear. Habit and bad example became almost sufficient exculpation. And then they invented the doctrine of mental reservation, on which Pascal was so severe, according to which perjury was allowable when the perjured inwardly determined not to swear. Also, they defended the notion of probability, which disgraced their system of moral philosophy—according to which people might follow any opinion or practice they pleased, and which they knew to be wrong, provided authors of reputation had defended the same. They permitted men to do things which were unjustifiable, provided they could find a plausible excuse, or invent laws of expediency. For instance, a man might fight a duel, if by refusing to fight, he would be stigmatized as a coward—he might betray the confidence of his friend, if the betrayal would seem to benefit his party or his church. They tolerated the grosser vices, if by a system of casuistry those vices could be at all defended. They did not openly, as has been maintained, justify murder, falsehood, treachery and blasphemy, but they resolved every thing into the doctrine of expediency in its most undisguised form. Nor have they escaped the imputation of justifying the blackest political crimes, if these could be made subservient to the interests of their order, or the apparent advancement of the Catholic church." P. 30, &c.

Here are grave charges, all involving the old accusations of an accommodating casuistry and loose morality. Are these charges true? If they are, let the Jesuits be justly denounced as the corruptors of ethical principles; but, if they are not, then let the authors and retailers of these calumnies be visited with the indignation and opprobrium which their unblushing mendacity deserves. In the whole paragraph that we have quoted, there is not one single sentence true. The writer has cited only one authority, whose claims to veracity we shall duly consider, observing at the outset, that Pascal, instead of being a "brilliant ornament of the Catho-

lic church," as he says, was "one of the sorest afflictions that have pressed upon that church since the days of Luther." Every one acquainted with history is aware that in the 17th century a new sect arose under the name of Jansenists, so called because they advocated opinions which had been broached by Jansenius, bishop of Ypres. At the first intimation of these errors, the Jesuits rallied all their talents and learning in defending the doctrine of the church, and their zeal became an unpardonable offence in the eyes of the new party. When its leaders had exhausted in vain the weapons of serious argument, they had recourse to the shafts of ridicule, and Pascal, who had enlisted under the banners of Port-Royal, poured out upon his adversaries torrents of the bitterest irony and abuse. Such was the origin of the famous *Provincial Letters*, a work which has formed a kind of text-book for the enemies of the Jesuits, where they have drawn without any examination the most odious charges of ambition and loose morality. When Voltaire, a century later, found it impossible to reason down Christianity, he adopted the tactics of Pascal as the only effective means of putting it out of the way. Acting upon the principle that bold lying will always accomplish something,* he dealt out the most refined sarcasm and ridicule upon the books of holy writ, upon the priesthood, upon every thing sacred and august, and the world knows how far he succeeded in his impious attempts.

By this mean and dishonest mode of warfare did Pascal undertake to defend Jansenism, when it was falling off in credit and seemed almost crushed under the anathemas of the church. It was a sort of military diversion. To withdraw public attention from the errors of the new sect, of which he was a member, he turned his batteries against the Jesuits. For this purpose, he availed himself of a few erroneous decisions and lax principles which were found in some Jesuit theologians, and by altering texts, transposing and interpolating words, and adding his own remarks, he served them up in the most ludicrous light, to the infinite amusement of his readers. He not only pretended that the Jesuits whom he quoted were teachers of loose morality, but that the society in general was accountable for it, and that the whole

* *Calumniare audacter; semper aliquid adhœrebit.*

order had formed a conspiracy to obtain universal dominion over the world, by adopting a code of morals accommodated to every taste and to every passion. Is Pascal a credible witness against the Jesuits? We have already shown that the ambitious project of subjugating mankind by unworthy means was a chimera, a sheer paradox, if any thing ever deserved the name. Voltaire, who was no friend to religion or the Jesuits, remarks concerning the *Provincial Letters* that "the whole work was built upon a false foundation; for the extravagant notions of a few Spanish and Flemish Jesuits were artfully ascribed to the whole society. Many absurdities might likewise have been discovered among the Dominican and Franciscan casuists, but this would not have answered the purpose, for the whole raillery was to be leveled only at the Jesuits. These letters were intended to prove that the Jesuits had formed a design to corrupt mankind, a design which no sect or society ever had or can have. It was no concern of Pascal to be in the right, but merely to amuse the public."* Mr. Dallas, already quoted, pronounces the *Provincial Letters* the satirical effusions of a writer who had espoused the cause of the Jansenists, the violent opposers of the Jesuits.† Schœll, another Protestant writer, speaks of them as "a party production, in which bad faith attributed to the Jesuits questionable opinions which they had long before censured, and held the whole society responsible for the extravagant views of certain Spanish and Flemish writers."‡ These testimonies in reference to the character of Pascal's work, are beyond suspicion, and must necessarily produce in a candid mind the conviction that it should not be received without much caution, and that it cannot form any decisive authority against the Jesuits. In fact, if we look into the work itself, we shall discover that it bears upon the face of it the evidence of malice, that it is a tissue of studied falsifications and atrocious calumnies, as Father Daniel has so triumphantly proved,§ and that the author justly deserves to be branded with the crime, as Chateaubriand so forcibly expresses it, of having "bequeathed to us an immortal lie."|| Malice, however ingeni-

* *Siecle de Louis XIV*, tom. 3d, ch. 37.

† *New Conspir.* p. 15.

‡ *Cours d'histoire des Etats Europeens*, tom. 28, p. 79.

§ *In his Entretiens d'Eudoxe et de Cleanthe*.

|| *Etudes Historiques*, vol. 3, p. 600, *Hist. de France*.

ous, is often caught in its own snare ; thus do we find Pascal testifying against himself in an act of the most glaring injustice, and we may well say to him in the language of the gospel, " Out of thy own mouth I judge thee, thou wicked servant." In his 9th letter he introduces two Jesuit writers, Barry and Binet, discussing the advantages of devotion to the blessed Virgin Mary. By the omission of some words and the artful arrangement of others, he makes them say that a sinner, although leading a disorderly life, has every prospect of salvation, provided he wear a rosary on his arm ! " A person must be miserable indeed," says the interlocutor in the dialogue, " if he cannot once in his life put a rosary round his wrist or in his pocket, in order to insure his salvation, as they have done who have tried this experiment, and who have never failed of success, no matter how they lived." Father Binet is made to confirm this absurd doctrine with the utmost good grace, saying in relation to it, " What matters it how we get to heaven, if we only get there ?" Now, Pascal forgetting his promise at the outset of his attack upon the Jesuits, that he would hazard no statement without verifying it, adds in a postscript to the letter which we have quoted, that *after having written it* he met with the works of Fathers Barry and Binet, which were well worth seeing ! Of course he had not consulted these works when he imputed to their authors the nonsensical doctrine that we have noticed ; it was quite sufficient for his purpose to take the quotations from his friends as genuine, and dress them up in the form of an entertaining satire ; for, as Voltaire says, his object was not to state the truth, but to amuse the public.

In the 7th letter, Pascal thus caricatures the sentiments of the Jesuit Molina on the subject of homicide. This casuist being questioned as to the lawfulness of killing a robber who is running off with your property, replies in the affirmative, and remarks, " You would look in vain among the early fathers of the church, to ascertain the sum of money for which it would be lawful to kill a man ; the honor of this discovery was reserved for the distinguished Molina, who is the glory of our society, and who, in his inimitable prudence has fixed the amount at six or seven ducats, (or dollars ;) so that you may take the life of a man who has robbed you of this sum, although he is in the act of running away, . . . nay, you may do the same, even if the thief has

stolen only a crown (dollar) or less. Whence Escobar has laid down the general principle, that according to Molina it is lawful to kill a man for one crown.* Now, the fact is that Molina, in examining, as all theologians do, the different circumstances under which homicide is allowable, for instance, in the case of self-defence, remarks that "it is *not* permitted to kill a robber who is running off with five or six ducats;" and he repeats, in several parts of his works, that "homicide should always be discountenanced, no matter what may be the amount of the robbery."*

Our limited space will not permit us to adduce other instances of the fraud and malice which characterize the *Provincial Letters*;† but we have said enough to show that it is not honest or just to rely upon such authorities, for the trial or condemnation of a man, much less of a numerous society which has filled the world with the renown of its literary, scientific, religious and charitable labors.

Quæ regio in terris nostri non plena laboris ?

Though Pascal's work was read for its wit and humor, being, according to Racine, a very good comedy, at which even the demurest Jansenist was obliged to laugh, it must be remembered that the ecclesiastical and civil authorities both denounced it as a publication replete with falsehood and defamation.

Such, however, is the character of all the testimony from which Hume, Robertson, Ranke,‡ Macaulay and others have derived

* "Quando res non esset magni valoris, ut si esset solum valoris trium aut quatuor aut quinque ducatorum, consentit Sotus, consentiunt et alii, non licere fugientem interficere. Quand vero esset magni valoris, exiguaque esset spes illam postea recuperandi, affirmat Sotus fas in eo eventu esse illum interficere. Ne que id auderem condemnare; modo prius voce admoneretur, nisi rem relinquat, esse interficiendum. Semper tamen est consulendum ne proximus in eo eventu interficiatur." *Molina, tom. 4, tr. 3, disp. 16, num. 6.* In the case of killing where only one crown is at stake, Molina supposes that the owner is in danger of losing his life, and that he kills the robber in his efforts to defend himself. *Ibid. num. 4.* We take it that no one would complain of this doctrine as being too relaxed.

† For other examples of wanton perversion, see *Reponses aux Lettr. Prov.* 1658. *Hist de la Comp. de Jesus*, by Cretineau Joly, vol. 4, p. 46, &c. *New Disquis. concerning the Jesuits*, p. 186, &c.

‡ Though Ranke is less coarse in his exposition of the pretended principles of Jesuit ethics, he grossly misrepresents them, and falls into the common error of quoting from hostile authorities, and of concluding from particulars to generals. For instance, to prove a degeneracy in the society, he relies chiefly upon an Italian manuscript, which he admits to be throughout hostile in its tone, of a satirical character, and local in its complaints. *Hist. of Papacy*, vol. 2, p. 525. The doctrine which he imputes to Busenbaum, a Jesuit divine, that "habit, nay, even a wicked example, inasmuch as they control the freedom of the will, suffice for exculpation" of the sinner, is nowhere to be found in that author: it is an igno-

their abominable charges against the Society of Jesus. They are all traceable to the *Provincial Letters*, the *Monita Secreta*, the *Histoire des Jesuites*, the *Extraits des Assertions*, the *Compte Rendu*, which, with a host of minor publications, emanated from the most violent enemies of the Jesuits, and were fabrications of sheer malice.* These are the only authorities for the atrocious calumnies repeated by our writer, for instance, that according to the doctrine of the Jesuits perjury was allowable, that people might follow any opinion or practice they pleased, although they knew it to be wrong, provided some author of reputation had defended the same, &c. If such was ever the doctrine of the Jesuits, why is not some document produced for which the society may be justly held responsible? It is not enough for this, to produce the isolated opinion of some Jesuit, who in theological discussion was led to the adoption of a rather relaxed principle, although in good faith, and more as a matter of scholastic polemics than a rule of practical conduct. We might in the same way, by taking up the peculiar views of some commentator on law, make the whole legal fraternity responsible, and represent all judges and lawyers as an army of conspirators against moral philosophy. What matters it that Escobar, for instance, thought dueling allowable under certain circumstances? Is it just to cast upon the whole society the responsibility of such an opinion, when it was condemned and opposed by all his brethren? Even if every charge which Pascal and others have preferred against the theologians whom they attack, were true, (which it is not,) how could the society numbering so many thousands of persons distributed in different countries of the world, be justly represented as holding and inculcating the objectionable views contained in the writings of those divines, especially as these views were combated and opposed in hundreds of works that had issued from the same society? If a whole

rant and unwarrantable deduction of the historian from the sound principle laid down by Busenbaum, that full advertency and consent are required to constitute a mortal sin. The inference can no more be imputed to him than we could infer from the civil law, that because it requires malice aforethought for murder in the first degree, it would therefore excuse the murderer who would kill another in consequence of being in bad company, or in the habit of assassination. This is but one instance of Ranke's unfairness.

* The *Secreta Monita* was written by an outcast from the society, in 1616, *Hist. des Jesuites*, by Coudrette, *Extraits des Assertions* by Jansenists, at the head of whom was Dom. Clemeneet, the *Compte Rendu* by Monclar and Chalotais, ostensibly, two magistrates in the interest of the philosophical party.

class or profession is to be made responsible for the acts of an individual that belongs to it, what body of men can escape censure and condemnation? Is the whole order of judges or magistrates to be denounced because a few of them prove recreant to their honorable calling? Is our whole republican system to be rejected, because some unprincipled demagogues do not hesitate to court the patronage of the mob? Are all our statesmen and fellow citizens the enemies of social order, because the Missouri rioters or the fanatical free-soilers oppose the peaceful operation of the laws? Our writer must either embrace these absurd conclusions, or he must abandon the charges which he has brought against the company of Jesus.

He has alluded to the doctrine of probability or probabilism, which is the great bugbear held up by Pascal and others against the Jesuits. But what are the real facts of the case? Of the theologians belonging to the society, who have written on moral divinity, (and they number over five hundred,) the great majority have always adopted the principles which were commonly received in the Catholic schools. In fact, they are required by their constitutions to follow the safer and more approved teaching, *securiorem et magis approbatam doctrinam*,* and at the time when the theory of probabilism was acquiring a scholastic form, and becoming a subject of warm discussion, the superior general addressed a decree to the whole society, in order to check the run of some doubtful principles which had been proclaimed.† But, what is probabilism? The adversaries of the Jesuits, without any clear or definite ideas on the subject, take it for granted that it was a sort of *carte blanche* given by the latter for doing right or wrong; not considering that the doctrine of probabilism, as defended by them, presents itself for application almost daily in the conduct of life. Though the dictates of the natural and the positive divine law, are in many cases clear and certain, there are many other cases in which the law itself or its application is doubt-

* Constitution, part 4, ch. 5.

† This decree was issued in 1617 by Mutio Vitelleschi. We may remark here, that the system of probabilism was not introduced by the Jesuits, as Pascal falsely asserts. It was already a doctrine of the schools, when it was first assailed by the Jesuits Rebello and Comitolo, in 1608 and 1609, and those of the society who maintained it, did so with much caution and moderation. See *New Disquisition*, p. 182, &c.

ful ; and the question then arises, how are we to act ? Now the whole mystery of probabilism consists in answering this question. It tells us that man is free, that an uncertain or unknown law is not binding, and therefore when the reasons against the existence of the law are as strong or nearly as strong as those in favor of it we are not bound under pain of sin to observe it.* What is there so very objectionable in this doctrine ? What is it but a rule for the prudent formation of one's conscience in a state of doubt or uncertainty ? It is easily conceived, for instance, that a writer, without having a very delicate conscience, might have a reasonable fear of violating the eighth commandment, by preferring charges of a disreputable nature against the character of an individual or community, when he has not inquired sufficiently into their truth, or knows that the evidence for rejecting is at least as strong as that for admitting them. In such a case, (and it is a very common one,) probabilism would teach him to remain silent, lest he expose himself to commit an injustice against his neighbor. It cannot be denied that, if the principles of a sound probabilism were a little more prevalent amongst us, we would not witness that ferment of minds in regard to certain questions, which threatens at times the dissolution of our Union. How do Protestant slave-holders satisfy their conscience that domestic slavery is not a moral evil, except upon the principle of probabilism ? And why do they who hold the opposite opinion lend themselves, with all the turbulence of passion, to the violation of the national laws, except by acting in opposition to the principles of probabilism ? Did they consider that the higher law which they recognize, or its application, is at the most very doubtful, how much ill-will, mutual recrimination, and social disorder would at once be obviated ? The principles of probabilism rightly understood have always formed a necessary part of ethical philosophy, and Catholic divines have only reduced them to a systematic form. If a few Jesuits, in the speculative consideration of certain points, have hazarded opinions that were rather relaxed, we repeat that their views were not advanced as settled rules of conduct, much less can they be taken as the sentiments of the Society to which they

* In a certain class of cases, for instance those in which the interest of the neighbor is involved, the safer opinion of the two equally probable is to be followed. Ravignan, *Life and Institute of the Jesuits*, Gury's Theology, vol. 1.

belonged, or as indicative of a stupendous scheme of ambition on the part of that society, to subjugate the world to its dominion by an accommodating system of casuistry. Pascal and his imitators may indulge their slanderous propensities, but when we consider that notwithstanding the most odious charges against the Jesuits on the score of loose principles, not one of them could be convicted of loose morality in practice; that at the very time when the fiercest animosity and persecution were raging against them, Grotius and other distinguished Protestants were eloquent in their praise;* that while charged with the design of corrupting mankind, the society was diffused over the whole world, "with its learned doctors, its thousands of saintly men, its apostles, its confessors, its martyrs; renouncing rank, renouncing wealth, renouncing their own will—preaching to the poor, carrying the gospel to the ends of the earth—encountering in their divine mission, pestilence and cold and hunger and long watchings and endless toils, and the rack and the gibbet and the sword," that while its enemies were loud and active in slandering it, the society had its Bellarmine, its Petaus, its Bourdaloue, its Suarez, its Schall, its Canisius, its Claver, its Regis, its Charlevoix—men who illustrated the true spirit of the institute, and at the same time exhibited to the admiration of the world the highest elevation to which human character can attain, in the sacred and profane sciences, in letters, in spirituality, in piety, in pulpit oratory, in the labors of the apostleship, in the cause of charity and civilization; when we cast our eyes upon this imposing picture, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that Pascal and his followers, instead of fixing the charge of unsound ethics upon the company of Jesus, have proved beyond question their own loose morality, by the invention and systematic propagation of lies against their fellow-men, which could only have been inspired by the basest passions, aroused and inflamed by that dark spirit whom eternal Truth has pronounced a liar and the father of lies.

But let us see how the Jesuits aimed at the dominion of the world by the instruction of youth. The writer says:

* *Mores inculpatos, bonas artes, magna in vulgum auctoritas ob vitæ sanctionem. Sapienter imperant, fideliter parent. Novissimi omnium sectas priores fama vicere, hoc ipso cæteris inveni, &c.* Grotius, *Hist.* l. 3, p. 273, Amst., 1658.

† Rev. Dr. Murray, *Essays chiefly theolog.* vol. 1, p. 183.

“ Their system of education again, though popular and specious, and in many respects excellent, was dangerous to the best interests of society and religion. It is true that some of the best scholars and greatest men of Europe were educated in their schools.

“ It is true that they gave a more religious education than had before been prevalent; it is true that the moral training was a great improvement on the old system; that the youth was trained to subdue his temper, to curb his passions, to discipline his will, to avoid quarrels and oaths, to be tranquil, patient and modest. It is true that great attainments were made in all departments of science and literature—that the most finished classical and mathematical scholars of christendom were sent out of their establishment, and not only finished scholars, but finished gentlemen—still, with all these high merits, which we are quite ready to acknowledge, influences were brought to bear on the human mind, which narrowed and prejudiced it, and made it subsequently hostile to all great and liberal movements, especially of a popular kind.”—pp. 31, 32.

What influences were those brought to bear on the mind of youth? The reader will be surprised to learn that these influences consisted in requiring young folks to observe the rules of a college, in their conduct being watched, in their not being allowed to read, without a previous expurgation, certain editions of the classics that were full of obscenity. The writer indeed informs us that “important truths were concealed or glossed over” in their education; but what truths he has not condescended to explain: nor has he told us in what way the Jesuits broke the wills of their students “on a wheel,” and “perverted their conscience.” How the consciences of young people could be perverted, when, as the writer admits, “the love of virtue and the fear of God” were instilled into their hearts, he will perhaps explain to us hereafter. In the meantime, we cannot but think that, according to our American notions of education, if boys are trained in Jesuit colleges to all the virtues and good qualities which the writer mentions; if they become obedient, modest, peaceable and orderly, finished scholars and accomplished gentlemen, our people are peculiarly blessed in having some of these institutions in their midst, and would do well to avail themselves of them, our writer’s fears for “all great and liberal movements” notwithstanding. Such apprehensions on his part are, to say the least, rather puerile, and if he wishes to be convinced of it, let

him consult in the past that bright luminary in the scientific world, Chancellor Bacon, of England, who says: "As to the education of youth, we may say all in one word. Look at the schools of the Jesuits, for there is nothing better than what they practice."* In another place he remarks: "The most beautiful portion of ancient discipline has been somehow revived in the colleges of the Jesuits. I cannot witness the application and ability of these masters in cultivating the minds and forming the morals of the young, without remembering the words of Agesilaus to Pharnabazus, 'Being what you are, how I wish that you were amongst us!'" In this country, lord Bacon's testimony is fully confirmed by the high character of the educational establishments under the charge of the Jesuits. Let the thousands of our citizens, Protestant and Catholic, who have studied in those institutions, and who are now honorably engaged in the various avocations of life, bear witness to the talents, the learning, the skill of their former preceptors; to their virtuous and laborious life, to the paternal solicitude which they evinced for the welfare of their pupils, and especially to the zeal with which they strove to inspire their youthful hearts with a pure and ardent patriotism. Let the honored name of Gaston, whom North Carolina is proud to number among her noblest sons, whose professional eminence as a jurist was equaled only by the purity of his character as a man, refute the driveling libel upon the educational system of the Jesuits. Among them did he learn those principles and acquire that virtue and knowledge, which afterwards distinguished him as one of the most exalted illustrations of American character, and made him the ornament and pride of his native state as well as an honor to the nation at large.

Our limits will not permit us to notice the inaccuracies of the writer in alluding to the literary and scientific attainments of the Jesuits; but we cannot refrain from quoting the following paragraph:

"D'Alembert says that the order never yet produced a man sufficiently enlightened to merit the name of a philosopher. They never sought to go beyond their age. They had no abstract and ideal standards. They were scholars, in order to appropriate knowledge and direct men, not to diffuse it, not to

* *De dignit. et aug. scient. lib. vii, p. 138.*

give impulse to society. They sought to guard the avenues of thought, not to open them," &c. p. 33.

It is true that the Jesuits never had any philosophers according to "D'Alembert's" views of the subject ; for they were the friends and champions, not the haters and revilers of Christianity. Nor did they go "beyond their age," in the sense of so many visionaries of our times, who are always speculating about the future, in the darkness of which they lose themselves and run mad, instead of attending to the present age and actual duties to which Providence has appointed them. Nor had they any "abstract and ideal standards," because they dealt in realities, not in the dreams of our modern rationalists and transcendentalists, who are "ever learning and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth."* But, to infer from this that they did not diffuse knowledge, or that they fettered the legitimate operations of the mind, is as unphilosophical as it is false. What body of men, secular or religious, have produced so many learned works in every department of human science? Are these literary labors an evidence of their attempt to keep the lamp of knowledge under the bushel? As to philosophy, the Jesuits have not indeed applied themselves especially to metaphysical theories, because the great object of their teaching was practical, to direct all knowledge to its real and ultimate end, the eternal salvation of man. But, notwithstanding this, how many distinguished names among them who have traveled with honor and success the hidden paths of philosophical science? Who have thrown more light upon these topics than Suarez, Gracian, Rapin and Buffier? Though D'Alembert asserted that the Society of Jesus never produced a philosopher, this did not prevent him and Diderot from copying a large portion of their *Encyclopedie* from a work of the last mentioned Jesuit ; nor is it less certain that in 1755, when the French Academy offered a prize for the best effort of eloquence on the question, "What is the true spirit of philosophy," Father Guenard pronounced a discourse which entitled him to the highest honors, and elicited universal admiration from that illustrious body of *savans*, because he taught them what most of our modern philosophers have yet

to learn, the limit beyond which it is not lawful for human reason to pass.*

In regard to the missions, another means by which the Jesuits undertook to enslave the world, the writer says :

“We would detract nothing from those intrepid and successful missionaries, who gained the ear of the potent emperor of China, who succeeded in controlling the empire of Japan, who tamed the ferocity of the North American Indian, who were friends to the African on the soil whence he was kidnapped and in the lands where he was enslaved, and who, while the remorseless Spaniard was hunting the Mexican and Peruvian with bloodhounds and persecuting them with inhuman cruelties, were realizing in Paraguay, the ideal paradise of man—a Utopia where no murders nor robberies are said to have been perpetrated, where unparalleled labors of charity and benevolence were performed, and where the blessed flowers of peace and harmony bloomed in gardens of almost primeval loveliness.

But, notwithstanding all the merited panegyrics that have been lavished on these successful missionaries, they instructed their converts only in a mere nominal faith—they taught them no allegiance but to the pope of Rome, and to themselves as his appointed ministers. They gave the idolater the crucifix, but not the Bible. They permitted him to retain most of his ancient superstitions and degrading customs. They even professed a sympathy with his institutions, and sought to remove but few of his prejudices. It is said that Robert de Nobili traced his lineage to Brahma, and that one of his brethren in America told the savages that Christ was a warrior who scalped women and children. They at last excited the envy of their converts by their extravagance and pomp, and irritated them by their cupidity and intrigues. It is certain they made no permanent conquests, not even in Paraguay and China. They were even expelled from those peaceful lands. Why, if they preached God’s eternal truth, did no vestiges remain of their success on the banks of the Amazon, or among the thousands whom they converted in Japan?” (Pp. 34, 35.)

Here is a precious specimen of consistency. Under the influence of the Jesuits Paraguay became an earthly paradise, where crime was unknown, where charity, peace and harmony universally prevailed ; yet the inhabitants had only a *nominal* faith ! What a pity that this faith is not more extensively known in the United States ! Our country is convulsed with political strife ; it

* Cretineau Joly, *ibid.* vol. 4.

is the theatre of every angry passion ; our eyes grow dim, if they do not weep over the catalogue of murders, robberies, peculations, riotings, and the awful consequences of trifling with human life, which are daily brought to us on the wings of the telegraph. Would it not be well, after all the experiments that have been made in vain, to try the efficacy of some *nominal* faith like that which gave to the Paraguayans the perfection of terrestrial happiness? If this nominal faith produced such a transformation of that savage people, would it not be capable also of taming the ferocity of the Florida Indians, and thus saving the government the immense expenditure required for a standing army? But the Jesuits gave the Indians the *crucifix* and not the *Bible* ! Where is the proof of this ? Moreover, is not the crucifix, properly understood, bible enough for any man ? Is it not an epitome of all the truths of Christianity ? Take an American to the tent or to the tomb of Washington ; will any thing further be required to kindle his patriotism and excite him to generous deeds ? *They permitted him to retain most of his ancient superstitions* : where is the reliable authority for this assertion ? Or, how can we conciliate the idea of an earthly paradise where every virtue reigned, with *most of the superstitions* that had characterized a set of cannibals ! *It is said* that one of Nobili's brethren told the savages that Christ was a warrior, &c. It was also said once, that Christ was an impostor, a seducer of the people, an enemy of the law of Moses ; but let not the writer imagine that he will escape before high heaven the responsibility of these outrageous calumnies against the Jesuits, merely because somebody uttered them before him. This kind of probabilism is altogether indefensible. *It is certain* they made *no permanent conquests*, &c. If it is certain, how happens it that the Indians of Lower Canada and the Abenakis within our own borders are still Catholic ? If it is *certain*, how did the Jesuits, on their re-entering China in 1841, find in Nanking and Chan-Tong nearly 150,000 of their converts who had remained steadfast in their faith ?* If they made no permanent conquests, how is it that Catholicity still prevails in Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, and the Rhenish provinces, after having been reclaimed by Jesuit missionaries, two hundred and fifty years ago, from the new

* Cret. Joly, *ibid.* vol. vi.

ideas which had spread over those countries at the time of the reformation? The writer asks why there remained no vestige of their success on the Amazon? Why, may we ask with equal reason, did no vestige of the gospel remain in countries evangelized by the apostles themselves, in Asia Minor, in Syria, in Jerusalem, after they had fallen under the dominion of the Turks? How could the magnificent creations of Jesuit zeal in Paraguay subsist, when they themselves were driven out by cruel tyrants, by Spanish and Portuguese avarice, from the scene of their labors, and their neophytes were scattered in every direction by the same power to die in the mines, or to be re-barbarized by commingling again with their savage brethren of the forest, without any religious assistance?*

This is the common sense as well as the historical answer to the question. Is it not manifest that if the Jesuits succeeded in christianizing the most degraded and most ferocious savages, and bringing them to a state of civilization which has been universally considered a masterpiece of wisdom and the perfection of earthly happiness, they had the ability to preserve this structure of their zeal and self-denying charity, so long as they were left free to pursue their labor of love? If they preserved it for over one hundred and fifty years, why could they not always maintain it? We fear that the plainest explanation of the fact will still be obscure to minds which view things only in these "eternal principles," by which the Jesuits, in spite of all their glorious achievements for the benefit of mankind, are always a set of villains, actuated by the worst motives and justly doomed to destruction. Listen to our writer's philosophy of history:

"And here we are impressed with the important truth that a bad system—a *regime* founded on ambition and duplicity, carries the seeds of its own speedy decay. The same policy which insures temporary and brilliant success, also as certainly insures destruction. This is one of the eternal laws of the moral Governor of the universe. In accordance with this law the Jesuits fell, and deservedly.

"At last, their increasing corruptions, their atrocities, and their intrigues to perpetuate the power they had gained, were known to the most discriminating people of Europe, even among the Catholics. Their hollow system was exposed," &c. pp. 35, 36.

*For a full account of this, and a complete refutation of the charges of ambition, avarice and sedition, see work of Mr. Dallas, p. 153, &c.

We can scarcely restrain our indignation when called upon to refute such rhapsodies. It would be curious to know by what "eternal law," according to our writer, the apostles of Christ fell. Their pagan persecutors indeed imagined that they suffered for their crimes; and upon the same principle precisely does the writer consign the Jesuits to ruin and contempt, while the most superficial investigation of the subject, conducted in a spirit of truth and justice, would have informed him that the dissolution of the society of Jesus in the last century, was the consequence only of a most frightful conspiracy against every thing sacred and divine. "The reign of Clement XIII," says the Protestant historian Schœll, "fell upon an unfortunate epoch for the ecclesiastical power. A combination had been formed between the old Jansenists and the philosophical party; or rather these two factions tending to the same end, worked together so harmoniously that they might easily have been considered as acting in concert. The Jansenists, under the garb of a great religious zeal, and the philosophers with an affectation of philanthropy and of representing the enlightenment of the age, concurred to overthrow the authority of the pope. Many were so blinded as to make common cause with a sect which, had they known its designs, they would have held in abhorrence. Such errors are not unfrequent, every age has its own, and few men have the energy to escape them. Towards the middle of the 18th century, the revolutionists, who aimed at the destruction of monarchies, wished first to overthrow the power of the church, because they knew that for a long time its interests had been tied up with those of the civil power, which in an ignorant age it had opposed. But, in order to put down the ecclesiastical power, it was necessary to isolate it by taking away from it the support of that sacred phalanx which had devoted itself to the defence of the papacy, viz: the Jesuits. Such was the real cause of the hatred borne to the society. The imprudences of a few members of the order furnished weapons for assailing it, and a general war ensued against it; or rather, to hate and persecute the Society of Jesus, whose existence was so linked with that of the Catholic religion and the throne, became a title to the name of philosopher."* Ranke, in portraying the spirit of the 18th cen-

* Cours d'histoire, tom. 44, p. 71.

tury, confirms this statement of Schœll. After alluding to the great influence which the Jesuits still possessed, he adds: "During the conflict of these two hostile tendencies (Catholic and anti-Catholic,) in the middle of the 18th century, the helm of affairs in almost all Catholic countries fell into the hands of reforming ministers; Choiseul in France, Wall and Squillace in Spain Tanucci at Naples, Carvalho in Portugal; all men who made it the object of their lives to keep down the preponderance of the ecclesiastical element. In them the church opposition was represented and became powerful; their own position depended upon it.—Open hostility became the more inevitable, as the Jesuits by their resistance and by the influence which they exerted in the highest circles, thwarted all their measures."*

Here we have the real starting point from which to survey the causes that brought about the destruction of the Jesuits. They formed the chief bulwark of Catholicism against its enemies: but, as the ministers in power at the Bourbon courts, with Carvalho of Portugal, infected with the false philosophy of the times, were aiming at the subversion of church authority, and as this could not be effected so long as the Jesuits retained their schools, and pursued their apostolic and pastoral labors, the latter were doomed to destruction. All this is summed up in a few words by Voltaire, the captain of the philosophic herd, in a letter to Helvetius (1761.) "The Jesuits once put aside, we shall have a fine triumph over the *infame* (that is, the christian religion.) The signal for the commencement of the attack was given in Portugal. Carvalho, a monster of ambition, cruelty and avarice, broke up, root and branch, the splendid missions of Paraguay, that earthly paradise, in order to work a pretended gold-mine; and as the Indians, with something of Anglo Saxon spirit, demurred at the orders of the tyrant, (although urged by the Jesuits to obey,) he accused the latter of inciting the inhabitants to revolt. If they had done so, (and they might have succeeded,) it would have been adding only another bright jewel to their crown, according to American principles. But the Indians were dispersed and the Jesuits driven out; and by a similar act of barbarity they were soon expelled

**Hist. of the Papacy*, vol. 2, p. 295.

from Portugal, in 1759.* In France, the Jansenists and encyclopedists were not less active in their warfare against the Society. Backed by the minister Choiseul and Madam de Pompadour, mistress of Louis XV, (whose disorders the Jesuit confessor of the court constantly opposed, and whose vengeance was accordingly vowed against the order,) they flooded the country with a thousand libelous publications, in order to blacken the character of the society. D'Alembert led off with his book *De la destruction des Jesuites*, which he wrote at the instigation of Voltaire, and with the encouragement of Pompadour, Choiseul and Carvalho. This was followed by the *Extraits des Assertions*, which was proved to contain no less than twelve hundred falsifications of texts from Jesuit writers. Such were the preliminaries which led to the dissolution of the Society in France, in 1762, by a decree of the parliament. How was it in Spain? "Every means was employed," says Schœll, "to impress the king with the idea that the Jesuits were a fearful body, and their enemies at length succeeded by an atrocious calumny. A forged letter purporting to have been written by the superior general to some one in Spain, was placed in his royal hands, in which he was charged with being a bastard. This absurd fiction so affected the mind of the king, that he consented to the expulsion of the Jesuits.† This took place in 1767, when over six thousand Jesuits were banished from their high and holy functions in Spain and its Asiatic, African and American dependencies, in the most summary and barbarous manner.‡

While all these infernal machinations were going on, there was a universal outcry against them on the part of the Catholic episcopacy. Not less than two hundred letters were received by Clement XIII, from the bishops in every part of the world, eulogizing the Society of Jesus, and loudly and eloquently attesting its faithful and incomparable labors, in stemming the tide of irreligion, in the instruction of youth, in the toils of the apostleship, in deeds of humanity. Fifty-one French prelates, assembled at

* Murr, (a Protestant.) *Hist. des Jesuites en Portugal*, 1787, 2 vols. Dallas, *New Conspiracy*, p. 153, &c.—Memoirs of the ministry of Carvalho.

† Flassen, *Hist. de la Diplom.* tom. v.—Schœll already quoted.

‡ *Ibid.* See also Murr, *Jour.* tom. 9. Coxe, *Spain under Bourbon Kings*, vol. 5.

§ Journal of Barnaby, an Anglican minister, London, 1804.

Paris in 1761, addressed a lengthy opinion to the king in favor of the society, refuting the foul slanders against it and demanding his protection.* Thirty other bishops, who had not attended the convention, concurred in the sentiments of the address, which at the same time re-echoed the voice of the flocks under their charge. Duclos and Laffrey, no friends to the Jesuits, both inform us that the great majority of the nation regretted the loss of the Jesuit fathers.† As to Spain, on the 4th of Nov. 1768, the feast day of the king's patron-saint, when Charles III appeared in public, and according to custom was to grant some popular petition, the immense crowd, with one voice and to the utter astonishment and confusion of the court, demanded the restoration of the Jesuits.‡ But in vain did the whole Catholic world raise its voice in their defence. Pombal and the Bourbon courts would be satisfied with nothing short of the entire dissolution of the order, and they urged this demand before Clement XIV, as the essential condition on which they would entertain amicable relations with the holy see. Under these circumstances, and as a matter of expediency, to avert a prospective schism, Clement XIV issued in 1773 the brief by which he reluctantly suppressed the company of Jesus as a regular order, throughout the world.§

* *Proces Verbaux du clerge*, tom. viii, part 2. In regard to this fact, Ranke has committed a remarkable blunder for a writer pretending to the character of historian. He makes the French bishops say that the obedience of the Jesuits in France to their superior-general, was "irreconcilable with the laws of the kingdom and with the duties of subjects in general." (Vol. 2. p. 299.) For this statement he refers to a letter of Praslin in Flassen's *History of French Diplomacy*, and to Saint-Priest, *Chute des Jesuites*. Now Flassen informs us that Praslin, minister of foreign affairs in France, was a bitter enemy of the Jesuits, and was in the habit of altering the official dispatches respecting them. With this information, how could Ranke rely upon Praslin as a credible authority on this subject? As to Saint-Priest, we think with Cretineau Joly that he was involuntarily betrayed into this error, as it is difficult to suppose that he could have willfully made such a glaring mis-statement. D'Alembert, Cretineau Joly, Dallas, Ravignan, and the author of the *New Disquisition*, all mention the address of the bishops to the king as highly commendatory of the society. Moreover, we have before us the entire document, which occupies twenty-six pages, 8vo., nearly twelve of which regard the power of the superior general, and there is not a sentence in it favorable to the statement of Ranke. On the contrary, it contains the very reverse of that statement. Towards the end, it says: "All which things considered, we are of opinion that no alteration should be made in the Jesuits' rule, with regard to the power and authority of the general." In another place we read: "The Jesuits, according to their rules, do not profess any other obedience to their general than is consistent with their duty towards their king and country." All this proves that Ranke has hazarded the gravest assertions upon suspicious authority, instead of consulting as he should have done, the original sources of information. See *Proces Verbaux des Assemblées-generales, du clerge*.

† Duclos, *voyage en Italie*—Laffrey, *vie privée de Louis XV.*

‡ Coxe, loc. cit.

§ Schœll, *Cours d'hist.*, tom. 44.

Such was the law by which the Jesuits fell, by the triumph of falsehood over truth, of iniquity over justice. By this law, so common in the world, six hundred and sixty-nine colleges, one hundred and seventy-one seminaries, two hundred and seventy-one missions, and other houses, in which over twenty-two thousand members of the society were employed in every thing honorable to God and salutary to man, were disbanded, without any form of trial, to silence the howlings of the wicked, in whom avarice, lust, hatred and impiety had stifled every dictate of reason, religion and humanity. But the persecutors of the Jesuits fell by a different law, by that "eternal" law according to which the vengeance of the Almighty never fails to overtake his enemies, and not unfrequently in this world. It is a remarkable fact that the principal agents in the overthrow of the Jesuits, were soon expelled from power and disgraced in the eyes of men on account of their crimes: such was the case with Choiseul, D'Aranda, Monino, Tannucci, du Tillot and Pombal. The last mentioned, convicted of various capital offences, would have suffered an ignominious death, had he not been protected by the court of France; as it was, he was driven into exile, an object of universal execration, and his body became covered with a loathsome leprosy, as if to show some correspondence between the outward man and the filthy soul within. Nor did the evil stop here; one generation had scarcely arisen after the suppression of the Jesuits, when all Europe was entangled in bloody wars, and society was shaken to its very foundations. It is not wonderful, however, that after a new generation had been formed in the schools of Voltaire instead of the Jesuit academies, the basis of social order should begin to totter, and that, to usher in the reign of terror, the goddess of reason, in the form of a prostitute, should be enshrined on the altars of the eternal God!

Will the Jesuits, it is asked, "succeed in their warfare against liberal opinions—against the principles of spiritual Christianity." We indignantly answer, No, because they are engaged in no warfare of this kind. In religion they recognize no other than a spiritual Christianity, whose object is to sanctify men and secure their eternal salvation. In religion they herald a truth revealed by the Saviour, to be transmitted without change to the end of

time, and therefore to be learned as all past events from competent testimony, and not to be evolved from the speculations of the human mind. The religion which they preach is not of yesterday; it has triumphed over the violence of paganism, over the ignorance of barbarism, over error in all its diverging forms. It is a religion that has civilized the world; that still produces its apostles, its martyrs, its sisters of charity, and continues with unabated zeal and vigor its mission of peace and love to mankind. In all affairs the Jesuits admit no other than the most liberal principles. The whole aim and spirit of their institute, as their constitutions profess and their history proves, is to illustrate the sublimest generosity of which the human heart is capable; to renounce all worldly interest, pleasures and distinctions for the purpose of laboring in all difficulty, danger, suffering, and often at the expense of life itself, for the temporal and eternal happiness of their fellow-beings. Jean de Muller, a distinguished Protestant writer, describes the Society of Jesus as "an institution, the results of which may be compared to those of the most important institutions and legislators of antiquity." In social and political questions the Jesuits are entitled to their opinions like other men; but their policy, as well as their obligation, is to obey the established order of things. If in union with all good men they are no advocates of that liberal opinion which shows itself in freebooting and filibusterism, it is because they think we have a sufficient subject of responsibility in the blessings we have received from a bountiful Providence, without invading the rights of others. If they object to that liberal opinion which results in the contempt of parental authority, in the vilification of official station, in the assumption of the law by the mob, it is because they know that whatever may be the frame work which a people are free to adopt for their social and political institutions, they have not the liberty to trench upon those immutable principles of the natural law, which define the essential relations between superiors and inferiors, and lie at the very basis of all national and domestic happiness. They do not applaud that liberal opinion which produces an unrestrained license of speech and allows men to publish the grossest calumnies against their neighbor, but they understand how to return good for evil, and blessing for reviling;

for instance, while our book stores are every where placarded with the foulest slanders against them, they know how to risk their lives amid the ravages of pestilence for the benefit of their suffering fellow-beings.* They do not comprehend that sort of liberal opinion which begets tyranny, which with the sacred name of freedom on its lips would attempt to rob peaceable and loyal citizens of their birth-right, that precious boon for which their forefathers poured out their treasure and their blood ; but they cherish that true and practical liberality which, under the old colonial government of Maryland and under the auspices of the Jesuits, first exhibited to the world an illustration of civil and religious freedom. Such was the liberality which they professed and *practiced*, and the blessings of which were interrupted only by the ascendancy of a party that held liberal opinions of another kind. But, when the reign of liberty was to be inaugurated anew, the Jesuits again showed themselves unsurpassed in patriotic feeling. As long as American history will be read, the name of Carroll, the Jesuit priest, will be transmitted with those of Franklin and Carroll of Carrollton, as one of the most ardent friends of the struggle for national independence. The country has now for eighty-two years been blessed with republican institutions, offering an asylum to the oppressed of every clime, and proving the practicability of a people's living together, without distinction of race or religion, in the bonds of fraternal peace, and the enjoyment of unbounded prosperity. The parricidal arm has indeed been lifted, to strike down this beautiful system of liberty and happiness.—The legislature, the ballot-box, the dark machinations of the club, even the sacred influence of the pulpit, have been perverted to the ignoble end of destroying the characteristic and the proudest feature of our political system ; but, when the history of our own times will have been written, no Jesuit name will figure in that tale of treason.

With these facts and considerations before us, there is no reason to ask whether the Jesuits will succeed in their warfare against liberal opinions ; let it be asked, rather, why should men

* At this very moment the Jesuits and Sisters of Charity are illustrating this sort of liberality in Norfolk, whither they hastened upon the breaking out of the yellow fever.

take up stories of a past age, to inflame the angry passions of the present generation ; what good is to be accomplished, either in public or private, by converting the press into an engine of re-crimination, hatred and war ? The cause of truth and justice forbids it ; the civilization of our age forbids it, the genius of our institutions forbids it, the circumstances of our political condition forbid it. The vital element of republicanism lies in the general disposition on the part of the citizens to shun falsehood, injustice, and whatever is capable of disturbing the reign of harmony and good feeling. It was a maxim recognized under the ancient Roman republic, and it is the time for all true friends of their country to proclaim it ; *neque tanta fortunis omnium pernicies potest accedere, quam opinione populi Romani rationem veritatis, integritatis, fidei, religionis, ab hoc ordine adjudicari.**

ART. IV.—THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA. 1851.

THERE are times in the history of States and people, when the mind of the cautious thinker pauses to meditate and reflect, when the waters of some mighty moral and political deluge, which have swept away for ever cherished and venerated institutions, long established opinions and principles, have subsided, and all is still and calm in the moral and political world, the wise and thoughtful weigh deeply and correctly, the immediate effects, as well as the more remote consequences, likely to result to society, either for good or for evil, from the deep and radical changes which have been wrought in the frame work of society.

In the silent lapse of years, in the vicissitudes of events, in the mutations of time, changes, moral and political, take place in the opinions, character and policy of people and governments, as entire and pervading as those which are marked by the tumult and carnage of violent revolution. History affords no instance of this truth more striking than the recent utter and complete revolution in the fundamental law of Virginia. This era is marked by the Constitution of 1851.

* Cicero, in Verrem, Act. 2.

A complete dissertation on the new constitution would far transcend the limits of this article, and would indeed embrace the whole science of government. I shall confine myself to an examination of its most important principles and practical provisions. In discussing the organization of the Legislature, the provisions of the constitution relating to the right of suffrage, are of the first importance.

What mode of representation, what qualification of the right of suffrage, is most likely to secure the liberty and happiness of a people circumstanced like the people of Virginia, is a question of the deepest and most vital interest.

In a republican government, the right of suffrage is the source and fountain of all power. In order to secure the wise and just administration of the government, the right of suffrage ought to be vested in that class of men who have the largest share of sense and virtue; who, possessing the property, are connected and identified in interest with the interests of the state, who "have sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community." The fixed, stable qualification of land is in the commonwealth of Virginia the only sufficient evidence of interest in, and attachment to, the community. The freehold qualification of suffrage brings to the polls, calls into activity, the greatest proportion of independent votes, and excludes those whose condition, situation and circumstances, render them dependent and unfit them for the free, untrammelled, independent exercise of the right of suffrage.

The free allodial owners of the soil, who till the land for the maintenance and support of themselves and their families, are permanent citizens of the commonwealth; and, however small or poor their fees, have a common interest, are benefited or injured by whatever benefits or injures the State.

As a class, the freeholders are virtuous, intelligent and independent. In elections, it is to their interest to make the best choice, which they are generally likely to do. They own not only all the real, but almost all the personal, property of the State; all that may not in a moment be transferred to the most distant capital in the Union. They constitute the massy foundation that sustains the fabrick of society. In time of war, they not only

fight, but pay and support the non-property holder, who takes up arms in defence alike of their and his personal rights and honor. They feed, support and maintain every interest in the State. The very strings of their hearts are deeply tied and linked to all the hopes, interests and destinies of the community.

The multiplication of dependent voters augments the influence of wealth. The extension of the right of suffrage to those whose condition renders them dependent for the food they eat, the clothes they wear, and the very houses which shelter them, on the freeholders, increases to a dangerous extent the political influence of wealth. In every wise and just government, property ought to have its fair and legitimate weight; it ought to enter into the building of the political edifice, as a powerful mean of propping and fostering the public virtue instead of undermining it. Public virtue and morality are the life's blood of a republic, and if a demoralizing and corrupting influence is given to property and wealth, morals, virtue and liberty soon sicken and die.

The Constitution, article 3, section 1, prescribes the qualification of voters, as follows: "Every white male citizen of the commonwealth, of the age of twenty-one years, who has been a resident of the state for two years, and of the county, city or town where he offers to vote, for twelve months next preceding an election; and no other person shall be qualified to vote for members of the general assembly and all officers elective by the people; but no person in the military, naval or marine service of the United States shall be deemed a resident of this State, by reason of being stationed therein. And no person shall have the right to vote, who is of unsound mind, or a pauper, or a non-commissioned officer, soldier, seaman or marine in the service of the United States, or who has been convicted of bribery in an election, or of any infamous offence."

The advocates of this provision undertake to support it by arguing that all men who pay public taxes, and bear arms in defence of the State, ought to have the right of suffrage. They are paid for their services, and supported by the State in time of war; they fight side by side with the freeholder, equally for the security and protection of person, and of property, when they happen to possess any; and they pay taxes for the protection of their per-

sonal rights, afforded them by society. This, therefore, can give them no right to the exercise of suffrage.

It is moreover contended that, as "all men are created by nature equal," all have an equal right to suffrage. The very reverse of this proposition is the truth, namely, that all men are by nature unequal. Although children are born equally helpless and dependent, in a few years, as soon as their bodies grow and acquire strength and vigor, and their minds, passions and faculties become expanded and developed, an infinite difference is seen in their natural powers, capacities and propensities; a difference, an inequality, laid deep in their physical, moral and mental organizations; and this inequality is still further increased and widened by education, habits, pursuits, manners, feelings and associations. In the most perfect ideal democracy men must be unequal,—possessing, in all the relations of life, unequal rights, and owing unequal duties. Husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant, principal and agent, judge and prisoner, juror and suitor or accused, general and common soldier, representative and constituent, are, and must ever be, unequal, and have unequal rights and owe unequal duties. *

Rights are of two sorts,—either natural, or social and conventional; and are derived either from nature or civil society. The very idea of suffrage is bottomed and grounded on the existence of society. In a state of rude nature it did not—could not exist. It is, therefore, a social, conventional right, conferred by society, and may be given with whatever conditions society chooses to annex to it.

Notwithstanding the assertion that all men are free and equal, and that all who bear arms and contribute to the support of the State ought to have political power, at least seven-eighths of the population of Virginia, by this provision of the Constitution, are excluded from the polls. All minors, whose property is taxed, and who after a certain age bear arms, all women, all slaves, all persons of unsound mind, all paupers, are, at a dash of the pen, excluded from the exercise of this right; excluded, when those principles of immutable justice, for which the advocates of universal suffrage contend, would equally give them this right along with the white male citizens of the commonwealth who are of

full age. They make their immutable principles of justice to depend upon their opinions, upon sex, upon age, upon the soundness of the mind, and upon the color of the skin. If this exclusion were contended for upon the ground of sound policy and expediency, it would meet my most hearty concurrence. But upon the principles of the advocates of universal suffrage, I cannot comprehend how these classes are excluded.

The admission to political power of those whose condition renders them dependent, the poor artisan and mechanic, the overseer, the hired servant, the merchant's clerk, the lessee, and the like, increases and gives a corrupt and corrupting influence to wealth. The dependent condition of such persons places their votes completely within the control of their wealthy landlords, patrons and employers. They are in no situation to be made martyrs for the sake of political opinions. In violent political struggles, when the passions of men are aroused, the influence of wealth has ever been, and ever will be, felt, exerting its abominable and corrupt power and dominion over those whose condition and circumstances render them dependent on the employment, patronage and countenance of the wealthy, from whom they derive the means of support and livelihood for themselves and their families. The wealthy hold this class in bondage by the strongest and surest tenure of servitude; they have it in their power to deprive them of the means of sustenance and support—of the very houses which shelter their families, and to subject them to want, to beggary, to starvation. This odious influence has been more and more resorted to and exerted in each recurring election in Virginia, since the adoption of the present Constitution. It is a legitimate result and consequence of the extension of the right of suffrage. It corrupts and depraves alike both parties,—him who exerts it as well as him upon whom it is exerted. Its increase can only be checked by the united efforts of all the good, honest and virtuous.

Can all the interests of the State be adequately protected when representation is based alone upon free white population? Is it not apparent that, if representation be proportioned to numbers alone, every interest in society must be at the disposal of numbers? It is idle to address those who believe that majorities can

control the eternal and immutable principles of right and justice ; to all others it must be evident that no interest, not even the most important, can have legitimate political security. None can have influence in the legislature—none can be elected to seats in that body but those whose manners, principles and opinions recommend them to the multitude. No wisdom, no talents, attainments or virtue will form an exception. The majority will be a tyrant more cruel and oppressive, because less responsible, than a few or one. To the freeholders it is a matter of little moment whether they be disfranchised or kept for ever in a hopeless, a doomed minority. Every momentary passion, every sudden delusion, under which the people chance to labor, will be carried into the legislature with unchecked violence. The commonwealth must sooner or later become an *aristocracy* of demagogues, to be occasionally interrupted by the *monarchy* of a single demagogue.

The great majority of the people, in every country, support themselves by daily toil. To earn their bread literally, in the sweat of their brows, is the condition of their existence. They have neither the leisure time, opportunity or means, to enable them to form correct and fixed political opinions ; being incapable of fixed opinions, peculiarly alive to present impressions, and the impulses of the moment, in their collective assemblages, it can hardly be expected that constancy and a sense of justice should be their most distinguished virtues. Indeed, in every country, in every age, it has been remarked that inconstancy and injustice are the great vices of an uncontrolled majority. The people vibrate between the extremes of high excitement, passion and violence, on the one hand, and of calm, unruffled, sluggish, listlessness and torpor, on the other.

In all governments based on the numerical majority, wealth must alternately exert a great, corrupt and corrupting influence, and be subjected to the attacks, violence and wrong of the people. In times of excitement, it will be an easy matter for demagogues—the aristocracy of such governments availing themselves of the popular envy of wealth to incite the people to an invasion of the rights of property. But the passions of the people burn out by their own violence. The apathy and sluggishness which

succeed, are in proportion to the madness and frenzy of the former extreme. The servile homage which, in a time of calmness and indifference, the people pay to wealth, its owners will use as the means of lulling them, of regaining ascendancy, and if necessary for the safety of property, of betraying them.

When justice, the great object of a good government, the basis of society itself, is destroyed, public virtue and liberty soon become extinct, and numerous indeed, are the roads which lead to slavery and despotism. "A demagogue seizes on that despotic power for himself, which he for a long time has exercised in the name of his faction; a victorious general leads his army to enslave their country, and both these candidates for tyranny too often find auxiliaries in those classes of society which are at length brought to regard absolute monarchy as an asylum. Thus, wherever property is not allowed great weight in a free state, it will destroy liberty. The history of popular clamor, even in England, is enough to show that it is easy sometimes to work the populace into 'a sedition for slavery.'" This is the lesson of every age, of every country, from Greece to France. Have the Virginia sophisters and innovators discovered that the people of this commonwealth are free from the vices, follies, lusts and passions, hitherto considered common to the human race?

The legislative department is composed of two distinct branches, the house of delegates and the senate. Representation in the house of delegates is apportioned on the "*suffrage basis*," that is, according to the number of voters; in the senate it is apportioned on the "*mixed basis*," that is, according to population and taxation combined. The senate is organized upon eastern principles, the house of delegates upon western principles. This organism of the senate was thought to be sufficient to make it a check upon the house of delegates, and to enable it to afford ample protection to eastern interests. That this hope is vain and delusive, I proceed to explain.

The members of both houses of the Legislature are taken from the same constituency, and represent the same people. The only difference is in the duration of their term of service. The house of Delegates is the more numerous body—is more directly con-

nected with the people ; and, of consequence, has much greater weight than the senate. The lords in England, possessing great property, holding and transmitting their seats by hereditary descent, have never been able successfully, to resist the house of commons, in any matter in regard to which the commons have chosen to persist. The Senate of Virginia has never been, and never will be able to resist the united action of the House of Delegates, in regard to any measure upon which the house earnestly insists.

Government is a contrivance of human wisdom. The great primary end for which it exists is the protection of the persons and property of men,—the security of the minority from the tyranny and oppression of the majority,—the preservation of the ruled from the injustice of the rulers. Man wants his person and his property, his present possessions as well as his future acquisitions, protected alike from the violence, lust and avarice of his fellow creatures and of his rulers. Therefore he wants government,—a government which, whilst it protects him in his rights of person, also protects him, at the same time, in all his rights of property,—in its acquisition, possession, alienation and transmission. The taxes paid to the government by the property holder constitute the equivalent given by him to the government for this protection. Now, in order that this property protection be made adequate—as the only means of making it sufficient—it must ever be regarded as a fundamental principle, that he who pays the taxes on property alone has the right to lay those taxes. The property belongs to the rightful possessor by all law and by all justice. The property-holder knows—he alone knows—how much, when, and what, he is able to pay for this protection. The only means of securing this protection is the right of the property-holder to have all his proprietary interests fully and adequately represented in that department of the government charged with the duty of assessing the taxes ;—so represented as by that representation they may be guarded and preserved from oppression, unjust and iniquitous impositions, lust and cupidity. To deprive the property-holder of this right,—to vest it in alien and hostile hands, is an act of injustice, odious, oppressive, destructive.

A senseless and false distinction of interest, having no existence in fact, between those who, in the cant and jargon of the day, are called the rich and the poor, was drawn by the panderer to popular lust, and was no impotent means of inveigling the masses. There is nothing clearer, when philosophically considered, than that a man who is not immediately possessed of property has as great an interest in the general protection and security of property as he who is.

The far greater mass of the property of Virginia is in that portion of the State east of the Blue Ridge of mountains. The great tobacco-growing, slave-holding interest is east of the ridge. The burdens of taxation must, therefore, be greatly unequal. Governmental exactions fall far more heavily upon the East than upon the West. Therefore, in common justice, the east ought to have the right to decide upon the mode, measure and objects of contribution, according to the census of 1850, there were 402,771 whites, and 411,337 slaves, east of the Blue Ridge; and 494,763 whites, and 63,236 slaves, west of the ridge. In 1852, the taxes assessed east of the mountain amounted to \$560,322,78; west of the mountain, the same year, they amounted to \$340,854,53. These taxes are collected and disbursed by the governing ruling majority. The much larger amount is paid by the eastern minority; the whole amount is disbursed by the western majority; and that they are, and ever will be, disbursed in a manner mostly beneficial and advantageous to *them*, is too plain to need explanation. So long as the constitution of man remains as *it* now is, so long as his selfish feelings continue to be stronger than his social feelings, this will ever be the case. Thus, the east pays more in taxes than she receives back in expenditures and disbursements; and the west receives more in expenditures and disbursements than she pays in taxes. The consequence is, that by the fiscal operation of the government, the eastern minority must be gradually impoverished, and the western majority gradually enriched. "This, indeed, may be carried to such an extent, that one class or portion of the community may be elevated to wealth and power, and the other depressed to abject poverty and dependence, simply by the fiscal action of the government; and this too, through disbursements

only—even under a system of equal taxes imposed for revenue only. If such be the effect of taxes and disbursements, when confined to their legitimate objects, that of raising revenue for the public service; some conception may be formed, how one portion of the community may be crushed and another elevated on its ruins, by systematically perverting the power of taxation and disbursement for the purpose of aggrandizing and building up one portion of the community at the expense of the other. That it *will* be so used, unless prevented, is, from the constitution of man, just as certain as that it *can* be so used.” Calhoun’s Discourse on Government. pp. 21-2.

The present constitution, by apportioning representation in the house of delegates, on the suffrage basis, completely and entirely deprives the east of the right and ability of deciding upon the measure and objects of her contribution. It separates power from property. It gives to one portion of the State, to the west, which contributes the least, the principal power of taxation; it imposes upon the other portion, the east, the principal burden of contribution. Power and property can never be long separated. Either power will violently, or through the forms of law, seize upon property, or property will buy power. In either event, the consequences must be disastrous. Liberty will either be destroyed by violence or by corruption.

In a republican government, whose organism approaches any thing like perfection, every interest in society ought to be truly and fairly represented. When this is the case, a concurrence of a majority of the representatives of the various and diversified interests of the community, will be necessary to the passage of any law. This *will* afford each interest, by its representation, the means of protecting itself from oppressive and unjust exactions; and will force the different interests, or portions, to unite in such measures as tend only to the common weal and advantage of all, and to abandon such as would prove detrimental and oppressive to any one interest or portion of the community.

A government based on the numerical majority is a thorough and complete absolutism. King Numbers is the governing, uncontrolled, despotic power. Those who make, as well as those who execute the laws, *are his* agents, trustees and representatives.

The governed, ruled minority, is, and of necessity must be, at the mercy and disposal of the ruling, governing majority. The minor portion of the community and their interests, powerless for their own protection,—are ever liable to oppression, injustice and abuse of power, on the part of the major portion.

The existence of a written constitution will be no safeguard to the minority,—destitute of the power to enforce its observance—to prevent the abuse of power by the dominant majority. The majority, either by strained and unjust construction, or by acting in obedience to what are called the customs, practices and usages of party, in defiance of the just construction of the minority, and their appeals to reason, truth, justice and moral and political right, will undermine all the barriers of the constitution; or, should these means fail, they will boldly set them at naught,—or call another convention for the purpose of sweeping them away. The separation of the government into independent departments, each of which is under the control of numbers, can make no difference. The government of King Numbers *must* be absolute and unlimited. To the minority, parchment guarantees are utterly worthless.

In a state, large, wealthy, populous, highly civilized, enlightened and refined, a change from the despotism of the many to that of one, will be speedy. This change will be regarded as far preferable, if not, indeed, absolutely necessary to insure the blessings of peace, justice, domestic tranquillity, and the security and protection of the rights of person and property.

Those grand and magnificent concentrations of capital in great public works—in internal improvements, in railroads and in canals, advocated by the West and the North, the East and the South have always opposed. The South and the East have always opposed taxation for any purpose other than to supply the necessities of the Federal and State Governments. The reason is, that by far the greater proportion of the taxes are drawn from them. They feel, bitterly feel the pressure and the burden of those taxes which fall so lightly on the North and the West. If the history and experience of the Federal Government be consulted, it will be found that the representation of the South in Congress is inadequate for the protection of Southern interests,—in-

adequate to protect the South from unjust and oppressive legislation.

The North and the West have made a discovery upon which they manifest every disposition remorselessly and unrelentingly to act; a discovery which must sooner or later, unless arrested, destroy all republican institutions. That discovery is, that a bare numerical majority may oppress and tax, *ad libitum*, the minority, and that it is to the interest of the majority to keep up the minority to the highest point compatible with their subjection; for the greater the minority in proportion to the majority, the greater will be the profits arising from the plunder and oppression of that minority by the majority. It is absolutely of no importance to the East and the South, whether this is done without their having any representation at all, or in consequence of their having a representation inadequate to protect their interests,—powerless to preserve their property from the plunder and exactions of the West and the North. They are at the mercy of inexorable task-masters, whose lusts and appetites can never be satisfied.

The governor, the chief executive officer, is elected by the voters, holds the office for the term of four years, and is ineligible to the same office for the term next succeeding that for which he was elected.

In a state so large as Virginia, where there is so little intercourse between the great natural divisions and extremes, it is manifestly impossible for the people, left entirely to themselves, to elect a governor. The consequence is that they are thrown into the hands of a caucus, or convention. Thus the governor is chosen, not by the people, but by a body unknown to the laws and constitution, and wholly irresponsible,—by a body composed, in the great majority of instances, of infamous, unprincipled, ignorant, corrupt, detestable and execrable partisans, time-servers and charlatans. By this base, proletarian rabble and rout, the people are cheated out of their election. This corrupt and corrupting system is established, *ex pri necessitate*, in all its rigor,—than which there is nothing more deadly in its effects upon the morals, virtue and liberties of the people.

The judges and judicial magistrates, from the highest to the lowest, are elected directly and immediately by the people. The

gradation and subordination of elections has been heretofore considered a great improvement on representative government. The right of election is as susceptible of delegation, as the right of making laws, or any other civil function; and it possesses many and great advantages. The voter knows his representative, and, if left to himself, has generally sense and honesty sufficient to choose a good one. The fugitive and precarious existence of the representative, his direct contact and connection with the general mass, preclude the possibility of his having an interest different from that of the great body of the people. He can, therefore, be safely trusted with this delegated right. The merits or demerits of the candidate for judicial honors can never be known to the voters. Such is the peculiar nature of the qualifications, capacities and attainments requisite to fill these offices with integrity and ability, that the people are as little informed in regard to them after the candidate has passed through the polluted medium of a popular canvass, as they were before; and they give their suffrages, in the great majority of instances, without any possible just knowledge of the character, talents and fitness of the candidate.

In free governments, it is an object of the deepest and most vital importance to have an able, learned, upright and independent judiciary. To have judges who, in the decision of the grave and momentous subjects which have to pass their adjudication, will be guided alone by the law, their consciences and their God. It is their duty to pass upon life, liberty, reputation, property,—upon all that man holds nearest and dearest. How important, then, to have a virtuous, intelligent, independent judiciary!

This is a consideration that comes home to every bosom. Such a judiciary, independent, alike of all influence, either from the executive, the legislative or the people, is vastly more important in a republican or democratic government, than in any other. In such a government, elective, temporary judges will compose the worst possible of all tribunals. The elective, judicial magistrate, at best, is but a *man*, influenced and affected by all the motives, passions and considerations, which affect and influence the mind and heart of man. It would, indeed, be a difficult matter to sep-

arate between what affects the mind and heart of the man, and what affects the mind and heart of the judicial magistrate.

Those unacquainted with the judicial history and records of England, previous to the revolution of 1688, can neither estimate the blessings of a virtuous and independent judiciary, nor form any conception of the odious and disgusting baseness and depravity of ignorant, corrupt, venal, time-serving, unprincipled, reckless, hard-hearted, daring, wicked, dependent judges. "Every time," says Macaulay, "that the power passed from one party to the other, took place a proscription and a massacre, thinly disguised under the forms of judicial procedure. The tribunals ought to be the sacred places of refuge, where, in all the vicissitudes of public affairs, the innocent of all parties may find shelter. They were, before the revolution, as unclean public shambles, to which each party in its turn dragged its opponents, and where each found the same venal and ferocious butchers waiting for its custom. Papist or Protestant, Tory or Whig, Priest or Alderman, all was one to those greedy and savage natures, provided only there was money to earn and blood to shed."

The successful candidate for judicial honors, when he mounts the bench, will find a routed minority, personal and political enemies and opponents,—a majority flushed with victory, personal and political friends and supporters,—the one to be punished, the other to be rewarded. Before such a tribunal, what chance will he, who is obnoxious to the judge and the majority, on any account,—because he is rich or because he is poor,—either because he has given distasteful votes, or expressed distasteful opinions,—stand for even-handed justice? On the eve of an election, can the judicial magistrate, whose only means of support for himself and his family, is the salary of his office, afford to incur the displeasure of the majority, or of a powerful and influential individual? Can he, at such a time, so situated, afford to give an unpopular decision? At such a time, a man of popularity and influence, has a cause to be decided, in which he is opposed to one humble and destitute of influence; or an unpopular individual is prosecuted, the whole community,—that community upon which the judge depends for his daily bread,—highly excited, demand his destruction; under these circumstances, who would confide

in the tribunal? Would the judge protect the humble, and throw around the obnoxious, innocent accused, the broad shield of the law and justice, and guard him from an infuriated community, when, by so doing, he would not only lose his power and position in society, but his only means of livelihood and support? In doubtful cases, is it probable, is it reasonable to presume that he would? Judges are men of like passions with ourselves,—clothed with all the infirmities and imperfections of human nature; and so situated, they will—it may be unconsciously to themselves—act as men so situated have always acted. If the convention desired this to be otherwise, they ought, whilst *hammering* out a new Constitution for the State, among their other changes and innovations, to have provided a new constitution for the mind and heart of man. But so long as the constitution of the nature of man remains as it was formed by the Creator, so long will elective judges be dependent, and sooner or later become venal and corrupt. The judges are elected by King Numbers; they are *his* agents and trustees; and upon *him* they are absolutely dependent. They must and will decide in accordance with *his* wishes, lusts, passions, desires and inclinations.

The virtue and honesty of the masses; the firm and lofty rectitude of the Virginia magistracy; the institution of African slavery; a correct appreciation—a full and perfect knowledge, on the part of the people, of the evils and calamities which are *before* them and *around* them, may for some time preserve us from the worst. But already a cloud, like that seen by the servant of the prophet of God, no bigger than a man's hand, has appeared in the political heavens, which threatens to grow and increase, until it shall burst upon us in a storm which will sweep every thing to destruction. Already large bodies of men, respectable alike on account of their position in society, and their numbers, have gone before several of the county courts of Virginia, *petitioning* those tribunals in regard to the decision of subjects which they were to adjudicate. To petition in this manner a court of justice, is nothing but a direct attempt to influence, intimidate and over-awe that tribunal; to compel it, by the force of popular pressure from without, to decide in accordance with the wishes, opinions, desires and inclinations of the petitioners. This prac-

tice, unless suppressed, will as surely sap the foundations of justice, corrupt, pollute and divert its pure stream ; destroy the honesty, the integrity and independence of the magistracy, as time will one day destroy us. Let it once be understood that judicial magistrates, "another priesthood, ministering at the altars of justice," in the decision of the momentous subjects upon which they pass, are, or can be influenced by popular wishes and opinions, by any considerations other than those of the law, justice and their consciences, and the judiciary will become the bitterest of all curses. The tribunals of justice, in their decisions will then consult, not the law and their conscience, but the wishes, lusts and desires of the more numerous party or faction. Than this, can any greater or more terrible calamity befall a people ? It is the solemn duty of the magistracy and people of Virginia, now while it is called to-day, to do their best and their utmost, to preserve the judgment-seats pure and unpolluted ; to maintain, as far as in them lies, the integrity, the independence and rectitude of the judiciary.

In an evil hour, the east consented to go into convention with the west. Inveigled, deceived and seduced by the clamor of Jacobins for "*reform*," it was either forgotten, or lost sight of, that the one solitary object for which the west had uniformly and continually struggled, with a zeal which knew no limits, was power. Treachery and defection gave the west the victory. Their darling object was gained ; the glittering prize was grasped. Power over the property of the east was formally transferred to the west.

Not one single department of the government, legislative, executive, or judicial, was left *unchanged*, unswept by the bosom of innovation. The consequences are before us ; about us ; upon us.

There is, indeed, a difference between *innovation*, *change*, and *reform*, a great gulph fixed between them, as wide, as deep, as impassable, as the gulf between Dives and Lazarus. *Innovation* is *novelty*—the *lubido rerum novarum* of the Romans ; a lust for new things. It is a *destructive* principle. It destroys all the good in existing institutions, along with all the real, or imaginary evil. *Reform* is a *conservative* principle. It preserves whilst

it betters. Before it will act, it requires to be most fully satisfied that a grievance exists ; then it contents itself with a direct application of a remedy to a particular grievance. There it stops, and goes not one inch further. It does not pull down and destroy, but it works upon the constitution ; it examines it with care, prudence and reverence ; it repairs it where decayed ; it amends it where defective ; it props it where it wants support ; it adapts it to the purposes of existing times and circumstances, and transmits it, not only unimpaired, but improved.

I am, and have ever been, an advocate of wise and judicious reformation. I believe that, in the changes and fluctuations which take place in this world, it sometimes becomes necessary to reform in order to preserve fundamental institutions ; to save the great principles of a constitution, by timely alterations in its subordinate parts ; by introducing such improvements as harmonize with the spirit, original plan and principles of the constitution, as experience has shown to be necessary. This I believe to be the middle ground, between the bigot on the one extreme, who shrinks with horror and alarm from touching the constitution, even for the purposes of repair, and the wild, reckless innovator on the other, who is content with nothing but utter demolition and destruction. This is the ground which a great and patriotic statesman, guided by wisdom, prudence and sagacity, will take.

In looking over a list of the persons who, at one heat, struck off the new constitution, the names of some few of good talents may be seen—of some few who had acquired partisan distinction ; but few, if any, who possessed that political wisdom, that practical experience, which alone fit the possessor for that most delicate, most arduous of all undertakings, the remoulding of the fundamental law. The mass, the large majority of the body, was composed of obscure village atomies, and ignorant, presumptuous county and district demagogues, charlatans and office-hunters. It is the mass, the majority of the body which determines its character and direction. There need, then, be hardly any surprise at any thing they did.

To make some sort of a constitution, requires no very great share of wisdom and ability. Fix the seat of power ; teach obe-

dience to that power, and the thing is done. But to make a free, just and wise constitution, for a great and free people proudly claiming their liberties as a noble common law inheritance, which have come down to them from the days of the great charter, baptized in the best blood of England and Virginia,—to make such a constitution for such a people, not only great, free and proud, but differing in interests, in education, in habits, manners, feelings, opinions and pursuits, requires the soundest judgment, the profoundest intellect, the greatest sagacity, the deepest knowledge, and the most intimate acquaintance with all the circumstances, situation and condition of the people. It requires in an eminent degree, political wisdom; wisdom which weighs, collates and compares with cautious prudence, good and evil, morally and politically—not arithmetically, nor by abstractions.

While I am fully convinced that many of the revolutions which have taken place in modern times, have ultimately proved beneficial to the human race, contributing much to the comfort and happiness of man, the development of mind, and the diffusion of useful knowledge and science, I do not believe that the changes through which the fundamental law of Virginia has passed, can or will prove beneficial to the people. I do not believe that any one of the remodelings of that most delicate and intricate of all contrivances,—the machinery of government, has been made in the right direction.

But what effects and consequences are to result from this great change in the organic law of the State, is a question which launches me into the field of political prediction, where the deepest sagacity has been so often deceived, and where it becomes me to express my opinions and judgments with distrust, however well persuaded I may be of their correctness.

The grand object, power and dominion over the property of the East, for which the West so long strove, with an unanimity and perseverance truly wonderful, has finally been attained. Those magnificent schemes of internal improvement, of popular education, of material grandeur and prosperity, which dazzle the imagination, and well nigh dethrone reason herself, are now, we are told, to be consummated. The West is to be made great, populous and prosperous. Government is to be wrested from the dis-

charge of its true duties, badly as it has discharged them, and made to apply remedies by legislation, to all the real as well as all the imaginary evils of the body politic. In utter disregard of all the lessons of history and experience,—teaching forcibly as they do, the great truth, that legislative remedies, so far from curing the evils to which they are applied, in a large number of instances produce evils more intolerable than those sought to be removed,—we are to have re-enacted, in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the scene of governmental impotence and utopian folly.

The protection of the persons and the property of men, is the great main object for which government exists. This is an end, a purpose, entirely temporal. And, notwithstanding the frightful abuses which exist, and have ever existed, in almost every government on earth, I believe that for this end and purpose, government, when wisely and justly organized, is entirely and completely adequate. I believe that government, just as any and every other contrivance of human wisdom, will best accomplish its purpose and object, when it is constituted with an eye single to that purpose and object; and that it will be best administered when it is honestly and faithfully administered with a single view to its main end. There are other objects of great importance to society, such, for instance, as the education and instruction of the people, the promotion of science, useful arts and knowledge, which government, when it can do so, in subordination to, and consistently with, its main object, ought to aid, assist and promote. But most of the evils and abuses of government result either from its being unjustly and unwisely organized, or from its attempting what it is powerless to accomplish. Government can protect the person and the property of the citizen, but it is helplessly incapable of making him either moral, virtuous, or religious.

The primary object of government, then, is protection—the protection of the person and property of each, from the violence and cupidity of others. Legislative interposition, governmental agency of any other sort, is the result of that fatal political heresy, that it is the duty of government to protect the citizen from his own folly and incompetence; and, instead of securing to him the unfettered right to pursue his own weal, to pursue it for him. The homely truths, that every man understands his own interest,

and can attend to his own business, better than any body else, give a conclusive reply to all this. The interest and the self-love of the citizen is a stronger, a truer, and a more unerring guide, than the fancies and megrims of vulgar politicians. The selfishness of the human heart is more potent than the legislator's love for his neighbor.

But in the accomplishment of these plans for Western wealth and aggrandizement, what is, and what must be, the situation of Eastern Virginia? On her, as was shown above, has been laid the principal burden of contribution. Oppressed and borne down by taxation as she now is, the means to effect these objects are yet to be drawn from her. Like Issachar, she must couch between her burdens, and bow her shoulders to bear, for she has become a servant unto tribute.

The Constitution of 1851 places power over the property of the East in the hands of the West. It places the right and the power to tax property, in the hands of those who possess not an identity of interest with the property holder. It has changed, and will change still more deeply, the ancient social system of Virginia. It will, it must change the situation and distribution of the property of the State. This Constitution, itself a great revolution, is but the sign and index of a still mightier and deeper revolution in the society, principles and character,—in the minds, hearts and feelings of the people of Virginia.

The injurious effects and consequences resulting from a change made in the organic law of a State in the wrong direction,—from a change of good to bad government, are slowly realized and gradually felt. For some time, the morals, virtues and talents brought forth, nurtured and sustained by wise and just institutions, may counteract the worst results. But if there be truth in history, in a few generations these morals, talents and virtues pass away and cease to exist. Then comes to pass that which was written, their stock shall not take root in the earth, they shall wither. Talent has lost in Virginia much of its conscious elevation, much of its erect and manly bearing, and is fast being degraded into the servile flatterer of king numbers. It requires no very great sagacity to perceive that public virtue and morality are rapidly declining. The day, come when it may, that shall

witness the consummation of the disgrace and degradation of the talent, independence, morality and virtue which God has given to elevate and adorn society, to shed lustre and glory around the State, will be a dark and a bitter day for Virginia. The vail of the temple of her moral and political greatness will then be rent; then, indeed, will her glory, power and honor have departed.

That the new constitution will last, no man believes. Political and social machinery is, indeed, of wonderful complexity, delicacy and difficulty. No political instrumentality, suddenly designed, and hastily executed, can possibly be of any permanence. Political institutions that last are of gradual growth; the result of time, of experience, of the profound thought, sagacity and cautious reflection, of many wise and deep intellects, in many generations. If, by the interposition of Divine Providence, all the wisest minds of every age and of every country, could be collected into one assembly, I do not believe that they would be capable of forming even a tolerable constitution. The Constitution of the United States is sometimes referred to as an exception to this. But this exception is only specious. The authors of the Constitution of the United States, and of the Virginia Constitution of 1776, had the British Constitution to work upon, and to adapt to the wants and purposes of the people. They had not a constitution to build from the foundation. They were far too wise to attempt such folly.

It is the quintessence of ignorance and stupidity to think that the New Constitution, the hasty construction of presumptuous men, of pettifoggers, place-seekers, and ridiculous pretenders to statesmanship, can be of long duration. Even those who admire *the thing*, admit that the canker worm is in the rose. It contains the seeds of its own destruction. Like its French models, it will be short-lived and ephemeral. The causes which produced it, are the causes which in every age have produced changes in the social and political fabric. *Eadem semper causa, libido et avaritia, et mutandarum rerum amor.*

The social and political institutions of Virginia, then, can hardly remain in their present form. But through what "varieties of untried being," they have still to pass, before a final and permanent settlement, I know not. But I do know that every page

of her history most emphatically teaches this great lesson: Put not your trust in legislators; trust not in constitution makers, in whom there is no help. Mindful of this lesson of experience, let not her people slay the mind and talent of the State; but let them in the selection of those who are to fill their offices of trust and honor, *demand* men of lofty virtue, of high rectitude, of much thought, of great prudence and caution, of powerful combining as well as analyzing minds. This demand, if made, will eventually be supplied; and much of what has been lost may be retrieved, and many of the evils which threaten us may be averted.

ART. V.—OLIVER CROMWELL.

THE character and services of the greatest man in the political annals of the English nation constitute our present theme. Nature and circumstances both contributed to his elevation, but, above all, he is indebted for his world-wide renown to the power of religious ideas. Men are never weary of discussing his character or contemplating his career, and his principles and exploits have long furnished one of the most hackneyed topics of moral and political disquisition. He is the great representative of the struggle of the Puritans against royalty and prelacy in favor of religious liberty, a struggle exhibiting traits of mind and peculiarities of passion not to be found in other Protestant contests. We detect here an intensity of feeling, a heroism, a grandeur never surpassed in the annals of nations. Nor ever before did such great ideas inspire political partisans, or characters so lofty and intrepid engage in political contention.

Cromwell was the type and representative of these men. Whatever moved them, moved him first, and more powerfully because he was the greatest among them. He was their idol, their friend, their protector. It was by their fidelity and bravery he was raised to power, and though he may have abused this power by aspiring to the sovereignty which he subverted, he never was unfaithful to the interests he was appointed to guard, and never abandoned those principles of religion which had once kindled in his soul an unquenchable enthusiasm. But Cromwell,

with all his genius, would never have been heard of, had not the Puritans arisen. They differed not from the party they opposed, in blood or rank, or worldly prosperity. It was not the accidental circumstance of wealth or position which gave rise to that wonderful people. Their peculiarities and their greatness, so far as they were distinguished, were the results of religious ideas and of those ideas alone.

Their history is plain and simple. When Mary succeeded Edward VI, she restored the old religion and persecuted the adherents of the new. Her bigotry and cruelty, not so much the result of natural disposition as of those principles in which she was educated, caused many of her subjects to flee to the continent for safety and repose. Among these were some of the most zealous of the Protestant clergy. They selected chiefly for their places of exile, Geneva and Frankfort, towns under the influence of Calvin and his disciples. There they acquired new ideas of the worship of God. They learned to love the Genevan service, and still more the greater religious liberty of the continent. They imbibed a distaste for imposing forms of worship, and sought to serve God with the most rigorous simplicity. They regarded the ritual which Cranmer had established as not sufficiently divested of popery, which they hated in all its forms. Moreover, exile and misfortune engendered a lofty spirit of piety and a fierce determination to divest religion of every thing which appealed to the senses or the imagination.

When Elizabeth ascended the throne, they returned to England with new tastes and new ideas, and found a more positive spirit of Protestantism among their brethren who had remained faithful to their convictions. A new religious life had also been kindled among the people. The preaching and the constancy of the martyrs had excited a spirit of devotion and a zeal in matters of religion before unknown.

At first they were kindly received and cordially welcomed to their English homes and English churches; but as soon as they were comfortably settled, they began to feel and express uneasiness in view of the liturgy and establishment which Elizabeth had restored. They desired still greater simplicity. The reform was not sufficiently radical to satisfy them. They did not dream of

secession from the English Church, and still less of rebellion against royal authority. They simply wished to be exempted from many of those forms and customs which they regarded as bearing too close a resemblance to Romanism ; accordingly they refused to conform to those parts of the service which they disliked. Nor did they manifest that respect for the prescribed form of worship which was expected of all Protestants. They objected to many parts of the clerical dress, especially the square cap, tippet and surplice. They thought also that the church sanctioned too many holidays. They introduced many irregularities. Some performed the service in the chancel, others in the body of the church ; some with their faces to the people, and others towards the altar ; some administered the communion with a surplice and cap, some with the surplice alone, and others without either. Some baptized from a font, and others from a basin. Some used the sign of the cross, and others omitted it. Some preached in scholars' robes, and others in common clothes. They did not regard these matters as essential, but as indifferent ; and as they appeared indifferent, they ridiculed and assailed them. They even showed a spirit of insubordination, and more than hinted their disquiet in view of the supremacy of a woman in matters of religion. Christ, in their eyes, was the only head of the church, and the Bible and their own consciences were their supreme laws. They thought they had a right to worship God according to their individual views of duty ; and as they did not sympathize with many parts of the ritual, they expressed their dislike in language of strong denunciation. Such a spirit and such views were exceedingly displeasing to the bishops and especially to the metropolitan Archbishop Parker, a great stickler for the forms of his church and naturally intolerant in his views.

But they were still more odious to the queen, who, with all her virtues, had much of the spirit of Henry VIII. She thought that as she was the head of the English Church, all ought to coincide with her opinions, and conform to her notions. She abominated every thing which looked like dissent, and still more that which had the appearance of disrespect to her authority. Hence, she would not suffer Knox to remain in England, and encouraged her ministers and her bishops in harsh measures to compel obe-

dience, and to suppress the spirit of insurrection and independence. She was a noble woman, but she loved unbounded power, and hated those who thwarted her in its enjoyment. Of course she did not love the non-conformists, nor had she any popular sympathies, nor any respect for the opinions of the people. Instead of introducing greater simplicity into the worship of God, she would rather have made the service more imposing and formal. As a whole, however, she was contented with the church Cranmer had formed, and was averse to any change, so that when the non-conformists respectfully petitioned liberty to worship in the manner they desired, the queen replied that it was not consistent with her humor, credit, or safety, to permit diversity of opinions.

Men who had learned their duties from the Bible, who were stern, conscientious, earnest, resolute, and independent, intelligent as well as religious, were not so easily satisfied. They demanded arguments and reasons, and they were answered by penal enactments, fines, jails and pillories. Their ministers were ejected from their livings; they were forbidden to assemble together even for prayer and exhortation; their meetings were stigmatized as conventicles; and they were compelled, under heavy penalties, to attend divine worship in the churches. Despotic tribunals were erected,—the Star-Chamber and the Court of High Commission,—before which offenders were summoned and by which they were subjected to redoubled persecution. Parliament, which in that age was servile and venal, readily conformed to all the wishes of Elizabeth, and laws, both unjust and cruel, were passed. Such violent and severe courses resulted in still greater dissatisfaction. The non-conformists, worried, disgusted, insulted and injured, then resolved to withdraw entirely from the Church of England and institute a separate service. They now increased their opposition and attacked the orders of bishops, archdeacons, deans and chapters, tythes and spiritual courts, the cathedral worship, organs, holidays and surplices.

This schism and opposition provoked still more vexatious persecutions, which were increased even when James, the Scottish Solomon, came to the throne. Elizabeth, though arbitrary, harsh and proud, was careful not to provoke her dissenting subjects too

far, for she was threatened by external dangers, and wished to retain, as she on the whole deserved, the affections of her people. But James had neither her prudence, good sense, nor spirit of conciliation. He was more despotic than she, and still more intensely hated popular insurrection and Presbyterian forms. He was even hostile to the Calvinistic creed, in which he had been educated and which he had sworn to defend. He looked upon bishops as the support of his throne, and on Protestantism as no less adverse to royalty than to church establishments. He feared the Puritans, and strove to crush them as his bitterest enemies; and he was surrounded by prelates who advanced the highest church pretensions, and who encouraged him in the most impolitic and unreasonable courses.

The Puritans were now persecuted for articles of faith as well as for dissent from the forms of religion; and persecuted with such unmitigated severity that they fled in despair to Holland, and sought in still more distant lands a refuge from royal anger and liberty to worship God.

When Charles I succeeded his nervous, driveling, pedantic father, he carried, if possible, the spirit of persecution to a still greater extent. But every sentence of the Star-Chamber called forth popular indignation, and fanned the spirit of opposition. Puritanism fearfully increased until a large party in the nation began to dream of positive resistance. The volcano, on whose frightful brink the royal family and the haughty hierarchy were standing, began to utter the premonitory growl of its approaching eruption.

Popular disaffection was further increased by the political blunders of the king, by his arbitrary rule, by his violation of the constitution, by his encroachments on the liberties of the nation, by his unlawful taxation, by his dispensing with his parliaments, and, above all, by his absurd attempt to impose the English liturgy on the Scottish nation,—a nation almost universally attached to the Presbyterian worship. The most alarming disorder ensued, and the means of resistance were openly prepared. Still the blind monarch would make no concessions, and sought no proper means of conciliation before it should prove too late. The people, and especially the Puritans were now aroused to a pitch of desperation and hatred which it was most dangerous to provoke.

Unfortunately for Charles, he was guided by ministers who did not fully appreciate this popular indignation, or who so thoroughly despised it that they believed they could put it down. Two of these men have made themselves peculiarly conspicuous, and, in the opinions of the friends of constitutional liberty, have gained an infamous immortality. We allude to Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, and Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury. It was only the demon of despotism which could have raised up such relentless foes to the religion of the Puritans and the liberties of England. The former was the most uncompromising absolutist that ever animated the councils of an English king; the latter was the most disgusting slave of priestly superstition that ever filled the chair of Canterbury. Both belonged to the dark ages, both despised the people, both were hostile to every noble aspiration, and every generous inspiration of human intelligence. For Strafford there was the least excuse, for he was educated with liberal sentiments, and had once been a leader of the parliamentary opposition to royal encroachments. But he was bribed; and when he had sold his soul, his love of absolutism became as great as his previous shown hostility to it. Like all men who desert their friends from interest rather than conviction, he set no bounds to his hatred and disgust of those whom he had betrayed and injured. The Earl of Strafford was, by nature, proud and overbearing—the haughtiest man in English annals. His picture painted by Vandyck, and hung at present in the princely hall of Earl Fitzwilliam, the descendant who has inherited his possessions, presents the most vivid expression we have ever seen of all which may be conceived to belong to a fallen angel; cold, dark, and frowning, strikingly intellectual, but most repulsively arrogant, most maliciously contemptuous, and most desperately absorbed in self idolatry.

Towards Laud we would be more lenient, although he was equally the foe of liberty and of all those sentiments which exalt mankind. He had spent most of his days in the venerable retreats which still cling to the customs and ideas of by-gone ages. He was educated with the spirit of a monk, and had long breathed the atmosphere of priestly pride and primitive royalty. In his way, he was a saint, but such a saint as would spread a

funeral veil over every philanthropic enterprise, suppress the noblest aspirations of our nature, and degrade the only image which man now retains of God. Reason, in his eyes, was a snare and a vanity, and must bend to every dictate of superior authority, especially when that authority had the sanction of those ages in which every noxious superstition was nurtured. If Strafford was an unscrupulous tyrant, Laud was no less an unsparing bigot; both of them were unfit to be the ministers of a deluded king; both were unable to cope with the new spirit of the seventeenth century.

They encouraged the king in crimes which we now see to have been blunders, and which resulted in those fearful commotions, and that dreadful agitation, which produced Oliver Cromwell, as well as Hampden and Pym.

Hampden was the great leader of the rebellion before hostilities actually commenced. He was the most conspicuous and influential member of that glorious House of Commons which achieved the liberties of England and punished the great agents of royal despotism. Like Strafford, he belonged to an ancient family, and had great wealth and social position. He had a bold and independent spirit united with singular prudence and magnanimity. He was deeply attached to the principles of Puritanism, without cant and without extravagance. He had the confidence of the Commons, and the respect of the whole nation; and was even admired by his enemies. If, in that stormy crisis, any man could have saved England from the terrors of a revolution, it was Hampden. He restrained his party when it was mad with violence, he urged it on to vigorous measures when it was in danger of being seduced by the arts of the king. He steered clear of Scylla without the danger of being drawn into Charybdis. He hated revolutionary excess, and yet spared neither his fortune nor his person to resist the king, when it was certain that no oaths or promises would be respected. No member of his party showed more energy when it was necessary to resort to arms. No one would have sustained defeat with more serenity, used a victory with more moderation. In him, and in him alone, were united all the qualities necessary to save a state, and when he had offered up his life, as one of the first martyrs in that dreadful contest, England

was abandoned to the "fierce conflict of sects and parties, ambitious of ascendancy and burning for revenge."

Of these parties there was one which cherished unextinguishable hatred, not merely of prelatic power and ecclesiastical encroachments; but even of royal authority. It was averse even to Presbyterian synods; it rejected all spiritual courts; it maintained the right of each congregation to govern itself, to reject or receive members, to call its ministers, and to settle its points of doctrine. It professed unbounded toleration, and claimed more spiritual liberty than even the Presbyterians desired, who, notwithstanding their hatred of the English Church, detested schism and were not averse to the union of church and state. This more radical party was composed of the most religious and earnest of the middle classes, and took its model of worship and doctrine from Geneva. John Calvin was pre-eminently the oracle of the Independents, in all matters of faith, though not perhaps in church government, since he was the author of the Presbyterian form. The Independents, however, cherished the greatest veneration for his memory and his ideas. Like him, they would have established a theocracy, had profound views of the majesty and sovereignty of God, gloried in the Old Testament, admired the social economy of the Jews, baptized their children with Hebrew names, observed the strictness of the Jewish Sabbath, enforced the rigid notions of justice and law which Moses had declared, and had faith in the restoration of the Jews to their ancient inheritance, in the rebuilding of Jerusalem, in the renewed glory of David and Solomon. They were decorous in their manner, austere in their social life, and severe in their discipline. They did not incline to convivial pleasures, gay amusements, or idle sports. They despised splendid churches, organs, peculiar dresses for the clergy, holidays, May-poles, and even stained glass. They looked with disgust upon the past, and wished to try experiments. To them the future was full of hope. New ideas were to shake all the institutions of society, and gradually introduce the reign of light. Progressive developments of emancipated human nature were to assimilate man to the image which was lost in Eden. Their views of God were positive, and their morality was practical and elevated. They have been accused of asceti-

cism, but if they were stern, and even repulsive, they strove to imitate Paul rather than Simeon Stiglites. Their morality was based on those duties which the Bible enjoins, not those which gave reputation for sanctity to a monk. Their piety did not consist in dreams and visions, but in earnest and living communion with the Source of good. If they erred, it was in applying the prophecies of Christ to themselves; if they were visionary, it was in supposing that they were the elect of God; if they were fanatical, it was in fancying they had a right to overturn the institutions of their country in order to introduce the reign of the saints, to which body they believed they peculiarly belonged. They had their delusions and their disagreeable peculiarities, but as a whole they were neither false nor hypocritical. They were loyal to their God and to their own consciences; they could not be seduced from duty, nor awed into abject submission. They had an unconquerable love of liberty, and were willing to make any worldly sacrifices to secure its triumph. They were not contemptuous of law, nor disobedient to its rigid requirements, when they were once persuaded of its legitimacy. They did not believe it should emanate from tyrants either in church or state, but direct from God Almighty, who had revealed himself in his Word, which they were bound to interpret for themselves. No people ever had a deeper reverence for the Scriptures, or more confidently received them as the only supreme rule of faith and practice. This extraordinary attachment to the Bible, and punctilious obedience to even its constructive precepts, was their most striking peculiarity. Hence they would propagate it, fight for its preservation, and die for its truths—as *the* truths, and *the* only truths, which could sanctify them, and save the world. Here they were antagonistic to Romanism in its most vital points, and to all those influences which sympathized with Romanism in England and on the continent of Europe. It was their abiding and intense desire to frame governments, laws and churches, to cultivate social habits, and create a public opinion in accordance with the principles of the Bible, to be, as it were, under the guidance of the Almighty, without the restraints and corrupt influences of the old world, quite as much as a wish for freedom to worship God according to the dictates of their own conscience, which led

them to colonize America. It is a base slander and exhibits profound ignorance of their characters, and of the truths of history, to maintain that they emigrated for the sake of improving their fortunes.

We need not add that Oliver Cromwell was the leader and representative of these men, in their warfare against both royal and priestly despotism. The evils around them seemed overwhelming and disgraceful. Persecution could no longer be endured with that patience which the gospel enjoins under injury. There must be a time when submission to oppression and wrong ceases to be a virtue, or else there is no other alternative but universal slavery and universal despotism, no heroism but the heroism of suffering, no revolution which can be called glorious, and no characters who have led the struggling in the hour of danger who are worthy of praise ! The Puritans of England saw the laws of God violated, the constitution of their country trodden under foot, the conscientious and virtuous imprisoned, fined and executed, liberty spurned and mocked, the sacredness of promises and the majesty of truth most wantonly disregarded. There seemed to be, on the part of the king and his ministers, a systematic attempt to extinguish freedom and suppress virtue ; to reduce the people of England to abject slavery and then to mock them with insults worse than injuries. Under such circumstances—and who can blame them ? who will not honor them ?—they rose up against their king. They would, however, have retained him on his throne, if reconciliation had been possible, or if he had respected his word with half the integrity of a gambler or a robber ; but he had proved himself to be utterly faithless—utterly unprincipled—false as he was weak, perfidious as he was cruel. It were madness to trust him any longer. There was only one course, to extort by force those rights which they could not gain in any constitutional way, or basely yield them up for ever, and consent to be slaves, when every generous impulse urged them to be free. They even then did not dream of taking away his crown, but only of forcing him to dismiss and punish his false advisers, and to grant those privileges which he had repeatedly promised. They asked for no favors which the constitution, by which he was bound as well as they, had not guaranteed. They simply de-

manded their inalienable rights ; the old privileges of Englishmen—the long established provisions of the Magna Charta. These he would not grant. When the independent commons refused him favors, he imposed grievous burdens, and sought to prostrate all that was dear to patriotism, and all that was sacred in religion. For these alone, they originally took the field. They fought for their rights, not for ascendancy, for the preservation of their altars, and their firesides, not for the overthrow of the throne, to which they, in common with loyal Englishmen in all ages, were attached.

It was during the early conflicts with the royal forces that Cromwell attracted universal attention, and was entrusted with those powers which he subsequently abused. He had, indeed, previously gained the respect of Hampden, by whom he was appreciated, as well as the sympathy of many of the more radical of the members of the House of Commons, of which he was a member. He had made some incoherent speeches which though pregnant with secret meanings, and burning with piety and enthusiasm, gave but little indication of his future greatness. He was not the oracle of legislators ; the House of Commons was not the field to develop his highest energies. He was a warrior, a self-taught general, a man of intuitive military genius who could perceive at a glance the mistakes of an enemy, and who was as ready in improving his advantages as he was quick to detect them. Moreover, he was an enthusiast and inspired his soldiers with the passions he felt, yet insisted upon discipline while he kindled enthusiasm. He would not be the leader of mere fanatics, as was Mahomet, or of mere machines, as was Charles XII, but would combine the ardor of the early Saracens with the discipline of a Roman army, so that it is difficult to tell whether his victories were the result of the impetuosity generated by the love of liberty, or the system of tactics devised by his military genius. Certain it is that his military successes were brilliant and rapid almost beyond a precedent, and gained over superior forces arrayed under the ablest generals of the times. He, however, ascribed his triumphs to the God of battles, from whom he believed himself to have received a supernatural commission to vindicate the sacredness of truth, and secure permanent blessings to mankind. He

was seen to pray with rapt devotion, before he went to the field of battle. He wrote letters to the speaker of the House of Commons, which were pervaded with the idea that he was merely an instrument in the hands of God, as was Joshua of old, to demolish the throne of Anti-Christ, and work out a deliverance for his chosen people.

It would be needless to detail his battles or describe the varied incidents of his eventful life, from his first entrance into Parliament till he was invested with sovereign power under the title of Protector of the Commonwealth. His victories at Nasely, Marston Moor, and Worcester raised his military fame to a height which had hardly been surpassed by any general in modern Europe. His address in managing his party—so turbulent and violent—showed consummate knowledge of human nature and the passions of his age. The use he made of victories proved his wisdom and his statesmanship to have been unparalleled. His abilities as a ruler were not inferior to his talents as a general. He maintained at once a strong government and a generous policy, and sustained the supremacy of the laws while he adopted the most tolerant principles of legislation. He entrusted the ablest men in the realm with power, for he was as discerning of merit as he was prompt in appropriating it. He encouraged learning and supported the ministers of religion. He ruled in the fear of God and on the principles of justice, gaining the respect of foreign nations and securing the veneration of his own party. The only religious persecution during his brief but glorious reign, was that of the Catholics and the Quakers. He tolerated all religions but such as encouraged in the devotees acts of violence or of rudeness. He circulated the Scriptures, and was not jealous of that manly independence which they have ever fostered. Never did he punish his enemies further than was necessary for his own safety and the peace of the realm; never did he flag in his devotions or apostatize from the truth he had early embraced. His letters, his common life, his familiar conversations alike show that he was sincere in his professions. He may have committed errors and resorted to unworthy tricks; but there is no proof that he was false to the trust committed to his charge. He believed that he was called upon to save the country, that no other person

was equal to the task, and that extraordinary embarrassments and difficulties required extraordinary courses—not in all respects to be justified, especially in coming time, but such as the circumstances of his age imposed. He is to be cleared from the charge of hypocrisy, and we believe from that of unprincipled ambition, while his numerous and splendid virtues, granting even more than ordinary infirmities, should redeem his memory from shame. In the opinion of a large and continually increasing class, both in this country and in Europe, he is regarded as a sincere and earnest Christian as well as an able and enlightened ruler. His piety, in the opinion of some of the most discerning, was as remarkable as his talents. Some of his acts are now generally regarded as blunders, even by his friends—blunders which his enemies have magnified into gigantic crimes. But they were such as it was natural to make, and they were supported by powerful reasons. Had they not been tried, greater evils than those we lament might have resulted. It is difficult to predict what would have happened had he pursued a different policy. After the battle of Centuars, we may detect errors which could not well have been avoided, in the whirlpool of revolutionary excess in which he was plunged. No lover of freedom, however, has ever attributed to him any important error until the seizure of the king; and on the justice of his execution will rest the verdict of all posterity as to the wisdom and propriety of Cromwell's whole political career. If that death were justifiable, then he must be acquitted of all the subsequent excesses of revolutionary violence; for, that deed done, the barriers of society were thrown down, and no mortal arm could have arrested the devastating torrent which swept England from North to South.

Was that act an obvious necessity in order to secure the triumph of civil and religious liberty? Such it doubtless seemed to the patriots of that age. They could expect no peace or security while that faithless monarch lived. They could hope for no permanent tranquillity while he had means to foment dissensions and to purchase aid. It was certain that he would never abate his high and presumptuous prerogative, and, that if king, he would strive to be an unlimited king. He believed the nation was made for him, and not he for the nation, and that all were bound to

obey implicitly his will. It was clear that his opinions would never be changed, or his energy relaxed to recover his throne and plunge the nation in anarchy and war. If the cause of the revolution were just, it certainly appeared that it should be maintained at any hazard, and at any sacrifices. It was plain that its leaders were either rebels or patriots ; that they must be hung as traitors or reign as conquerors. There was no middle course. Their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honors were staked upon the issues of the contest. If their safety and the cause of freedom required his death, then why should they hesitate to commit the deed ? What were his sorrows more than their sorrows ? What was a man's life in comparison with a sacred cause ? And what was a monarchy to a zealous republican ? Hence, the throne itself must fall and he who sat upon it must die—not from malice but cruel, hard necessity.

So seemed this act to the regicidal patriots. It is another question whether it proved a blunder. They could not have anticipated the results which really happened. Cromwell could not have known how short-lived would be the enthusiasm of the nation for a republican government, nor predicted the decline among the people of those virtues which they then professed. Nor could the party he led have anticipated his future usurpation nor his hard iron rule of military despotism. The experiment of a republic had not been tried—infirmities of human nature had not been fully tested, and no one could foresee the fearful re-action.

Still, since a re-action did take place in the opinions of the people,—since they retrograded in morals and in doctrines—since hypocrisy and cant succeeded honesty and fervor—since infidelity lurked in many a bosom in which the fires of devotional ardor once fervently burned—since men became ashamed, as usual, of their old enthusiasm—since distrust of all improvement became as strong as former hopes, and the ordinances of religion became irksome, and folly, levity and indifference succeeded faith and earnestness, events which show the infirmity of man, rather than defects of systems—the regime of Cromwell could not be sustained without the power of armies. When it appeared that, by killing the king, Cromwell had not destroyed the claims

of Charles II; that the regicide was regarded with general detestation on the continent; that pity for a persecuted family was created; that the crime led on to other excesses, and ended in a military despotism; that the soldiery trampled law and justice under their feet, and subverted institutions dear to the English heart; that in order to maintain his power, Cromwell was forced to do the very things for which he had condemned Charles I; that he was obliged to impose taxes without the consent of Parliament, and even dispense with parliaments and all the constitutional checks to absolutism, thereby preventing constitutional liberty, and inflicting burdens which must necessarily produce a re-action, and nullify the good he undoubtedly contemplated at the outset of the difficulties; it was not unreasonable to conclude that the regicide proved a blunder.

Had Charles I simply been dethroned, or imprisoned, or sent out of the country, and his kingdom given to a legitimate successor, then Parliament might have continued loyal and true to the interests they had so nobly defended, and Charles II would never have been permitted to make those encroachments which stain the memory of all the members of the house of Stewart. The Parliament might have retained that healthful ascendancy, which it took another revolution to accomplish, and law and liberty might have commenced their reign with the accession of Charles II, instead of being delayed till that of William III. It is, however, impossible to tell what might, and what might not have happened, had Charles I not been executed. It may have proved a blunder, but one which no wisdom could have avoided in revolutionary times. It was the will of Providence that he should die, and that the nation should struggle fifty or sixty years longer, before true constitutional liberty could be enjoyed. Doubtless the nation was not prepared for it under the administration of Cromwell

Was Cromwell, then, an usurper, after the military power, united with the parliamentary, had entrusted him with the helm of state? Was his course justifiable after he was clothed with the dictatorship? His worst step was the dissolution of Parliament, and his final resolution to rule without it. It was the last vestige of the ancient constitution. It was, imperfectly however, the repre-

sensation of the national will, the natural and legitimate protector of the laws ; an ancient and time-honored institution, not dangerous to the lives and property of the people, and responsible to the nation, and not to Cromwell. It should have been nothing to him, whether it acted in accordance with his notions or not. By subverting it, he imitated the tyranny against which he had rebelled. He crushed the hopes of the most sanguine friends of liberty. These are facts which will for ever sully the memory of the Protector. The nation can never forgive his assumption of the powers of an absolute prince, not because absolutism is so hateful in itself, but because he had made far different professions, had violated his early principles.

It is true, this course has many palliations. It seemed to him that a dictatorship was the only government which England then could bear, and that he alone was capable of managing the helm of state. Why, then, did he bequeath his power to his son Richard, who was not equal to the task of preserving it? Why did he seek to found another dynasty, and one that was not legitimate, except on the false principle that might makes right? It may be said that he was obviously drawn into a vortex of political necessity, and no other course apparently remained to him, unless he was willing to re-plunge the nation into anarchy and crime. Such was probably his firm conviction. We do not believe that he aimed at usurpation before the death of Charles. He certainly could not trust any of the parties with which he had been associated. He could not trust the Presbyterians, for they would have recalled the king, attempted to establish uniformity with their doctrines and discipline, united the church with the state, and built up a monstrous clerical usurpation. He could not trust the Independents, his own peculiar party, for this was split up into various sects—fanatical in their notions, and impracticable in their aims—a party which would have made more sweeping changes than any nation could have endured, and which would certainly have introduced anarchy and misrule. He could not trust the Parliament, for it sought a supremacy hostile to all good government, and was devoid of unity and concert of action. He was forced to reign alone or not at all. Perhaps he would have endangered his life, and certainly would have jeopardized the cause of law and order, had he descended from the chair of state.

These, certainly, were powerful motives, with a truly patriotic ruler, for no one has ever doubted his attachment to his country and his devotion to all its interests. Yet, nevertheless, with all the palliations which can be urged, notwithstanding he may have been as conscientious as he was able and enlightened, ruling benignantly, though firmly, it must still be acknowledged that he ruled on principles not recognized by the constitution, principles which, had they been enforced by his successors, would have converted England into an absolute despotism, like that which Richelieu prepared for Louis XIV. This is a true usurpation, and as an usurper Cromwell must pass down to all posterity. We may excuse him, we may forgive him, we may honor his virtues, we may venerate his name; but it is as unworthy for us to degrade history by denying this great fact, as it would have been in the sacred writers to conceal the vices and the crimes of David and Solomon. And it would be miserable as a history. It would divest history of truth, of instructive lessons; and of the most impressive of all truths, the most instructive of all lessons—the degeneracy of man, the infirmities of good men, the weakness of human nature at the best, and the danger of intrusting to any one, however exalted by talents and virtues, unguarded power, since power ever has been and ever will be abused.

There were some great acts in Cromwell's life which have called forth, especially in this age, much censure and reproach; and among these, his cruelties in Ireland while subjugating that country. All such censures must be based on the principles of policy, rather than on those of everlasting truth. If it were right to make war with the Irish nation at all, then we can only criticise his military policy, and that can never be settled except by results, since we are ignorant of the circumstances by which all policy is determined. We know what these results were. Ireland was subjugated in a few months and peace and tranquillity restored throughout the island. Cromwell was undoubtedly severe, but he believed that vigorous measures in war would soonest bring about the end desired. He wished to intimidate as well as punish. He could not trust the Irish; he had no confidence in their promises or their oaths. They were savage and treacherous; bigots to a religion which had ever de-

clared that no faith was to be kept with infidels, and that the end justified the means. They hated him and his nation with the most implacable animosity. The moment his back was turned they would commit new atrocities, unless they were kept in perpetual fear. If they had had the power, they would have exterminated the Protestants with the most unrelenting cruelty. Unless they were frightened into submission, there would be no end to rebellions and massacres; and he wanted to finish the war as soon as possible. He was needed in England. He could not stop to conquer by the ordinary rules. He lived in times of revolution when all ordinary rules were set aside. Besides, he made no pretensions to philanthropy in war. He knew that war was violence and cruelty and nothing else. He did not profess to carry the sword in one hand and the Bible in the other. He was too earnest to fall in with such folly and inconsistency. He regarded war as a scourge and a hateful necessity. He did not love it, but he thought that when once engaged in, it should be conducted upon no principle of maudlin benevolence. So he adopted whatever measures he thought would the most speedily accomplish his work. As he was a great master of the art of war as well as of human nature, it may be reasonably presumed he knew how to act judiciously, and that he did so act, however severe his cruelties may seem to us.

It is a different question altogether whether he had a right to subdue the Irish. We do not believe he would have invaded the country were it not a part of the English possessions. He did not make the original aggression. The island had been subdued and formed a part and parcel of the British empire. As such he was bound to protect his own subjects who had settled there, and who had been wantonly massacred by an infuriated people. There had long been a desultory contest between the Irish Catholics and the English Protestants. The struggle was between different religions as well as different races. He was one of the great defenders of Protestantism. He could not bear to see it suppressed. He looked on with the eyes of a religious partisan, as well as of a christian ruler. There was no law or tranquillity or security on the island. It would be abandoned to hopeless pillage and anarchy unless law and order were restored

by the only power which could restore it—the military. So he came to the rescue of his English subjects as well as the Protestant religion.

Exception, again, has been taken to his iron military government in England. The only palliation or excuse for this was revolutionary necessity. His power would have been a mockery without an army devoted to him. It was the instrument by which he enforced laws—the sword of the magistrate—the terror of evil-doers. An army of course created the necessity of taxation in some form to support it, and taxation proved, as it always does, oppressive and hateful. When taxes were imposed without the consent of the representatives of the people, practical liberty was at an end, and the objects for which men had assumed the sword were lost.

It is ever to be regretted that law could not be enforced without a subversion of liberty. Cromwell himself must have felt the disappointment with all the anguish of a bruised heart. He had hoped that men would be ruled by the word of God. He had cherished greater faith in human nature than the Bible and human experience warranted. He must have felt both vexation and humiliation that, after all, his experiment had outwardly proved a failure; that the people were then unworthy the freedom for which they had been ready to offer up their lives; that envy, and suspicion, and rivalry had destroyed the finest prospects.

When the people themselves had leisure to contemplate the true state of affairs, they doubtless also felt disappointment added to the impression that they had been mocked and duped. They groaned in bitterness of spirit to see a revolutionary army in time of peace quartered in their towers, and patrolled along their streets. They were mortified to find, by the strongest of all proofs, that the civil power was subordinate to the military; that their great constitutional rights were still disregarded; and that a hateful party which then was only a minority of the nation, by the mere force of violence, absolutely ruled the country, and might, if this despotism were perpetuated, destroy all their hopes and plunge them in one common ruin. Men asked one another, as the troops of Cromwell marched along the streets, wherefore all their past struggles—wherefore the blood that had been shed on Mar-

ston Moor and Worcester? Wherefore the treasure expended on the parliamentary acts? Wherefore the eloquence of Vane, and Hampden, and Pym? For what purpose had Charles been executed? What were the boasted results of a revolution, if a monarch more powerful and despotic than Charles were seated on his throne? What boot it if he ruled wisely and beneficently, if great constitutional laws and natural rights, to preserve which, they had originally taken up arms against an ancient dynasty, were to be trodden under foot? If we must have a king, why not have a legitimate king who will unite all parties, for we are disgusted with change? It has not brought the blessings we had anticipated. We are checked in our former pleasures. Social despotism is added to political. We cannot enjoy those diversions which attract our minds from the evils around us. We only encounter sour and hypocritical faces, and canting philanthropists, who talk of liberty and give us a double and a most hateful yoke, since it would curb the natural exuberance of our feelings. Away with this protectoral government—this puritanical regime, which has mocked us and restrained us in matters in which we were left at liberty even under Charles I.

Hence the nation ardently and almost universally desired the restoration of Charles II. It is a fact that no event was ever hailed in England with more indescribable enthusiasm. The great public rejoicing, the merry peals of bells, the imposing processions, and the flattering speeches which attended the return of the exiled prince were most remarkable; and still more remarkable, that Charles II, so light, so frivolous, so faithless, so incapable of friendship, so utterly depraved and selfish, should have retained the affections of the nation. How great must have been the reaction which could produce such a state of public feeling in spite of his misrule and worthless personal character! What a lesson this teaches us of the infirmity and capriciousness of human nature! How naturally men prefer pleasure to duty! How intolerable is restraint upon their social life! How indifferent they are to disgraceful national vices, to public adversity, to despotism even, provided they may enjoy their demoralizing pleasures unrestricted by the government! Who cares for elevated sentiments, or public prosperity, or permanent glory, when pleasure is

in the way? This was the great reason why the experiment of Cromwell and the Puritans proved a failure. The people after the first gush of enthusiasm hankered after bear-baitings, cock-fighting, boxing-matches, horse-racing, holiday sports, theatrical amusements, and social dissipation. The people of England retrograded in virtue. From the extreme of ardor they went to the other extreme of indifference. The whole blame of the failure should not be attributed to Cromwell—hateful as was the course he felt it necessary to adopt. It was not his fault that degeneracy and change should so soon come over his countrymen. He did not degenerate. His tastes never changed. The times changed,—new ideas, principles and habits supplanted the old Puritan regime. Nothing is permanent in our world. How seldom, even in our own times, will the tastes and opinions of the people last two consecutive years in reference to any thing under the sun. Men love new things. They weary of old ones, however good. This is an element of human nature,—neither good nor evil,—which we cannot help, and which we would not prevent, even if we could. Cromwell and the loftier spirits of his age must have seen and felt that self interest, and passion, and love of pleasure are more powerful principles of action with most men, than the suggestions of reason, or the fear of God's displeasure, that few are found to persevere in self-sacrifices which are neither appreciated nor rewarded, that all improvement is difficult, the progress of society slow, and the promised period when human happiness and virtue shall be consummated still at an immeasurable and indefinite distance in the uncertain future.

Did Cromwell, then, and the Puritans, live in vain? Was their experiment a failure? Certainly not! Puritanism indeed achieved but few outward triumphs after the restoration. It even lost caste and retired to obscure retreats—disowned by the state, mocked by the universities, ridiculed by learned men, oppressed by legislative enactments, condemned to be poor, plebeian, unfashionable, slandered and despised. The rich, the great, the learned, would have nothing to do with it, or with those who professed it. A rigid, cold, unkind and insulting policy towards it was adopted by the government and by all the leaders of society. It was shut out of the universities; its ministers were refused the right to

marry ; its churches were called chapels ; its people were compelled to pay tythes ; and all the combined influences of the church and state were systematically exerted to crush its spirit and make it contemptible, as the surest way in an aristocratic country to degrade and undermine it. So powerful have been those influences that it is seldom that a man who becomes rich retains his allegiance to its ideas. It is disowned by worldly fathers and mothers who wish to introduce their daughters into fashionable life, or to improve their own social condition. But few barristers, or physicians, or educated men, or men of leisure, or men of rank, have ever belonged to it—so that it has not kept pace with the established church. It has apparently declined so decidedly, and become so unfashionable, and perhaps retains so little loftiness or self-respect, that even its panegyrists and adherents in America disown it, and are ashamed of it when they visit the scenes of its ancient triumphs. Puritanism, therefore, has proved a failure in England. But then its great ideas have entered into new combinations. Its forms have passed away ; but its spirit has invaded many of the churches of the establishment.

Moreover, be it remembered that Puritan love of liberty, after a temporary reaction, animated the patriots of the second revolution of '88, which followed naturally from the first, and led to the eternal exclusion of the house of Stewart from the throne, and the more permanent reign of constitutional privileges, under William III, and the Hanoverian kings. It produced the famous Declaration of Rights, which guarantees the liberties of the English people, and which was the "germ of the law," says Macaulay, "which enfranchised the press, limited the duration of Parliament, abolished the slave trade, reformed the representative system, and secured the rights of all orders of men." The English are in no slight degree indebted for their political prudence and their temperate but steady perseverance in obtaining privileges from favored classes, to the experience they learned during the first dreadful revolution. Had it not occurred under Cromwell, it might have happened in a worse form in a succeeding age, or it might not have occurred at all. A regime of cruelty, perfidy and crime might have been established, and that

glorious country, now the home of refuge for the persecuted of other nations, and a beacon-light to all the world, might have become, like the continental people, indifferent to the progress of liberty. Thanks to Cromwell and the Puritans, their experience and their ideas were not thrown away, although they may not have been honored as fully as we could wish, and therefore mankind shall honor them long after the sects and parties which arose with them shall have passed away—shall honor them, not because they were strong, but because they were good, because they did practically believe in a God, and sought to institute a government founded on his laws.

ART. VI.—INTERNATIONAL LAW

Mr. Marcy's letter to Mr. Hulseman relative to the Koszta case.

Mr. Marcy's letter to Col. Kinney, of Feb. 5th, 1855.

INTERNATIONAL law consists of such usages as nations may have adopted in their intercourse with each other, whether in peace or war. Of necessity, these usages must be influenced by the characters of the people who exercise them. The laws of nations must vary as nations become more enlightened, more civilized, more liberal in their foreign policy, and more just and free in their internal institutions. The laws of barbarous nations are tinged with the savage character of the people with whom they originate. The assuasive influence of intellectual culture, and of domestic and social improvement, is extended to the nation from the individuals who compose it; and international law becomes humane, just and free, as the people who rule become imbued with these qualities. The effect of increased knowledge and improvement in the arts and habits of living is not immediately perceived upon the individual man or in the domestic and social circle. Civilization must modify more slowly, and with more difficulty, political institutions and international law. We are strong in the conviction, however, that as intelligence and refinement are diffused through a people, the barbarous institutions of despotism and aristocracy must grow weak and expire. And

it seems to us to follow as a consequence from the same moral law, that as tyranny and injustice in their own institutions grow odious and intolerable to a people, and are stricken down, they must infuse into the law which controls their intercourse with other nations a helping charity and a respect for freedom, individual and national. We think we perceive in the universal intelligence, the absolute personal freedom and social equality of our people, the true cause of our efforts as a nation in behalf of national freedom and equality. The mutual enjoyment of liberty renders our hearts indisposed to oppress, as it makes us impatient of being oppressed. Accustomed to witness the pursuit of happiness by all around us, free from every restraint but that of justice to others, we have distinguished ourselves since the establishment of our independence by efforts to remove from the law of nations its asperities and inhumanities, and to infuse into it the spirit of charity, and equality, and freedom. Such ideas as these have been repeatedly suggested to us by the action of this country. In its foreign policy this people have sought freedom of commercial intercourse, as the true source of national wealth and human advancement. Upon questions of maritime rights, whether neutral or belligerent, our people have been distinguished by the humanity, liberality and justice of the improvements which they have with uniformity and zeal urged upon all other civilized nations. Sometimes they have been content to suggest modifications as proper in view of the advanced state of civilization. At other times they have asserted rights as having sprung out of that advancement of society, which it was their purpose to insist upon against the world in arms if necessary. The tendency of all these propositions has been, however, the general well-being. They have not been selfish in their purpose or limited in their sphere of action. They have had in view the security of the weak against the powerful, the recognition of the political equality of every people, the abandonment under all circumstances of every pretence of right to control by one nation the independence and free action of any other. And we feel an exulting pride in recollecting that as a nation this people has, in its laws at home and in its assertion of international law, ever regarded individual right, individual feeling, individual happiness

and safety, as the object of its especial regard, for the security of which it has been especially commissioned.

In no case have the general ideas we have expressed of international law, and the influence of civil institutions upon it, been more forcibly impressed upon us than in that which produced the letter above referred to, from Mr. Marcy to Mr. Hulseman. The case of Martin Koszta excited so much feeling at the time of its occurrence, in this country, that its facts need be only briefly recapitulated in order to be revived in the memory of every one. Koszta was an Hungarian who had engaged in the attempt to dissolve the connection of Hungary and Austria by an armed revolt against the Austrian emperor. When that rebellion was crushed, he, with a number of others, escaped into the Turkish dominions, and thence, in consequence of the action of the governments concerned towards those fugitives, he came to this country, resided here about two years, declared his intention to become a citizen by naturalization of the United States as soon as the laws would permit, and to renounce formally his allegiance to Austria, and to swear allegiance to the United States. Before the period arrived at which he could be admitted to citizenship here, he visited Turkey again on private business, and was seized whilst in Smyrna by agents of the Austrian emperor, and placed in confinement on board an Austrian ship of war as a subject of the Austrian emperor, to whom he owed allegiance and service, and by whom such service was then about to be exacted forcibly. Capt. Ingraham was in the harbor of Smyrna at the time, in command of a vessel of war of the United States. Having been informed by the agents of our government there of the transaction, he demanded of the commander of the Austrian ship that Koszta should be set at liberty. The demand was refused, and Capt. Ingraham at once prepared to enforce the demand by an attack upon the Austrian vessel of war. A collision between these armed representatives of the two governments was prevented only by timely and very proper concessions on the part of the Austrian commander, and the liberation of Koszta from his custody. The emperor of Austria, through his representative at Washington, appealed to this government against the acts of Capt. Ingraham, and fortified that appeal with remonstrances (if our

memory is correct) from other leading European powers. The letter to Mr. Hulseman under consideration is an avowal of the conduct of Capt. Ingraham as a proper discharge of his duty to his country, and a defence of this government in the transaction thus adopted as its own. Koszta was an humble individual we presume ; and his fate, judging from his history prior to and since that event, would have interested few persons at the moment and have been forgotten by all in a very short time. His rescue, and the defence of the principles of national law it involved, have given to his life a high importance, and connected his name with national progress and the security of human rights. The questions involved in the defence of Capt. Ingraham's conduct in this affair have been for a long time and often the subject of discussion among lawyers and between nations. They have frequently involved countries in grave difficulties, and have been felt at all times to be extremely harassing.

We have indulged the hope, perhaps too fondly, that the signal circumstances of the Koszta case, and the bold and unre-served vindication of our national attitude in that affair have given to our reasoning a conclusive effect, and that the questions so much controverted, so fraught with danger to nations, and so interesting to the freedom and safety of individuals, have been so far put at rest, as that no nation will hereafter put the peace of the world at hazard in controverting our views upon them. We do not recollect in history a finer individual effort than the rescue of Koszta. Capt. Ingraham was, as a military officer, not of very high rank, and without the prestige of brilliant and imposing services, of a country comparatively new, and just developing its resources. He was far from his home, feeble in his armament, and surrounded by the representatives of the oldest and most powerful monarchies of the earth. Thus circumstanced, he was informed of an aggression attempted upon an unknown individual who claimed the protection of this country, by one of the most powerful and time-honored of those great monarchies. There was something in his loneliness to inspire dread, there was much in the character of his antagonist to impress him with awe. The duty to which he was called was full of doubt and perplexity, and he might have erred fatally to his fame and position in its per-

formance. On the other hand, the honor of his country was involved, and it might be that its rights were invaded in the person of one who had sought and had a just claim upon its protection. Capt. Ingraham did not hesitate. He confronted this august power. Was unmoved by the condemnatory powers of the august witnesses of the scene, and wrested their victim from the hands of his oppressors. We were as much impressed by the simplicity with which he reported what he had done and submitted his conduct to the judgment of his country, as we were by the independence of his decision and the intrepidity of his action. He had held upon himself for a while the attention of all the great powers of the world, and his countrymen awaited in anxiety the decision of his government in regard to him. Fortunately for him and for his country, and, as we believe, for civilization, his government had the moral courage and the enlightenment of opinion to approve his conduct and adopt his responsibilities. The emperor of Austria, by the manner in which he sought redress for the alleged outrage upon his dignity and peace, contributed much to render the occasion conspicuous and the conclusion of the affair impressive and lasting in its effects. He was not content with presenting his complaint in the gravest form through his minister at Washington, but he fortified himself by uniting with him in the call for explanation other great European powers, who were not interested in the particular fact, but whose representatives had no doubt with astonishment witnessed it. We certainly think the people of this country have reason to feel pride in the independence of opinion and the courage with which their government met this imposing proceeding. Had the complaint been confined simply to the course of Capt. Ingraham as an extreme proceeding, and been presented with statements showing that such extremities were not required by the occasion,—as Austria was prepared to review the conduct of its agents, and to give redress if proper, and to retrieve the mischief of their acts if found to have been unjustifiable,—we should have seen in the course of the government only a fine proof of the quick sense of our national dignity, an eager courage in its defence, and a generous sympathy with its officers in the manifestation of these qualities. The Austrian gov-

ernment did not, however, pursue this course, and in not doing so has given to this transaction, we think, great significance and value. The complaint against Capt. Ingraham by the powers of Europe was not merely that he had been hasty, imprudent, high-handed, disrespectful in his mode of redressing a wrong, but that he had mistaken his rights and the rights of his country, and had under color of his office perpetrated an outrage. An issue was raised by Mr. Hulseman, not upon the propriety of a military officer of this government resisting by arms at once a wrong offered to his country abroad and in a friendly port, but the claim of redress was put expressly upon the ground that no wrong had been done this country. The propriety or impropriety of Capt. Ingraham's course was made to depend upon a great and important question of international law, and upon the existence of a most valued individual right. The emperor of Austria chose to involve in this issue the much disputed question of perpetual allegiance of the subject or citizen to the country of his birth and the right of expatriation. He chose this signal occasion when he had been assailed by our arms, to seek that the justification or condemnation of that assault should depend upon the question whether his subjects were his slaves for ever, at all times, and in all countries; whether governments were compacts binding only upon their members whilst they continued as such, dissoluble at the will of a majority of them, and from which any individual might withdraw at any time, under circumstances of fairness and good faith, or whether the control under which a man might be born was one from which he could not be extricated except with the consent of the controlling power, and in the mode it should point out. Mr. Marcy accepted this issue frankly and boldly, and in doing so announced to Austria and the powers of Europe who united with him on this occasion that this government was prepared to maintain their view of this question of international law by arms. We remember very few acts of our country more important than this, or more significant of the influence which our institutions are destined to exert over those of other countries, and over the rights and happiness of men. We have maintained in the very attitude of war that the establishment of government is not an extinguishment of liberty, but a restraint upon personal

freedom, limited by its terms and by the continuance of an individual under its sway. The issue was thus made up between the parties: "In our opinion (says Mr. Hulseman) Koszta has never ceased to be an Austrian subject. Every thing combines to make the imperial government persist in this estimate of the matter. The laws of his country are opposed to Koszta's breaking asunder of his own accord, and without having obtained permission to expatriate himself from the authorities of that country, the ties of nationality which bind him to it." Mr. Marcy states his opinions in opposition to this view in the following language: "There is great diversity and much confusion of opinion as to the nature and obligations of allegiance. By some it is held to be an indestructible political tie, and though resulting from the mere accident of birth, yet for ever binding the subject to the sovereign; by others it is considered a political connection in the nature of a civil contract, dissoluble by mutual consent, but not so at the option of either party. The sounder and more prevalent doctrine, however, is, that the citizen or subject having faithfully performed the past and present duties resulting from his relation to the sovereign power, may at any time release himself from the obligation of allegiance, freely quit the land of his birth or adoption, seek through all countries a home, and select any where that which offers him the fairest prospect of happiness for himself and his posterity."

It seems to us that this question as to the binding nature of allegiance and the inextricable power of the sovereign lies at the foundation of this controversy, and that upon it the Austrian pretensions and the American defence must rest. It is true Mr. Hulseman argued that, whether right or wrong, upon that general proposition his government had just ground of complaint at the course pursued by Capt. Ingraham, inasmuch as the parties were all in a friendly port and under the protection of a neutral power, to whom an appeal should have been made for justice by all concerned. And it is also true that Mr. Marcy argued at length and with great ability, that whether Koszta remained a subject of Austria or not, he had, by acquiring a domicile in the United States, become its citizen for the time, and that so long as his domicile was with us he was entitled to our protection. No doubt

this proposition of Mr. Marcy's is true to a certain extent. For all commercial purposes, by the uniform decisions of all civilized countries he was during his domiciliation an American, and his property employed in American trade would be deemed American, neutral, where this country was neutral, belligerent, where we should be parties in a war. We venture to doubt, however, whether the allegiance of birth or allegiance permanently and fully acquired by adoption be even temporarily dissolved or its obligations and rights suspended by such commercial residence. We rather incline to the opinion that if the Austrian allegiance existed of right, it was paramount to any rights or obligations which existed betwixt Koszta and this country, except so far as the mere trade carried on in and from this country might have been involved. It would follow that, if Austria by her laws had a right to enforce, by seizure, her claims of service upon her subjects generally, she might do so at any time and place where the act did not violate the territorial rights or the peace of a friendly power. And it would follow that, as the seizure of the person was not in itself a wrong, and was not in violation of any right which we held over the person, the only party who could justly complain of the Austrian violence was Turkey; our right to liberate him could not be placed upon the wrong done to Turkey, and would be indefensible. It seems to us therefore, we confess, in reflecting upon these nice and difficult questions, that we can be held justifiable in the acts of Capt. Ingraham only upon the ground that Koszta's renunciation of his allegiance to Austria had annihilated it, that he no longer owed that country obedience and service, and that the emperor of Austria had no further power over him; and that until he should have acquired a permanent allegiance by adoption, he owed none any where, except that which his domicile imposed, which was temporary and was ours.

It was well for Koszta, for the gallant Captain Ingraham, and for the honor of our country, that we had at the time intrusted with the management of our foreign affairs one whose intrepidity of thought and moral firmness fitted him for the crisis, and that Mr. Marcy's progress in liberal opinion was equal to the utmost reach of our institutions and to all the just requirements of our position among nations. Had it been otherwise, our country

might have lost a fine opportunity of impressing deeply and lastingly upon the world a great principle of personal right and individual freedom; the buoyant courage and daring independence of our naval officers might have been rebuked and repressed, and the cankered and loathsome usurpations and abuses of feudalism might have been recognized even by this fresh, free and intelligent people as established and just laws among the civilized and enlightened nations of the present age.

We find the same liberal sentiment with which Mr. Marcy met the pretensions of Austria repeated in his letter to Mr. Kinney. "Sir, (he writes to Mr. Kinney,) if the enterprise of which you speak in your letter to me of the 28th ult. is a mere peaceful emigration,—if you, and those who propose to go with you, prefer to leave the United States and seek a permanent home in a foreign country, to renounce your citizenship here, and the rights and privileges belonging to it, and submit yourselves to the laws of another jurisdiction, it is neither the duty nor the desire of this government to interfere with your proceedings. By such a course you cease to be citizens of the United States, and can have, after such a change of allegiance, no claims to protection as such citizens from this government." Here, as in the letter to Mr. Hulseman, we find avowed under our government, as established, the great principle of personal freedom which animated the leaders of our Revolution and controlled those who framed our constitution, as the only law which we can recognize among civilized nations. It has not been our purpose in advertising to these letters to discuss this principle in detail, or to defend the propriety of its application by Mr. Marcy to the particular questions in issue with him. It would be impossible for us to give new force to his arguments by any suggestions of our own; we should only weaken them by attempting to condense them, and they have been so generally circulated that we need not republish them here. We have thought, however, that it might not be impertinent to record our unreserved acquiescence in his doctrines, our admiration of the ability with which he has maintained them, our respect for the independence and courage with which he has asserted them, and our firm conviction that a most important influence has been exerted upon our own institutions

and upon civilization by the positions which he assumed and the success with which they were defended on these occasions.

It may be thought by some to have been, in a national point of view, a light matter at most, upon which the event depending was merely whether Austria should punish or not one of its subjects, who had revolted against its dominion. We feel the scope of this case of Koszta to have been, in a practical point of view, infinitely more comprehensive, and its influences to have been various as well as large. But were this not so, we should feel the rescue of a fallen patriot from the hands of his oppressor, from captivity, perhaps from death, to have been a beautiful and proud charity. Those who may have been disposed, however, to esteem this transaction a light and ephemeral thing, should remember that the principle of law which we invoked to justify the rescue of Koszta is the only one upon which we can justify the recognition as citizens, and the protection outside of our own territorial limits, of the millions of foreign birth who have sought safety, freedom and happiness among us. Every naturalized citizen of ours might, as was Martin Koszta, be seized by the sovereign by whom his allegiance of birth might be claimed, when found elsewhere than here, as justly, and under the same pretences of law which were put forward in Koszta's case. No German could with safety revisit his home and kindred, nor, indeed, land for the purposes of business in any part of Europe in safety. No Irishman, or other native subject of Great Britain, could return to his home, or be found upon any part of the almost ubiquitous territory of that kingdom, without being liable to be detained and reduced to military service under the claim of power of its sovereign to that effect, a full and valued citizen of this country, though he might have become, under our laws. The case of Koszta was destined, therefore, to become a precedent in practice of great extent and deep import. And the hundreds of thousands of our citizens exposed to its application have reason to rejoice in the intelligence and force of character of the statesman who has made that precedent so happily decisive of their safety and their rights. The numerous bands of strangers, who have learned in the oppressed lands of their nativity, from our instruction and example, the nature and value of liberty, and have

fled from wretchedness and servitude to freedom and happiness here, must have heard with intense delight the announcement from Mr. Marcy, that their disenthralment was perfect, that their citizenship here was unqualified, and that the protecting arm of this country should be extended over them wheresoever their business or their pleasure should invite their presence. Many a stout heart and arm must have been invigorated afresh to the reduction of our forests and forcing our wide wilderness into contribution to human support, national wealth and civilization, by this proud thought thus strikingly exemplified to them. And the intelligence with which so many of our workshops are enlightened, must have become brighter, and derived a new impulsive power from the personal dignity of which Mr. Marcy's doctrines must have given to its possessor a clearer consciousness. There is another mistake on this subject very unjust to our secretary of state, which may spring up under the retro-active influence of his moral courage as a statesman, his comprehensive intelligence and his strength in controversy. It may be thought, since the conclusive effect of the letter to Mr. Hulseman, that the question involved was one of easy solution; that the view taken of the subject by Mr. Marcy was as a matter of course to be taken by every one in this country, and that every American statesman and lawyer would have acted, decided and reasoned as he did. We feel the case to be far otherwise; we are sure that our glorious institutions have not yet so far emancipated the minds of our people, and especially of our lawyers, from traditionary doctrines and the prestige of power, as to make the decision of the Koszta case a common thing, or the argument which sustained it other than an original and great one. We admired that decision at the time, and we look back upon it now proudly as a progressive step in national intelligence and freedom, and as evidence of a happy influence of our habits of thought and our institutions upon ourselves as well as upon mankind generally. If we are correct in our recollection, there was a pretty extensive and decided dissent expressed in Congress from the doctrines of Mr. Marcy, as abstract propositions of national law, upon the occasions when Capt. Ingraham's conduct was brought incidentally in question before that body. The lingering effects of England's municipal laws

and feudal relics, our hereditary deference to her opinions and establishment, the habitual submission to her common law, was shown conspicuously among the publicists and lawyers of that body, notwithstanding the pride with which Capt. Ingraham's gallantry thrilled them and the noble posture in which Mr. Marcy placed the country. Upon extending our inquiries further back, unless our recollection is wrong, we shall find our countrymen disturbed by the same doubts upon these great questions of right, and the maintenance of the honor and dignity of our country embarrassed by a like want of mental freedom and a moral courage to assume the position to which our destiny calls us. When Great Britain, during the last war, asserted over our naturalized citizens then fighting in our ranks against the country of their birth, the same inalienable right under which Austria attempted to justify her seizure of Koszta, many of our statesmen, lawyers, defended the aggressive attempt of the British crown to impose her common law upon us as the law of nations. In Congress it was boldly asserted, by distinguished and well-informed men, that England had a right to punish as traitors our naturalized citizens, born her subjects, who were taken in arms defending this country against her, and that our retaliation upon her soldiers, taken prisoners by us, was wicked and unjustifiable, indefensible alike by the law of nations and the principles of humanity. Many other of our statesmen conceded these acts of Great Britain to be right under her own laws, conformable to our own asserted rights, and in harmony with the practices and pretensions of the rest of civilized countries, but vindicated our retaliation upon the innocent as being also a *just, civilized usage*. These were the opinions, unless we are greatly mistaken, of the ablest men,—men whose opinions commanded most respect at that day upon that subject. There were comparatively few who denied the law asserted by England to be the recognized law of nations, which she professed, and by which, in her foreign intercourse, she was bound. Those who denounced her proceedings as outrages upon the established law, as well as upon humanity, and who appealed to our retaliatory measures as the just punishment of crime, were not, we think, a majority of those who sustained our then administration in the adoption of those measures. Mr. Marcy disclaims in his

letter that he puts forth any new principles, or that he attempts on the part of the United States any innovation in international rights. And certainly he is justified in this disclaimer when his principles of international law are submitted to the test of the approved writers upon that subject, whether ancient or modern. We think, however, that those principles have not been very influential over the arrogance of power and exasperated despotisms in recent times. And from the slight review which we have given of the state of opinion in our own country, we see reason to fear that the hand of power has shoved by justice, and the voice of reason has been silenced or unheeded amid the noise and pomp of camps and courts. Certainly the doctrines of law upon the particular points under discussion, which have been recently asserted by England and Austria, and, so far as we know, by all the powers of Europe, (except France, since her great Revolution,) are at variance with those of Mr. Marcy and the civil law writers of best authority. Nor do we, since our independence, seem to have entirely emancipated ourselves from the control of those overbearing innovators. If we leave our legislative halls and resort to the evidence afforded by our courts, whether of admiralty and civil jurisdiction or of common law authority, we are left in the same doubt as to the actual state of the law as even here recognized to be obligatory upon nations. Mr. Marcy said to Mr. Hulseman, that he asked no more for the United States than had been conceded to others, that he claimed only the full benefit of established law, and that his were the sounder and *more prevalent* doctrines upon the subject at issue. Chancellor Kent, on the contrary, upon a review of the action of our courts upon the question, has pronounced the "better opinion to be, that a citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States without permission of government, declared by law," and that "the rule of the English common law remains unaltered" and in force here. We shall turn presently to the cases to which Chancellor Kent alluded, and venture to express a doubt as to the sufficient extent and the accuracy of his examination. We refer to his opinion at present, along with those of our statesmen in Congress, merely to illustrate the freedom of thought and high bearing of the statesman who now presides over our affairs of

state, and to show that he uttered no common-place opinions, assumed no position of undoubted security, pronounced no principles conceded by those upon whom he must depend for support when he confronted the nations of Europe with this masterly letter. It must be evident to all, from what we have thus shown, that, if he has boldly and successfully vindicated the rightfulness of our policy and laws upon the subject of naturalization—if he has furnished an enlightened defence of our retaliatory proceedings in our past conflicts with Great Britain—if he has thrown the safeguards of reason and justice around our naturalized citizens, instead of the protection of mere force and will,—the obligations of the country, of these naturalized citizens, of the oppressed of other lands, and of the lovers of freedom every where, are greatly due to him as the leader of opinion upon these important subjects. As a statesman, properly and fully inspired by our institutions, he may well be referred to as an example deserving consideration. If the foreign policy of this country upon such subjects is fixed, as we think it will be found to be, by its course in the Koszta case, the decisions of our courts upon similar questions are matters of interest, and might become very important. We should feel it at all times embarrassing in controversies with other nations, to find the rights asserted and the law insisted upon by our executive, to be in conflict with the course of our judicial decisions, and the views of our antagonist sustained by the authority of our own courts. It would certainly be unpleasant, and would do much to weaken our influence and defeat our purposes, should we be met upon occasions like that of Koszta with the reproach that, whilst the executive branch of our government insisted even to the extremity of arms against certain rights claimed by other nations, our own courts of justice assert and enforce these same rights in the name of and in behalf of our government. Such must have been our condition in the Koszta case, and such it must be upon all similar cases hereafter, if Chancellor Kent's appreciation of our judicial decisions be correct. We can scarcely hope that any courts will have the frankness and energy to emancipate themselves from the trammels of precedent decisions, however wrong and mischievous, provided such precedents exist beyond doubt. It is a matter,

therefore, of importance, as well as interesting curiosity, to know whether Mr. Marcy be right, even so far as our own courts are concerned, in asserting that his views of this question are the established, the sounder and more prevalent doctrines, or whether Chancellor Kent be right in stating the better opinion to be, that the common law of England is the law which our courts enforce as the law of nations upon this matter of allegiance.

The cases cited by Chancellor Kent are those of Talbot and Gansen, 3d Dallas, 133, decided in 1795; that of Isaac Williams, decided in 1797, and referred to in a note in 2d Cranch, 82, taken from a report in Hall's Law Journal; that of Murray vs. the Charming Betsey, decided in 1804, 2d Cranch, 64; the United States vs. Gillies, 1 Peters, C. C. Rep. 159; the Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat, 283, decided in 1822; that of Shank and Dupont, in 3d Peters, U. S. Rep., 242, and a case in 9th Mass. Rep., 461. In all these cases it will be found that the decisions turned upon points foreign to the question which they are referred to as affecting in Chancellor Kent's opinion, and he himself admits that they do not determine the question. In some of the cases intimations of their opinion on this question of allegiance are given by the judges, which we propose to present to the reader and leave him to decide their relative importance. In the cases in the Supreme Court, reported in 2d Cranch and 7th Wheat, the slightest indication of opinion is carefully avoided as to the abstract question; the judges say no more than, whenever an allegiance shall be renounced, it must be done in good faith in order to be effective. Chief Justice Ellsworth, in the case of Williams, expresses a decided opinion that the common law of England rules here on the subject of allegiance, and that a citizen of the United States can never, without an express law on the subject and of his own free will, free himself from its jurisdiction and control. If we understand the report in Hall correctly, the associate judge indicated contrary impressions. In the case of United States vs. Gillies Judge Washington indicates impressions in harmony with Ellsworth's. In opposition to this we think a principle distinctly laid down by Judge Marshall, in the case of the Charming Betsey, to be very significant. He says that "*certainly*" one who has sworn allegiance to a

foreign power has placed himself out of the protection of the United States. Now it is an undoubted and universal principle, that the obligation of obedience and service on the part of the subject is dependent upon and co-extensive only with the right to claim protection from the sovereign. In the case of *Jansen vs. Talbot and others*, (3d Dallas, 137,) we find strong and beautiful sentiments upon the freedom of the citizen or subject expressed in their discussion of this question of allegiance by all the judges. And we confess that with our minds those sentiments entirely counterbalance the indicated imperfections of Ellsworth and Washington. The full bench of the Supreme Court we believe sat in that case, consisting of Rutledge, chief justice, and of Patterson, Wilson, Cushing, Iredell, justices. This case depended upon whether Ballard, a citizen of the United States by birth, had ceased to be so by a renunciation of his allegiance to the State of Virginia. The court determined that, whatever might have been the effect of such a proceeding done in good faith, Ballard's action in the whole affair had been a fraud and was void as to its effect upon his rights and responsibilities. The abstract question of the nature of allegiance and the right of voluntary expatriation was much disputed, as well at the bar as by the bench. We do not understand the judges to say in that case, as seems to be Chancellor Kent's impression, their reported opinions, that a law *is necessary* in this country to confer on the citizen the right of expatriation, but that would be *convenient* and *valuable* as a matter of *regulation* and *evidence* of *fairness* in cases such as were then before them. Patterson said that if the claimant had been duly naturalized as a French citizen and commissioned in good faith, he might *lawfully* do the acts complained of. Iredell said upon the general question that a man ought not to be a slave, that he should not be confined to a particular spot because he happened to draw his first breath upon it. Cushing thought the rule of the civil law, the law of nations, not the common law of England, was a reasonable and satisfactory one. Wilson and Rutledge gave no opinion on the general question. We find in Bee's Admiralty Reports (page 25) that intelligent judge admitted without question the right of voluntary expatriation from his country, subject only to good faith, honesty of

purpose and innocence in the circumstances of its exercise. The case of *Shanks vs. Dupont*, (3 Peters Sup. Crep. 100,) is much relied upon by those who dissent from Mr. Marcy's views as establishing the contrary doctrine. We think that, when properly understood, it has no such import. A lady born in South Carolina before our revolution remained in Charleston after its capture by the British troops, and there married an officer of the English army. After the peace she removed with her husband to England to reside. The question in the case was whether after the treaty of peace she continued a citizen of Carolina or was a subject of Great Britain. South Carolina had, at the time of declaring her independence as a state, adopted the common law of England as part of her fundamental law. Judge Johnson, who differed from the rest of the court in this case, held that by the common law the lady in question could not by her own mere act release herself from the allegiance of her birth, and that she remained a citizen of South Carolina notwithstanding her removal and permanent residence in Great Britain till her death; and that the treaty of peace had no influence on the question or on her condition. The court admitted that the common law of England was the law of South Carolina, and that under ordinary circumstances at the date of this lady's removal, before the adoption of the federal constitution, the law would have been as Judge Johnson stated it, but they held that the treaty of peace amounted to a recognition on the part of the two countries of the allegiance of their respective inhabitants according to their then residence and not according to their places of birth. Justice Story, in speaking of the rule of the common law and its control over this question in ordinary cases, spoke of it as influencing the case of this lady at the time of her removal and before the federal constitution. He spoke of the law as England asserted it, and had no reference to our national law. He could not have intended to decide in this case unnecessarily what he had before declined to determine so frequently until it should become *necessary* so to do. There are several cases in which this question has been discussed in the State courts, beside the one decided by Chancellor Kent in 9th Mass., (which, by the way, has been overruled,) that are of great interest we think. In 3d Binney 85, we understand the

court to hold that the English common law of perpetual allegiance is incompatible with the principles of the constitution of Pennsylvania, and in the opinion of Judge Tilghman with those of her sister states. Judge Iredell intimated the same views in *Jansen vs. Talbot* and others before referred to. In *Cross and others vs. Black*, 9 Gill and John. 198, and in *Ringgold vs. Borley*, 2 Maryland 186, that allegiance to the State of Maryland may be renounced by the mere volition of the party, the acquiring a permanent domicile and the exercise of the rights of citizenship in another state. In the State of Virginia in the case of *Murray and McCarty*, 2 Munford's Rep. 393, the court held that the removal from the state with an intention not to return, and the acquiring a residence elsewhere, was sufficient to dissolve the relation of citizen and government. These decisions have the authority of law where they were pronounced. They are the conclusions of intelligent minds, and are entitled to respect every where. They show that in adopting the common law of England, as did all the states subject to their peculiar institutions and conditions, they did not adopt the common law doctrines of allegiance and expatriation. We are tempted to quote from the Virginia judges in the case of *Murray and McCarty*. "Nature," said Judge Cabell, "has given to all men the right of relinquishing the society in which birth or accident may have thrown them and of seeking subsistence and happiness elsewhere. And it is believed that this right of emigration or expatriation is one of those inherent rights of which when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity." Judge Roane denied that "Congress had any power to regulate the right of expatriation as implied in that of naturalization, the latter being a political acquired right, the former a natural right." That the legislature of Virginia had not presumed to confer this right upon her own citizens; it being one of paramount authority bestowed on us by the God of nature." We venture to doubt both the scope and accuracy of Chancellor Kent's examination of the authorities of this country upon this interesting question. We take this occasion to deny that the common law of England controls at all the relations between the United States and its citizens, or enters into its constitution, or into the powers of its legislature or

the jurisdiction or authority of its courts. Whatever may be true in regard to the states and their authority over their citizens, the United States has no common law of allegiance or police or other form of sovereignty. It has no unwritten law but the civil law, the law of nations, which results to her necessarily from her position among the associated nations of the world. That law has been derived by modern civilization from the Roman republic, and proclaims to all a perfect freedom in the pursuit of happiness, which we shall express in the language of Cicero: "O jura preclara, atque divinitus jam inde a principio Romani nominis a majoribus nostris comparata; ne quis nostrum plusquam unius civitatis esse possit; dissimilitudo enim civitatum varietatem juris habet, necesse est, ne quis invitatus civitate mutetur, neve in civitate maneat invitatus. Hæc sunt enim fundamenta permisissima nostræ libertatis, sui quemque juris et retinendi et dimittendi esse dominum."

ART. VII.—THE PERIODS OF OUR PLANET.

Cosmos. A sketch of a physical description of the universe.

By ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT. Translated from the German by E. C. Otté. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1851.

The Two Records,—the Mosaic and the Geological. A lecture delivered by HUGH MILLER before the Young Men's Christian Association, in Exeter Hall, London. 1854. Gould & Lincoln, Boston.

The Six Days of Creation, or the Scriptural Cosmology, with the ancient idea of time worlds, in distinction from worlds in space. By TAYLOR LEWIS, Professor of Greek in Union College, Schenectady, N. Y. 1855.

THAT our planet has passed through protracted periods of formation and transformation, antecedently to the present order of things upon its surface, is doubted at this day by no man who has made himself familiar with the bearings of geological discovery. That man, and the animal races and botanical species co-existing with him, were preceded through an extended term by creatures of a proximate character, yet strikingly distinguished

from those of the human period; that such proximate species were but the successors of races of a previous age, of still stranger forms and more striking peculiarities; that these also had their predecessors, of various orders and through many generations, up to an unrecorded era, when life was first introduced on our globe; and that, at a date far earlier even than this, there was an immeasurable period of formative process, through a trackless antiquity, reaching onward from the initial moment of our world's creation, is the ultimate decision of science, and the carefully traced, concurring interpretation of the sacred volume of christendom.

Of these periods the general order and extent is a question full of interest to the philosopher, the antiquarian and the Christian. To the first, because it furnishes him one of the richest and most attractive fields of investigation, and affords already one of the most signal instances of the mind's triumph, under the guidance of scientific methods, over difficulties apparently insurmountable, in the search after truth. To the second, because it not only brings into requisition all his love of earliest record, and still earlier legend, but also places him in the very elysium of his fancy, the boundless waste of by-gone being. To the third, because, while it touches to the quick the prevalent inadequate interpretation of the grand introduction to the document of his creed, and summons him to the exhibition of a more consistent construction, as the true meaning of that record, it also affords him the most impressive illustrations of that creative wisdom, beneficent providence and progressive plan of which in the sacred books he is assured; and thus adds the great analogies of the past to the other evidences of his faith and to the hope he cherishes of a yet higher state of being in the future.

Of the calm, philosophic and thoroughly informed antiquarian interest in the question of our earth's successive ages, the world-renowned Baron Alexander Von Humboldt presents perhaps the best instance. Hugh Miller, of the geologist, the Christian and the man of letters combined; and Prof. Lewis, of the latest and most many-sided scholar and biblical critic. In treating the question, we propose mainly to condense and interweave for our readers, as of general currency in the scientific and literary world, the methods and conclusions of these three authors.

A word, however, at this point will not be out of place, respecting themselves and their productions.

The illustrious Prussian savant and his grandly conceived work come before us, indeed, only incidentally, and as far as our topic forms an element in his comprehensive survey of the universe. Still, his powers, and his preparation for that great task, and the admitted success of his performance, entitle his views on this, as on other points, to the highest regard. No other man, in the history of travel and authorship, has so combined the inspecting eye, the intellectual grasp, and the sustained industry requisite for unfolding the plan of nature. Nor is there any other work on the related verities of the world, as one vast organism, that can compare with his *Cosmos* in originality, as well as compass of design, or in completeness of execution, as well as accuracy of detail. Genius and study, observation and reflection, ability, opportunity and energy, plied with unsurpassed constancy through a long life, have justly placed him, and this crowning work of his days, in the very front of modern learned authority. Our readers will need from us no apology for the drafts we make from this treasury of knowledge.

Of Hugh Miller, and the brilliant achievements of his genius, we must, from his more special relations to our subject, speak a little more fully. And although some of our readers have, no doubt, like ourselves, dwelt with delight upon the pages of his rich, fresh and varied productions, yet we deem it due to the great cause of truth, to commend to still higher and wider regard the great Cromarty quarryman and his admirable works. The annals of literature present few instances of a man so highly endowed by nature and so exemplary in self-improvement, so situated and so successful,—exhibiting in one character so much intellectual force, muscle and sinew, combined with exquisite sensibility,—a strong, tender and upright heart, and a spirit free, genial and devout.

We know of no work of his which will not well repay considerate perusal. His “*Old Red Sandstone*,” “*Footprints of the Creator*,” “*First impressions of England and its People*,” “*Schools and Schoolmasters*,” or story of his self-conducted education, are all worthy of the widest circulation. The last,

especially, could we wish to see in the hands of every young man in the country. "The works of Hugh Miller," says Agassiz,* "have excited the greatest interest, not only among scientific men, but also among general readers. There is in them a freshness of conception, a power of argumentation, a depth of thought and a purity of feeling rarely met with in works of such character, which are well calculated to call forth sympathy, and to increase the popularity of a science which has already done so much to expand our views of the plan of creation. The scientific illustrations published by Mr. Miller are most happily combined with considerations of a higher order, rendering both equally acceptable to the thinking reader. But what is in a great degree peculiar to our author, is the successful combination of christian doctrines with pure scientific truths." To such commendation, from such a source, we need add but little. Nor will our readers object, we are sure, to our permitting Mr. Miller's exquisite lecture, with some fullness, to speak for itself. His views, though in some respects of a character not often introduced into this periodical, are so happily illustrated from the richest stores of geological acquisition, with the consummate sagacity of an accomplished scientific mind, and from extensive biblical knowledge, with the free but reverential spirit of an enlightened Christian, and they are so adorned with the charm of high poetic genius, that we cannot but believe they will, whether acquiesced in or not, be universally admired.

We have also to speak favorably of Mr. Lewis and his work. Learned authorship had already placed him forward, as among the erudite of the day; and his reputation as a critical scholar will not be diminished by this production. The American professor, it is true, has not the rare gifts of the Scotch stone-mason, —his life and energy, his insight and glow, his grasp and grace; yet his book possesses merits of a high order. It comes evidently from a mind enriched by long and varied study. It is the outgrowth of accurate and extensive research into ancient records, particularly into those held sacred in christendom. It breathes a spirit of confidence in truth, and especially of reliance on the christian archives, and on Him whom he believes their author,

* Introduction to Am. Ed. of "Footprints of the Creator."

and it brings to the elucidation of the sacred history of creation much from other parts of the venerated volume, not, as far as we know, heretofore noticed. It thus adds to the amount of knowledge on the subject at issue, and presents the question in a light honorable to the book so justly prized by the wise and good, and cognizable by a periodical which, as this does, embraces in its general plan the interests of science, literature and social virtue.

In certain particulars of execution we think Professor Lewis's book, as a work of art, justly liable to criticism. Its style is often involved, and generally wanting in clearness and force. The development of its argument is neither logical nor exact; and, in consequence, needless repetitions and irrelevant discussions at times occur. By over-admiration of his favorite Plato, he is misled into an excessive use of abstract *a priori* methods of investigation; and sometimes he over-refines the niceties of etymology, and paints too vividly the pictorial power of primitive words. But with due allowance for all this, the work is one entitled to general commendation. Without pretension, it possesses originality and independence, and to other good traits adds the merit of modesty. It will, we doubt not, take rank among accredited contributions to the cause of truth.

The critical discussion which we introduce from it, as bearing on the prevalent inadequate view respecting the periods of our planet, and as connected with a supposed issue between revelation and geological science, is entitled, we think, to the place we assign it, because of its literary character, and because of the ultimate relation of the question involved to the interests of mankind.

We proceed to a consideration of the protracted periods of the past, as indicated alike in the unwritten and the written records. "The globe itself reveals at every phase of its existence the mystery of its former condition. We cannot survey the crust of our planet without recognizing the traces of the prior existence and destruction of an organic world. The sedimentary rocks present a succession of organic forms, associated in groups, which have successively displaced and succeeded each other. The different super-imposed strata thus display to us the forms and floras of different epochs. In this sense the description of

nature is intimately connected with its history; and the geologist who is guided by the connections existing among the facts observed, cannot form a conception of the present without pursuing through countless ages the history of the past. In tracing the physical delineation of the globe, we behold the present and the past reciprocally incorporated, as it were, with one another; for the domain of nature is like that of languages, in which etymological research reveals a successive development, by showing us the primary condition of an idiom reflected in the form of speech in use at the present day.”*

The steps of this process, however, it becomes desirable to illustrate for our readers, especially for the satisfaction of those of them to whom the processes of geological investigation constitute something of an unrevealed mystery.

Many large rivers present certain features, which speak so plainly of a comparatively recent, and yet very ancient age, that their meaning cannot be mistaken. Such prodigious wear and tear of compact rock by water, as that of the tough limestone, shown in the Niagara gorge, now terminating in the wondrous cataract, has not been accomplished in a few generations. And similar instances occur on every continent. They abound in our own. Within scarcely more than a good two hours' walk from our national metropolis may be seen a channel, worn by the falls of the Potomac, more than fifty feet deep and several miles in length, in rock of the most unyielding texture. The historic human period seems a trifle compared with the term required for such an effect. Impressively is the same story told by the vast accumulations of alluvium in the beds and at the mouths of rivers. The deltas of the Mississippi, the Ganges and the Nile, are but funeral monuments, inscribed all over with memorials of departed ages. The latter of them presents, in connection with Egyptian monuments, certain landmarks by which its rate of growth may be approximated; and this, extended backward, may give some general idea of the alluvial period. So estimated, it is many thousands of years. Man, even from geological evidence, belongs probably only to its latter portion.

* *Cosmos*, vol. 1, p. 72

But this is only the recent section of our planet's history. Above the alluvium of the rivers are terraces at various heights, into which many openings have been made by natural convulsions or by human agency; and their interior, thus laid open, offers to view a record of much higher antiquity. Here are seen soil, sand, clay, and gravel or boulder beds, not mingled in one confused mass, but deposited in plainly marked layers, one above another; the pebbles and boulders, wherever they occur, affording also, by their worn and rounded form, proof of long rolling in water,—just as we see the proofs going on in the beds of streams and on the ocean's shore. All this must have taken place in an age greatly preceding the formation of river bottoms and deltas.

But under and back of these terraces of loam, clay and gravel, is every where found a vast framework of variously textured rock, sometimes underlying the plains, sometimes swelling into hills, sometimes piled in huge mountain ridges, or shooting up into towering pinnacles. Now this great skeleton has also been by nature and art in many places denuded and exposed to observation, and it too is found to consist of beds or strata, holding a very marked relation of sub and super position, in corresponding order, all over the world, and reaching down to a great depth. In no one place, it is true, have all the strata been offered to view at once. No natural chasm or artificial cut has gone much beneath the mere surface of the crust; and yet, tilted up as the strata are, especially in the neighborhood of mountains, one may be traced behind and beneath another, as the edges of a pile of blocks; and though they may be never seen altogether in this relation, yet, since any two of them found contiguous are always seen in that order, and never reversed, the entire range is unquestionable. By such means the strata beneath the soil, clay, gravel, &c., are known to range downward in this order: *tertiary*, a partially indurated system above the chalk; *secondary*, a series from the chalk, through the oolite, to the new red sandstone; and *Palæozoii*, from the coal beds to the slates. And while the highest give tokens of an antiquity greatly surpassing that of the unindurated beds above, those that lie beneath indicate an age greater in proportion to their depth; and although no mine, cave or boring has yet reached half a mile below the level of the sea-

surface, yet the downward measure of the strata may be approximated. A coal bed for instance is found to descend from *a* towards *d*, at a certain angle, with a curvature upward, and it emerges at *b*. Knowing the distance across and the angle of descent, the perpendicular distance, *c d*, is readily gotten. In this way "I have found," says Baron Humboldt, "after repeated examinations, that the lowest coal stratum which is known in the neighborhood of Duttweiler, near Bettingen, north-east of Saarlouis, must descend to depths of twenty to twenty-two thousand feet below the level of the sea."* And estimating below this the old red sandstone, and the silurian limestones, and then the slates, before the primary granite is reached, the whole depth is probably not less than from eight to ten miles. Now, gradually and successively formed as were all these laminæ in so immense a mass, how vast obviously were the periods employed!

But there is that known in connection with the granite and its associated Plutonic rocks, which points still further back towards "the beginning." Repeated and far separated borings into the earth exhibit an increase of temperature inward, at the rate of 1 deg. Fahrenheit, for every 54 feet descent. At 8 miles there must then be a glowing heat. Now the scorix of furnaces, and like products effected by chemists, exhibit the very minerals composing granite. This, and its peculiar crystalline structure, indicate very distinctly the igneous origin of granite; and rather enforce the conclusion that the primitive skeleton of the earth is but the slowly cooled crust of a once molten world. Immense indeed must have been the time employed in such a process.

The most reliable chronometry for these periods, however, especially for all since the introduction of any form of life, is that furnished by the successive orders of fossils found in the accumulating strata; from the prevalent *radiata*, *articulata*, and *mollusca*, and the simple *botanical* species of the lower formations, through the enormous fish, reptiles, birds and other *vertebrata* of increasing elevation of type, during many ages, to the existing mammalia, and, last of all, man, the consummation of animated forms, the connecting link between earth and heaven.

"All geologists agree in holding that the vast geological scale (of ancient life) naturally divides into three great parts. There are

* Cosmos, vol. 1, p. 151.

† See Cosmos, vol. 1, p. 158.

many lesser divisions—divisions into systems, formations, deposits, beds, strata; but the master divisions, in each of which we find a type of life so unlike that of the others, that even the unpracticed eye can detect the difference, are simply three,—the Palæozoic, or oldest fossiliferous division; the secondary, or middle fossiliferous division; and the tertiary, or latest fossiliferous division.

“In the first, or Palæozoic division, we find corals, crustaceans, molluscs, fishes, and, in its later formations, a few reptiles. But none of these classes of organisms gives its leading character to the Palæozoic,—they do not constitute its permanent feature, or render it more remarkable as a scene of life than any of the divisions which followed. That which chiefly distinguished the Palæozoic from the secondary and tertiary periods, was its gorgeous flora. It was emphatically the period of plants,—‘of herbs yielding seed after their kind.’ In no other age did the world ever witness such a flora,—the youth of the earth was peculiarly a green and umbrageous youth—a youth of dark and tangled forests—of high pines and stately araucarias—of the reed-like calamite—the tall tree-fern—the sculptured sigillaria, and the hirsute lipidodendron. Wherever dry land, or shallow lake, or running stream appeared, from where Melville island now spreads out its ice wastes under the star of the pole, to where the arid plains of Australia lie solitary beneath the bright crop of the south, a rank and luxuriant herbage cumbered every foot-breadth of the dark and steaming soil; and even to distant planets our earth must have shone through the enveloping cloud, with a green and delicate ray. Of this extraordinary age of plants we have our cheerful remembrances and witnesses in the flames that roar in our chimneys when we pile up the winter fire—in the brilliant gas that now casts its light on the great assemblage, and that brightens up the streets and lanes of this vast city,—in the glowing furnaces that smelt our metals, and give moving power to our ponderous engines,—in the long dusky trains that, with shriek and snort, speed, dart-like, athwart our landscapes,—and in the great cloud-enveloped vessels that darken the lower reaches of yon noble river, and rush in foam over ocean and sea. The geologic evidence is so complete as to be patent to all, that the first great period of organized being was, as described in the Mo-

saic record, peculiarly a period of herbs and trees, 'yielding seed after their kind.'

"The middle great life-period of the geologist—that of the secondary division—possessed, like the earlier one, its herbs and plants, but they were of a greatly less luxuriant and conspicuous character than their predecessors, and no longer formed the prominent trait or feature of the creation to which they belonged. The period had also its corals, its crustaceans, its molluscs, its fishes and, in some one or two exceptional instances, its dwarf mammals. But the grand existences of the age, the existences in which it excelled every other creation, earlier or later, were its huge creeping things—its enormous monsters of the deep—and, as shown by the impressions of their footprints stamped upon the rocks, its gigantic birds. It was peculiarly the age of egg-bearing animals, winged and wingless. Its wonderful whales, not, however, as now, of the mammalian, but of the reptilian class,—ichthyosaurs, plesiosaurs, and cetiosaurs, must have tempested the deep; its creeping lizards and crocodiles, such as the teleosaurus, megalosaurus, and iguanodon,—creatures, some of which more than rivaled the existing elephant in height, and greatly more than rivaled him in bulk, must have crowded the plains, or haunted by myriads the rivers of that period; and we know that the footprints of at least one of its many birds are of fully twice the size of those made by the horse or the camel. We are thus prepared to demonstrate that the second life-period of the geologist was peculiarly and characteristically a period of whale-like reptiles of the sea, of enormous creeping reptiles of the land, and of numerous birds—some of them of gigantic size; and in meet accordance with the fact, we find that the second Mosaic life-period was a period in which God created the fowl that flieth above the earth, with moving (or creeping) creatures, both in the waters and on the land, and what our translation renders 'great whales,' but what I find rendered in the margin 'great sea monsters.'

"The tertiary period had also its paramount class of existences. Its flora seems to have been no more conspicuous than that of the present time; its reptiles occupy a very subordinate place; but its beasts of the field were by far the most wonderfully developed, both in size and numbers, that ever appeared

upon earth. Its mammoths and its mastodons, its rhinoceroses and hippopotami, its enormous dinotherium and colossal megatherium, greatly more than equaled in bulk the hugest mammals of the present time, and vastly exceeded them in number. The remains of one of its elephants (*elephas primigenius*,) are still so abundant amid the frozen wastes of Siberia, that what have been not inappropriately termed 'ivory quarries' have been wrought among their bones for more than a hundred years. Even in our own country, of which, as I have already shown, this elephant was for long ages a native, so abundant are the skeletons and tusks, that there is scarcely a local museum in the kingdom that has not its specimens dug out of the Pleistocene deposits of the neighborhood. And with this ancient elephant there were meetly associated in Britain, as in the northern continents, generally all round the globe, many other mammals of corresponding magnitude. 'Grand, indeed,' says an English naturalist, 'was the fauna of the British islands in those early days. Tigers as large again as the biggest Asiatic species lurked in the ancient thickets; elephants of nearly twice the bulk of the largest individuals that now exist in Africa or Ceylon, roamed in herds; at least two species of rhinoceros found their way through the primeval forests; and the lakes and rivers were tenanted by hippopotami as bulky, and with as great tusks as those of Africa.' The massive cave-bear, and large cave hyena, belonged to the same formidable group, with at least two species of great oxen, (*bos longifrons* and *bos primigenius*,) with a horse of smaller size, and an elk (*megaceros hibernicus*,) that stood ten feet five inches in height. Truly this tertiary age—this third and last of the great geologic life-periods—was peculiarly the age of great 'beasts of the earth after their kind, and of cattle after their kind.''' *

Surely this great scene of life and death, unveiled by human intelligence from the lowest depths of buried organisms, conveys lessons to which no awakened mind can be indifferent. With it comes into view one of the most striking illustrations of that penetrating intellectual power possessed by the highest earthly creature. To have grappled thus successfully with the complex problem of rock-entombed wonders, and to have traced backward

through so vast a series the immensely extended chain of successive phases of life, and even to have tracked the thread of creative order far beyond the dawn of either animal or vegetable life, through preparatory ages of convulsion and erosion, up to an antecedent unindurated condition of mingled elements in our globe next subsequent to the creative fiat, is an achievement speaking scarcely less for the wondrous endowments of the mind, than the kindred exploits of scaling the heavens and circling with planets and suns in their mighty rounds through space. Indeed the one is but the complement of the other, since it brings into harmony the two grand elements of vast duration and immense extension, in our conceptions of the universe. But if the faculties of man be here thus illustrated, how far more impressively are displayed the attributes of God. The majestic march of ages proclaims his changeless being from everlasting to everlasting, and the onward progress of creative plan shows forth the excellences of his all-perfect mind. In every step there is order, and as order can spring alone from intelligence, such consummate adjustment manifests the highest wisdom ; while that wisdom, seen employed in adapting the existence, of every period, at once to their surrounding conditions, and to the well-being of subsequent higher races, exhibits unerring skill as but the handmaid to infinite goodness. And now when the rational and immortal being, last in the series, occupies the planet, what have not the chaos and consolidation, the convulsions and subsidences, the growth and the graves of previous periods, prepared for him ? A bounteous soil and a genial air, gushing fountains and perennial fires, a home of safety, a treasury of truth, and a world of beauty. Besides every supply for his wants to be drawn by man, with the sweat of his brow, from the bosom of his "alma mater," in the folds of her vestments are stored mines of wealth for his discovery and extrication, and charmed mirrors of truth for the delight of his mind. "The diversity of the most heterogeneous substances, their admixtures and metamorphoses, and the ever changing play of the forces called into action, afford to the human mind both nourishment and enjoyment, and open an immeasurable field of observation, from which the intellectual activity of man derives a great portion of its grandeur and power. The world of percept-

ive phenomena is reflected in the depths of the ideal world ; and the richness of nature, and the mass of all that admits of classification, gradually become the objects of inductive reasoning.”* But if this be the philosophy of past transforming periods, what shall we say of the poetry they have spread over our world ? Mountain peak and ocean tide, leaping cataract and flashing cloud, rolling hill and sloping plain, smiling vale and frowning crag, laughing stream and mournful shade, beauteous landscape and delightful scenes ; the grand, the picturesque and the lovely ; almost every where displayed, and appealing with a mute but mighty magic to the sensibilities even of childhood, and in every nobler bosom enkindling sympathies that wake

“To perish never,
Which neither listlessness nor mad endeavor,
Nor man nor boy,
Nor all that is at enmity with joy
Can utterly abolish or destroy !”

But with these conclusions the long entertained six thousand years’ interpretation of Genesis irreconcilably conflicts. That interpretation, however, is now shown *like its forerunning astronomically offending blunder*, to be the fault, not of the sacred book, but of its prejudiced readers. A reading apparently sanctioned by the document itself, and admitting the great periods of change, was proposed half a century ago by Dr. Chalmers, and has since received support from such theologians as Archbishop Sumner and Dr. John Harris, and from such geologists as Drs. Buckland and Conybeare, and Prof. Sedgwick. That reading isolates the primary statement, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,” and supposes a great chasm of ages then passed over in silence, and the narrative that follows to describe the preparation made in six natural days, for man and his associate races, after a catastrophe that destroyed all previous existences. But this supposition is discredited by more recent geological discovery, and disallowed by more searching scriptural exegesis. Existing races of animals have been traced back in unbroken course to a time long antedating man. And consequently there was no such destroying catastrophe just before the

* Cosmos, vol. 1, p. 156.

human era. While the sacred creative history, interpreted by its own structure, other parts of the Bible, and the habits of the ancient Jewish mind, indicates that the successive *yoms* were not days, but ages.

In permitting Mr. Lewis to set this forth in our pages, let it not be supposed that we are misapplying our subject. A chapter in Plato or Pliny might be thus properly discussed in a literary periodical, if bearing on some great question of ancient history or modern science. How much more suitably a chapter in that venerable book which has received incalculably higher sanction from the wisdom of mankind than all other treatises on earth ! And if there be any reader misled into depreciation of the sacred chronicles by such foolish mockeries as those put forth by Mr. Gliddon, we would bespeak for them at least as marvelous literary monuments, and for the use we are about to make of them, candid consideration, by quoting the following remarkable testimonial of Baron Humboldt. While, following Schiller, he says * of the Greek mind, in regard to nature, " We cannot fail to remark with surprise how few traces are to be met among them of the sentimental interest with which we in modern times attach ourselves to the individual characteristics of natural scenery. The Greek poet is certainly in the highest degree correct, faithful and circumstantial in his descriptions of nature ; but his heart has no more share in his words than if he were treating of a garment, a shield, or a suit of armor." He is constrained to speak very differently of the Hebrew mind, under the influence of a loftier religion. " It is characteristic of the poetry of the Hebrews, that, as a reflex of Monotheism, it always embraces the universe in its unity, comprising both terrestrial life and the luminous realms of space. The Hebrew poet does not depict nature as a self-dependent object, glorious in its individual beauty, but always as in relation to a higher spiritual Power. Nature is to him a work of creation and order, the living expression of the omnipresence of the Divinity in the visible world. Hence, the lyrical poetry of the Hebrews, from the very nature of its subject, is grand and solemn, and when it treats of the earthly condition of mankind, is full of sad and pensive feeling. . . . It might

* *Cosmos*, vol. ii, pp. 21-58.

almost be said that one single psalm (civ) represents the image of the whole Cosmos. . . . We are astonished to find in a lyrical poem of such limited compass, the whole universe—the heavens and the earth—sketched with a few bold touches; the calm and toilsome labor of man, from the rising of the sun to the setting of the same, when his daily work is done, is here contrasted with the moving life of the elements and of nature. . . . Similar views of the Cosmos occur repeatedly in the Psalms, and most fully perhaps in the ancient, if not ante-Mosaic book of Job. The meteorological processes which take place in the atmosphere; the formation and solution of vapor according to the changing direction of the wind, the play of its colors, the generation of hail and of the rolling thunder, are described with individualizing accuracy; and many questions are propounded which we, in the present state of our physical knowledge, may indeed be able to express under more scientific definitions, but scarcely to answer satisfactorily.” And he is even impelled to add, in accounting for those views of nature which the Greek had not and we have, “At the period when the feelings died away which had animated classical antiquity, and directed the minds of men to a visible manifestation of human activity rather than a passive contemplation of the external world, a new power arose. Christianity gradually diffused itself; and wherever it was adopted as the religion of the State, it not only exercised a beneficial influence on the condition of the lower classes, by inculcating the social freedom of mankind, but also expanded the views of men in their communion with nature. The eye no longer rested on the forms of the Olympic gods. The fathers of the church, in their rhetorically correct and often poetically imaginative language, now taught that the Creator showed himself great in inanimate, no less than in animate nature, and in the wild strife of the elements, no less than in the still activity of organic development; thus, modifications in the religious sentiments and tenderest feelings of men occurred, and predominance was given to that which might otherwise have escaped attention, by the tendency of the christian mind to prove from the order of the universe and the beauty of nature the greatness and goodness of the Creator.”

In turning, then, to the introductory chapter of the great christian volume for its actual utterance respecting the periods of our planet, we are asking attention to no unfit or inconsiderable authority. What it really teaches is no doubt the truth, and its ascertainment an acquisition of value. That its successive periods (Hebrew *yoms*) mean, not *days*, but *ages*, we have already stated to be Mr. Lewis's view. It is also our own; and the reasons for this conclusion we will, as an epitome of Mr. Lewis's argument, briefly give. They are derived from the general tone and the particulars of the account, and from other biblical tokens and ancient ideas.

In its general tone, we think, the sacred creative history must strike every considerate reader as indefinite in its comprehensiveness and adaptive in its scenic descriptions. Neither the date of "the beginning" nor the compass of "the heavens and the earth" is at all specified. No moderate term of past time is hinted; no measured boundaries of space are intimated. On the contrary, the very purpose seems to be, by a singularly indefinite and comprehensive form of expression, to convey an idea of vast duration as well as of immense extension. The whole grand introduction to the history of life is condensed into a few all-including phrases, abundantly specified as to the world's actual creation by the Almighty, but altogether vague as to the secondary points of space and time. The first, absolute creation, as an ultimate verity, is emphatically stated and variously illustrated; but in regard to the second, how extensively or how anciently, entire freedom seems designedly left to human inquiry and imagination! *The whence*, for the world, is settled once and for ever; but *the where* and *the when* are left in total indetermination. And this being so, it does not appear that any transition occurs in the record from the indefinite to the precise. There is no notice whatever of any commencement for the definitely bounded periods of twenty-four hours that have been imagined, while that notice, moreover, is a violent compression of the account, destructive of its consistency and unworthy of its grandeur. And this view is strengthened by the remarkable epitome of the whole given in Genesis, ii, 4: "These are the generations of the heavens and the earth, when they were created, in the day that

the Lord God made the earth and the heavens." Here the scenic is replaced by the absolute, the adaptive by the indefinite. The whole process is *one creation*, the whole period one (*yom*) "*day*." This general view, then, indicates that the successive *yoms* were not limited diurnal periods, but extended ages.

The particulars of the record convey the same even more strikingly. Every body has observed that no mention is made till the fourth *yom* of the luminaries by which we measure time. Those luminaries we suppose, indeed, to have been in existence from the first, as announced in the first verse, and to have been rendered manifest in the fourth *yom* by the clearing up of the atmosphere. But total silence respecting their office during the earlier *yoms* seems to indicate very plainly that those periods were not intended to be described as natural days; and, if not natural days, there is no reason for limiting their duration. And the same is true of the fourth and those following, for they are all spoken of alike. This particular in the narrative long ago occasioned questionings concerning the *yoms*. "*Quis ergo animo pevretret quo modo illi dies transierint,*" asked St. Augustine, "*antequam inciperent tempora quæ quarto die dicuntur incipere?*"

And with this circumstance is intimately connected the farther fact that the time designations "*evening*," "*morning*," "*day*," are not only terms of very general signification according to their etymology in the original, and according to habitual usage in Scripture and elsewhere, but they are in this very record so employed as to suggest the indefinite sense (*ereb*) evening, undoubtedly the mother of *edebos*, comes from *erab* to mingle, hence applied to the mingling, blending, or dusky time; (*boker*) morning, from *baka*, to cleave or separate, hence applied to the distinguishing time. These words then are like our spring and fall, characteristic of mode of being, not of specific duration. In accordance with this, the Scriptures, as we do, speak of the morning and evening of life, or of the year, or of the world. Besides, in every instance here, the evening is placed first, and there is nothing whatever to indicate its beginning or end. Had creation and its record opened with the gleaming light there had been marked an initial moment, and had some recurring phenomenon been declared,

the termini of evenings and mornings might have been imagined. But not so. It was here as Hesiod later wrote, *meleuna lux egeneto*, and Ovid, "*Lucis egens aer*," "black night came into being," "the ether was void of light."

And the *yom* is as indefinite as the *ereb* and the *boker*. It is a general term, expressive of no particular period, and applied in many senses: as "the *yom* of the Lord," the *yom* of justice or of mercy, the *yom* of Jerusalem, &c. The word is used in no less than four distinct senses in this very record. (1) As a name for light-time, in v. 5, as we speak of day-light, or day-time. (2) Actual "*days*," as we now have them, marked as "season," and "years," and v. 14. (3) For the whole creative series, c. ii, v. 4. And (4) in the peculiar sense, whatever it was, of a term composed of the unphenomenal evening and morning, without restricting conditions such a word cannot be intended to be specifically construed. We think then it should be read, as it plainly must be in Micah iv, 6. "In that *yom* (age) saith the Lord, I will gather the outcasts of Israel;" and Isaiah xii, 1, In that *yom* (age) shall ye say, I will praise the Lord, for he is become my salvation, and a hundred other places.

Again, the mode of expression concerning the evening, morning and day, especiatly the first, is so peculiar as to have attracted attention from the earliest ages. The affirming verb is emphatically repeated, and the number used is cardinal, not ordinal. "*There was an evening, and there was a morning,—one day.*" As if, after describing a term of repose, and an interval of change, an extended darkness, and a succeeding order of illumination, it had demonstratively said "this was the evening, and this the morning—one day." The peculiar "*one day*" of Zechariah xii, 6, 7, Mr. Lewis parallels with this, to show that this also, the beginning of *yoms*, must have been widely different from ordinary *yoms*, and Josephus, master of the Hebrew idiom as he was, noticed the extraordinary meaning of this *one yom*. He says, and this was the first day, but Moses called it *one day*, the cause of which I am able to give even now, but shall put off its exposition to another time."* The exposition did not come, but his sense of the peculiarity is significant.

* Antiq. bk. i, ch. 1.

One other particular we mention, the total omission of the previously repeated "evening and morning," from the account of the 7th *yom*. Their repetition before, is, in each case, associated with a finished term. Is not an appropriated term indicated by their omission here? Then, the divine Sabbath is an *age* yet in progress. And if so, all the *yoms* were *ages*.

To this view of the account itself, there are striking confirmations in other parts of the Bible. The Hebrew poets, while abounding in references to creation and its sacred record, never gave a hint of a limited term of "*days*." On the contrary they labor to convey in connection with it, ideas of vast duration. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting," is one of these passages, by Moses, in Ps. xc, 2. In like manner Solomon, Prov viii, "Before his works of old, is "from everlasting, or ever the earth was," &c. Associated with this, is the very remarkable, it may be even said wonderful, use of the two *time-words* *olam*, in the Hebrew, and *eon*, in the Greek, for the world. "By whom he made *the worlds*," Hebrew i, 2; is *tous aionas*, *the ages*. "This usage of *aion* is not in the classical Greek. It must have come from something peculiar in the Hebrew mode of thinking, and conceiving, whilst of pluralities of worlds, in space they had little or no conception, pluralities of worlds in time or successive conditions of the same world must have been an idea early entertained by the Jewish, and in general the eastern mind, and whence but from the sacred books, and especially this ancient record of the world and its successive changes, did they derive what is to us so strange a mode of speech and thought?"

Exceedingly strong are all these evidences certainly, in favor of that reading of the creative history which assigns age after age, of undefined extent to the formations and misformations anterior to the human era. And this reading invests the period now passing with a significancy that adds grandeur to the past as well as the future. It exhibits this as the yet continuing divine sabbath, a sacred season for man's earthly existence, of which and of a yet more sacred celestial state, the weekly hallowed rest enjoined him, is a perpetual type. In this view how significant

* Professor Lewis, p. 353-4.

that weekly restand the reason stated for its appointment ! Hugh Miller shall elaborate for us this thought ; and the last, highest conception we have to present of the periods of our planet, shall be given in his eloquent words.

“ What, I ask, viewed as a whole, is the prominent characteristic of geologic history, or of that corresponding history of creation which forms the grandly-fashioned vestibule of the sacred volume ? Of both alike the leading characteristic is progress. In both alike do we find an upward progress from dead matter to the humbler forms of vitality, and from thence to the higher. And after great cattle and beasts of the earth had, in due order, succeeded inanimate plants, sea monsters, and moving creatures that had life, the moral agent, man, enters upon the scene. Previous to his appearance on earth, each succeeding elevation in the long upward march had been a result of creation. The creative fiat went forth, and dead matter came into existence. The creative fiat went forth, and plants, with the lower animal forms, came into existence. The creative fiat went forth, and the oviparous animals, birds and reptiles, came into existence. The creative fiat went forth, and the mammiferous animals, cattle and beasts of the earth, came into existence. And finally, last in the series, the creative fiat went forth, and responsible, immortal man came into existence. But has the course of progress come, in consequence, to a close ? No ! God’s work of elevating, raising, heightening, of making the high in due progression succeed the low, still goes on. But man’s responsibility, his immortality, his God-implanted instincts respecting an eternal future, forbid that that work of elevation and progress should be, as in all the other instances, a work of creation. To create would be to supersede. God’s work of elevation now is the work of fitting and preparing peccable, imperfect man for a perfect impeccable future state. God’s seventh day’s work is the work of redemption. And, read in this light, his reason vouchsafed to man for the institution of the Sabbath is found to yield a meaning of peculiar breadth and emphasis. God, it seems to say, rests on *his* Sabbath from his creative labors, in order that by his Sabbath-day’s work he may save and elevate you ; rest ye also on your Sabbaths, that through your co-operation with him in this great work, you may be elevated and saved.

Made originally in the image of God, let God be your pattern and example. Engaged in your material and temporal employments, labor in the proportions in which he labored; but in order that you may enjoy an eternal future with him, rest also in the proportions in which he rests.

“One other remark ere I conclude. In the history of the earth which we inhabit, molluscs, fishes, reptiles, mammals, had each in succession their periods of vast duration; and then the human period began—the period of a fellow-worker with God, created in God’s own image. What is to be the next advance? Is there to be merely a repetition of the past? An introduction a second time of man made in the image of God? No! the geologist, in those tables of stone which form his words, finds no example of dynasties, once passed away again returning. There has been no repetition of the dynasty of the fish, of the reptile, of the mammal. The dynasty of the future is to have glorified man for its inhabitant; but it is to be the dynasty—‘the *kingdom*,’ not of glorified man made in the image of God, but of God himself in the form of man. In the doctrine of the two enjoined natures, human and divine, and in the further doctrine that the terminal dynasty is to be peculiarly the dynasty of HIM in whom the natures are united, we find that required progression beyond which progress cannot go. We find the point of elevation never to be exceeded, meetly coincident with the final period never to be terminated—the infinite in height harmoniously associated with the eternal in duration. Creation and the Creator meet at one point and in one person. The long ascending line from dead matter to man has been a progress Godwards, not an asymptotical progress, but destined from the beginning to furnish a point of union; and occupying that point as true God and true man, as Creator and created, we recognize the adorable Monarch of all the future!”

ART. VIII.—*A Memoir of the Reverend Sydney Smith.* By his daughter, LADY HOLLAND, with a selection from his letters, edited by MRS. AUSTEN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1855.

HE must be either very sour or very stupid who has never laughed over Sydney Smith's jokes, and the sectary wounded by the shaft of his wit must have an undue share of the *odium theologicum*, if his anger has not long ere this yielded to the persevering good humor of his brilliant adversary. If there be any such unhappy wight, who has for all these long years been "nursing his wrath to keep it warm," we commend him to the volumes before us. If he can resist the mollifying influence of the genial and too merry parson upon his temper, we give him up in despair, and recommend him as an immediate subject for *ante-mortem* canonization to the austere paternity of La Trappe.

The book before us is so entirely abandoned to the subject, has so evidently the single aim of consecrating the memory of a respected and beloved parent, that the ordinary function of a critic finds scarcely room for its exercise. It must be confessed that the style is not that which we might expect from a daughter of the redoubtable reviewer, that, at the commencement of the volume especially, it is heavy, labored and inelegant. Still it brightens with the subject, and when the writer abandons herself to her theme, and forgets at once the critics and her own personality, which she soon does, she becomes more easy and natural. Then the subject itself induces us to overlook the minor details of authorship, and the earnest, loving spirit, in which the task is accomplished, deprives us of all disposition to find fault, even where blame is justly due.

The history of this publication is simple and touching. After the death of the Reverend Sydney Smith, his widow, who seems to have loved him with rare devotion, labored assiduously to collect materials for his biography, and to secure an author worthy to be intrusted with the task of giving to the world a satisfactory picture of her renowned husband. Very soon after his death she wrote to Moore, requesting his assistance, but he regarded the

event as too recent to admit of the publication of a biography. She had also desired Jeffrey to undertake the task, but he was well nigh superannuated. "I confess," she writes to Miss Austen on this occasion, "it is foregoing the last gratification that remains to me—the hope of seeing that published of him, which to me far exceeds all the brilliancy of head that the world took cognizance of, but which I least valued; well knowing what the world knew not, the perfection of his heart, and his fearless love of truth. If delayed, I can never hope to see it, for I am not so selfish as for an instant to oppose my own gratification to that which is deemed expedient for his sake."

After yielding for several years to the opinions of those who thought the publication of the memoirs still premature, she addressed Mrs. Austen upon the subject, earnestly entreating her to undertake the task of making known to the world the "admirable qualities of his mind and heart." Mrs. Austen modestly declined, but the modern Artemisia, bent on erecting to her husband a mausoleum in the hearts and memories of men, pressed still more earnestly her reluctant friend. "My days, I suspect, cannot be many, and thence my urgency. Pray, attribute it to the real motive—the desire to see that done which shall fill up the measure of my wishes. I have arranged his letters by the years and months, so that he indirectly tells the incidents of his own life. But now comes my own incapacity. I think every word he wrote so precious, that my better judgment is blinded, and I should not be able to erase a line or a thought. Here I greatly want one on whose just perception, on whose right feelings of affectionate regard, not only for him, but for his fame, I can implicitly rely."

Miss Austen finally accepted the trust, and received from the devoted wife the materials which she had laboriously collected, and transcribed with her own hand, to facilitate the labors of the biographer. Soon afterwards, however, the intended author of the memoirs was struck down with a severe illness, which rendered it impossible for her to attempt any literary work, even after she had recovered from her immediate disease. She offered to return the materials, but Mrs. Smith was so satisfied with her fitness for the task that she urged her to wait. She did wait, but it grieves us to record the fact that the zealous wife died without seeing the desire of her heart accomplished.

In her will, however, this true-hearted woman enjoined it upon her daughter to carry out her design. Miss Austen having, from the causes already mentioned, declined the task of biography, Lady Holland, the wife of the distinguished physician, Sir Henry Holland, and the eldest daughter of the witty divine, determined to write these memoirs herself, leaving to her friend, Miss Austen, the easier labor of selecting and arranging the correspondence. We cannot take leave of these ladies without expressing our admiration for the exquisite delicacy and nice sense of propriety which characterize their performance. They have scrupulously avoided uttering a word or publishing a note which might in the slightest degree wound any one's feelings. They have carefully suppressed all unpleasant personalities, and have covered up every allusion that could possibly give pain with a veil which they beg may not be removed by any one who may be able to lift it. It may be that some may consider them too fastidious, but they can console themselves with the reflection that if they have committed an error, it is upon the right side.

According to the usual custom, Lady Holland commences her work with some account of her father's family,—a matter which that gentleman ever professed to hold in utter contempt. He was very fond of repeating Junot's famous phrase, "*Moi, je suis mon ancetre,*" and adopted as the motto of his carriage, "*Faber meæ fortunæ.*" On one occasion, being asked for his family arms, he replied that "the Smiths never had any arms, and have invariably sealed their letters with their thumbs." Being asked about his grandfather by one of his noble acquaintances, he told her that his respected ancestor had disappeared about the time of the assizes, and the family asked no questions. In spite of this badinage, however, his family was respectable on both sides, and his daughter claims the eminent philosopher, Sir Isaac Newton, as an ancestor.

His father was a very eccentric man, and from him he seems to have inherited much of that oddity which he frequently exhibited. His mother was the youngest daughter of M. Olier, a French emigrant, whom the revocation of the edict of Nantes drove across the channel. From her the subject of the memoir obtained his gaiety of disposition and many of the higher qualities of his

mind. She seems to have been no exception to the rule which demands for extraordinary men remarkable mothers.

He was born at Woodford, in Essex, in 1771, the second of a family of four brothers and one sister, all remarkable for talents. Their controversial powers were exhibited at a very early period. "Their mother describes them as neglecting games, seizing every hour of leisure for study, and often lying on the floor, stretched over their books, discussing with loud voice and most vehement gesticulation every point that arose—often subjects beyond their years—and arguing them with a fierceness as if life and death hung upon the issues." Sydney himself used to say that the result of all this was to make them the most intolerable and overbearing set of boys that can well be imagined, till, later in life, they found their level in the world.

Such was the competition among them that, in sending them to school, their father was advised to separate them to prevent undue rivalry. Robert, the eldest, and Cecil, the third son, were accordingly sent to Eaton, while Sydney and Courtenay went to Winchester. All the boys distinguished themselves. Robert, or Bobus, as he was nicknamed, gained a great reputation for Latin versification, while Sydney and Courtenay made such headway that the rest of the boys signed a "round-robin," refusing to compete for the prizes with the Smiths, who always gained them.

The discipline of the school was brutal, like that of most English schools of that day. The birch was the potent wand whose magic virtues were supposed to instil learning into the unwilling disciples. Besides, the abominable system of "fagging" was then in vogue, so that the younger boys were subjected to the double tyranny of the masters and of their senior fellow-sufferers. So oppressive was this combined cruelty that little Courtenay twice ran away, unable to endure it. Even the food was extremely coarse in kind and very meagre in quantity, so that the boys were perpetually on the verge of starvation. Indeed, in its discipline and domestic arrangements, the famous school of Winchester seems, at that day, to have been another Dotheboy's Hall.

Sydney, however, advanced rapidly in his studies. He mentioned an incident which occurred at that time, and which, he

says, powerfully stimulated him to study. While the other boys were at play, he was sitting under a tree, reading Virgil. A man of note, seeing him, took the book out of his hand, looked at it, patted the boy's head and gave him a shilling, exclaiming, "Clever boy! clever boy! that is the way to conquer the world." He worked hard and accomplished much. He used to say that he had made above ten thousand Latin verses while at school, "and no man in his senses would dream in after life of ever making another. So much for life and time wasted."

He had little respect for the plan upon which he had been educated, and attacked the whole system of classical education in England in two powerful and witty articles in the *Edinburg Review*. He ridiculed the immense importance which the English still attach to mere classical scholarship, and demanded that other studies should at least be put upon a level with the dead languages in the universities of the nation. He accused the clergy of bringing up "the first young men of the country as if they were all to keep grammar schools in little country towns," and exaggerating the value of the classics till "the distinguishing abstract term, the epithet of scholar, is reserved for him who writes on the *Æolic* reduplication and is familiar with the *Sylburgian* method of arranging depletives in *o* and *mi*." He advocated the *Hamiltonian* method of teaching language, and waged bitter war on the old system of dictionary and grammar. He clearly pointed out the absurdity of wasting time in the attempt to make critical scholars of all the pupils of a school, and spared no weapon of argument or ridicule to maintain his position. It is impossible to avoid coinciding in his views, and condemning, not the study of the classics, but that inordinate devotion to them which still characterizes English scholars. These remarks do not, of course, apply to our own country. Our classics are meagre enough, as the catalogues of our colleges abundantly testify; and had Sydney Smith written for us, he would undoubtedly have taken the other side of the question.

On leaving Winchester he was sent to Mont Villiers, in Normandy, where he was kept six months *en pension*, to perfect his knowledge of French, which he ever afterwards spoke with great fluency. Thence he went to New College, Oxford, where the

honors he had earned at Winchester secured for him, first a scholarship, and then a fellowship, yielding about £100 a year. His father now cast him upon his own resources, and urged him strongly to enter the ministry of the established church. His own inclinations were towards the bar; but he finally took orders, though reluctantly, and solely in obedience to the wishes of his father.

He was established as a curate at Nether Haven, a small village in the midst of Salisbury Plain, a sort of interment for a man of his social habits and high animal spirits. "Once a week," his biographer tells us, "a butcher's cart came over from Salisbury; it was then only he could obtain any meat, and he often dined, he said, on a mess of potatoes, sprinkled with a little catchup. Too poor to command books, his only resource was the 'squire during the few months he resided there, and his only relaxation, not being able to keep a horse, long walks over those interminable plains." To the 'squire he managed to render himself such a favorite, that, at the termination of his engagement, that gentleman intrusted him with the care of his eldest son, and it was arranged that the tutor and his charge should proceed to the University of Weimar, in Saxony. "We set out," says he, "but before reaching our destination, Germany was disturbed by war, and, in stress of politics, we put into Edinburg, where I remained five years."

Never before had Edinburg witnessed such a re-union of actual and prospective celebrities as were then assembled within her classic precincts. The names of Jeffrey, Horner, Playfair, Walter Scott, Dugald Stewart, Brougham, Allen, Brown and Alison are mentioned in the list of the familiar associates of the youthful clergyman. Society is also represented as being delightfully free from the pomp and etiquette of snobism. "The Scotch were neither rich nor ashamed of being poor, and there was not that struggle for display which so much diminishes the charm of London society, and has, with the increase of wealth, now crept into that of Edinburg. Few days passed without the meeting of some of these friends, either in each others' houses, or, (in what was then very common,) oyster cellars, where, I am told, the most delightful little suppers used to be given, in which every

subject was discussed with a freedom impossible in larger societies, and with a candor which is only found where men fight for truth and not for victory." *Oh noctes quidem atticæ, cænæ que dernum!*

What Sydney was doing during these five years our author does not inform us. We learn, indeed, incidentally, that he continued to attend to his pupil; but the rest of his efforts appear to be as utterly unknown to his biographer as to ourselves. Whatever may have been his occupations, and a man of his energy could not be idle, they must have been of an agreeable character, for he ever afterwards reverted to the time he spent in the northern metropolis with undisguised satisfaction. In a letter written in 1814, he exclaims, "When shall I see Scotland again? Never shall I forget the happy days passed there, amidst odious smells, barbarous sounds, bad suppers, excellent hearts, and most enlightened and cultivated understandings."

The peculiarities of the people by no means escaped his penetrating eye, and though he loved them honestly, he never ceased to play off his satirical squibs against them. He was particularly fond of laughing at the bluntness of their sensibility to humor, a trait which is largely exaggerated by him and all other Englishmen who have written about the Scotch.

"It requires, he used to say, "a surgical operation to get a joke well into a Scotch understanding. Their only idea of wit, or rather that inferior variety of this electric talent which prevails occasionally in the North, and which under the name of *Wut*, is so infinitely distressing to people of good taste, is laughing immoderately at stated intervals."

Their metaphysical tendencies were also a source of infinite amusement to him. "They are so imbued with metaphysics that they even make love metaphysically; I overheard a young lady of my acquaintance, at a dance in Edinburg, exclaim, in a sudden pause of the music, 'What you say, my lord, is very true of love in the *abstract*, but—here the fiddlers began fiddling furiously, and the rest was lost.'"

"There are two Scotch ladies staying here," he writes to Lady Holland, "with whom he will get acquainted, and to whom he may safely make love the ensuing winter, for love, though a very

acute disorder in Andalusia, puts on a very chronic shape in these northern latitudes, for, first, the lover must prove *metapheeexically* that he *ought* to succeed; and then, in the fifth or sixth year of courtship (or rather of argument) if the summer is tolerably warm, and oatmeal plenty, the fair one is won."

Again: "I take the liberty to send you two brace of grouse—curious, because killed by a Scotch metaphysician; in other and better language, they are mere ideas, shot by other ideas, out of a pure intellectual notion, called a gun."

Their strong nationality and vehement patriotism also afford him opportunities for bits of fun which he does not suffer to escape.

"Their temper stands any thing but an attack upon their climate, even the enlightened mind of Jeffry cannot shake off the illusion that myrtles flourish at Craig crook. In vain I have represented to him that they are of the genus *carduus*, and pointed out their prickly peculiarities. In vain I have reminded him that I have seen hackney coaches drawn by four horses in the winter on account of the snow; that I had rescued a man blown flat against my door by the violence of the winds, and black in the face; that even the experienced Scotch fowls did not venture to cross the streets, but sidled along, tails aloft, without venturing to encounter the gale. Jeffrey sticks to his myrtle illusions, and treats my attacks with as much contempt as if I had been a wild visionary, who had never breathed his calm air, nor lived and suffered under the rigor of his climate, nor spent five years in discussing metaphysics and medicine in that garret of the earth, that knuckle-end of England—that land of Calvin, oat-cakes and sulphur."

The last word in our quotation shows that he did not forget the standing jest upon the Scotch. Afterwards, in alluding to Lord Gray's difficulty of getting a tutor for his son, he remarked: "You are aware it is necessary to fumigate Scotch tutors; they are excellent men, but require this little preliminary caution. They are apt also to break the church windows, and get behind a hedge and fling stones at the clergyman of the parish, and betray other little symptoms of irreligion; but these you must not mind."

After two years' residence in Edinburg, he returned to England, to marry Miss Pybus, to whom he had long been engaged. His entire contribution to their *menage*, according to his daughter,

consisted of half a dozen small silver tea-spoons, much the worse for wear. His wife, however, had a small portion, which he insisted upon her and her children, and they secured the necessary plate and linen by the sacrifice of a pearl necklace which had belonged to her from infancy. They had the usual fortune of people who sell from necessity, they obtained much less for their jewels than they were worth. Five hundred pounds constituted the proceeds of the sale, and the purchasers, several years afterwards, held them at fifteen hundred. A thousand pounds given Sydney, about the same time, by the 'squire, whose son he had educated, and invested by him with characteristic prudence, augmented his slender resources.

His first child, the author of this memoir, was born while he resided in Edinburg. Previous to her birth he had the strangest fancy in regard to her. He wished very much for a daughter from whom he should never be called to part, and fondly cherished the hope that she might have only one eye. In spite, however, of her possessing the usual complement of visual organs, he welcomed her warmly, and to the horror and consternation of the nurse, during the temporary absence of that important functionary, he stole her from the nursery and ran down stairs with her, a few hours after her birth, in order to exhibit her to Jeffrey and his other friends.

Having mentioned Jeffrey, we are reminded of the great result for which the world has to thank that "stress of politics" which drove the witty parson into Edinburg. To him belongs the merit of having suggested that famous Review, which has so long been the terror of insipid mediocrity in the literary world, and which has contributed to English letters so many brilliant and powerful essays. We shall let him tell the story of its origin.

"Among the first persons with whom I became acquainted," says he, in the preface to the first edition of his works, "were Lord Jeffrey, Lord Murray, (late lord advocate for Scotland,) and Lord Brougham; all of them maintaining opinions upon political subjects a little too liberal for the dynasty of Dundas, then exercising supreme power over the northern division of the island. One day we happened to meet in the eighth or ninth story, or flat, in Baccleugh place, the elevated residence of the

then Mr. Jeffrey. I proposed that we should set up a Review; this was acceded to with acclamation. I was appointed editor, and remained long enough in Edinburg to edit the first number of the Edinburg Review. The motto I proposed for the Review was, '*Tenui musam meditamur avena*,' (we cultivate literature upon a little oat-meal.) But this was too near the truth to be admitted, and so we took our present grave motto from *Publius Syrus*, of whom none of us, I am sure, had ever read a single line; and so began what has since turned out to be a very important and able journal. When I left Edinburg it fell into the stronger hands of Lord Jeffrey and Lord Brougham, and reached the highest point of popularity and success.

"To appreciate the value of the Edinburg Review, the state of England at the time that journal began should be had in remembrance. The Catholics were not emancipated. The corporation and test acts were unrepealed. The game laws were horribly oppressive; steel-traps and spring-guns were set all over the country. Prisoners tried for their lives could have no counsel. Lord Eldon and the Court of Chancery pressed heavily on mankind. Libel was punished by the most cruel and vindictive imprisonments. The principles of political economy were little understood. The laws of debt and conspiracy were on the worst footing. The enormous wickedness of the slave trade was tolerated. A thousand evils were in existence, which the talents of good and able men have since lessened or removed; and these efforts have been not a little assisted by the honest boldness of the Edinburg Review."

Of the character and influence of his own articles we shall hereafter speak. We shall at present only say that it required no little courage to speak so freely in such times. He himself draws a vivid picture of the unhappy position of a man of independent notions:

"From the beginning of the century, (about which time the Review began,) to the death of Lord Liverpool, was an awful period for those who had the misfortune to entertain liberal opinions, and who were too honest to sell them for the ermine of the judge or the lawn of the prelate;—a long and hopeless career in your profession—the chuckling grin of noodles—the sarcastic

leer' of the genuine political rogue—prebendaries, deans and bishops made over your head—reverend renegadoes advanced to the highest dignities of the church for helping to rivet the fetters of Catholic and Protestant Dissenters, and no more chance for a whig administration than for a thaw in Zembla. These were the penalties exacted for liberality of opinion at that period. And not only was there no pay, but there were many stripes. It is always considered a piece of impertinence in England if a man of less than two or three thousand a year has any opinion at all upon important subjects; and in addition, he was sure at that time to be assailed with all the Billingsgate of the French Revolution,—Jacobin, Leveler, Atheist, Deist, Socinian, Incendiary, Regicide, were the gentlest appellations used; and the man who breathed a syllable against the senseless bigotry of the two Georges, or hinted at the abominable tyranny and persecution exercised against Catholic Ireland, was shunned as unfit for the relations of social life. Not a murmur against any abuse was permitted; to say a word against the suitoreide delays of the Court of Chancery, or the cruel punishments of the game laws, or against any abuse which a rich man inflicted or a poor man suffered, was treason against the *Plousiocracy*, and was bitterly and steadily resented. Lord Grey had not then taken off the bearing-rein from the English people, as Sir Francis Head has now done from horses.”

Such was the state of public affairs when the Edinburg Review was started. It made an immediate sensation. The contrast of its lively, vehement and independent articles with the tameness and servility that Grub street served up for the old Reviews, at once fixed the attention of the public. It was a complete change in the art of Reviewing. “The old periodical opiates,” says Lord Cockburn, “were extinguished at once.” The sharp, spirited attacks upon all varieties of charlatanry and humbug, were both dreaded and relished. The success of the new undertaking was complete.

There was a difficulty, however, which had nearly proved fatal to the Review in its infancy. The projectors had pledged themselves to contribute to it for one year gratuitously; but it is no slight labor to “study up” on a variety of topics sufficiently

thoroughly to unite articles of a tone high enough to attract the attention of that class of people who usually subscribe to a quarterly review. Hence, when the first fervor of zeal had abated, the contributions flagged, and much difficulty was experienced in filling the regular number of pages with good reviews. Smith's practical common sense saw the deficiency and suggested the employment of Jeffrey as a salaried editor and the payment of the contributors. These suggestions were adopted, and no further trouble, on the score of contributions, was experienced. Jeffrey conducted the journal with great spirit and independence, and attracted to its pages the deepest thinkers and most vigorous writers of the time.

We must not neglect to state that, while in Edinburg, Sydney Smith paid no little attention to medicine, studying it practically as well as theoretically, walking the hospitals and listening to the clinical lectures of the celebrated Dr. Gregory. Lady Holland has the high authority of her husband for stating that he was a very judicious and skillful practitioner. He certainly possessed those traits of promptitude, decision and sound good sense, which are so essential to the physician, and we are satisfied that, had he turned his whole attention to medicine, he would have attained a very exalted position in the profession. An instance of his firmness is given by his daughter in this memoir. "When only six months old she fell ill of the croup, with such fearful violence, that it defied all the remedies employed by the best medical man in the place. The danger increased with every hour. Dr. Hamilton, then one of the most eminent medical men in Edinburg, was sent for, could not come, but said, "persevere in giving two grains of calomel every hour; I never knew it fail." It was given for eleven hours; the child grew worse and worse; the medical man in attendance then said, "I dare give no more, I can do no more, the child must die, but at this age I would not venture to give more to my own child." "You," said my father, "can do no more; Hamilton says, persevere; I will take the responsibility, I will give it to her myself." He gave it, and the child was saved.

In 1803, his pupil's education was finished, and his own income necessarily diminished, so that it became necessary to take coun-

sel for the future. His wife, who seems to have been a woman of good sense, and like all true wives, to have unbounded confidence in her husband's ability, urged him to remove to London. This was an undertaking of no small magnitude to a poor parson, yet he saw the advantage of carrying his talents to that market where there was likely to be the greatest demand for them, and acceded to his wife's proposition. "*Audaces fortuna juvat*," and the move turned out to be the best he could have made. In 1804 he took a small house in Doughty street, Russell square, and immediately gathered around him that choice society which he could so well adorn. Sir Samuel Romilly, Mr. Scarlett, Dr. Marcet, Sir J. Mackintosh and others of the same stamp became his familiar associates.

Here his wife had another opportunity to display her practical good sense and her faithfulness to his interests. Her mother, who died just before the enterprising young couple left Edinburg, bequeathed her some valuable jewels. "Feeling that such ornaments were most unbecoming in her present position, she insisted upon their being sold as soon as they came to London, and she describes her husband's comical anxiety lest mankind should recover from their illusion, and cease to value such glittering baubles before they could be sold. The negotiation begun with the jeweler, Sydney was not easy till it was accomplished; and even then, she says, she does not think he was quite easy in his mind at having helped to continue the illusion by accepting so large a price for them." With such a wife, and the energy which he unquestionably possessed, success could only be a question of time.

Soon after his arrival in the metropolis of the British empire, he became acquainted with Sir Thomas Barnard, who had in his gift the preachiership of the Foundling Hospital, and who was so pleased with the sense and originality of his clerical friend that he tendered him the post. Though the salary was small, only £50 a year, he gladly accepted it, and struggled bravely against adversity. His brother Robert also was very kind, and advanced him £100 a year during his stay in London.

Eager to avail himself of every opportunity to make an honest livelihood, he applied, about this time to the rector of a parish,

for permission to preach in a little chapel belonging to a friend of his, who had hitherto allowed it to be occupied by Swedenborgians, but who now tendered it to him. The rector, with the churlishness of a narrow spirit, dreading all interference in his own little domain, refused it on the ground that he did not wish to bind his successors to an arrangement which might not be agreeable to them. Sydney at once replied that he was willing to enter into a contract by which the agreement should hold only during the life-time of the then incumbent, and urged upon him the propriety of furnishing accommodation to a number of persons still in communion with the church of England, who could not attend the parish church. The surly priest replied that he intended to abide by the precedents of his predecessors, and positively refused to accede to his brother clergyman's proposition, though he doubtless denounced very freely the doctrines of the sect who occupied the chapel in question.

He obtained an appointment, however, as preacher at Berkeley chapel, the property of a Mr. Bowerbank, who had hitherto found it so bad an investment that he was anxious to dispose of it, but could get no purchaser. Compelled to make the best of a bad bargain, he employed the young preacher, and the chapel began to pay very well. It had previously been almost deserted, but in a few weeks after Sydney Smith took charge of it, not a seat was to be had, and ladies and gentlemen frequently stood in the aisles during the whole service. Such detestable peddling in holy things would hardly be encouraged by a man of Sydney Smith's talent and honesty in our country, but in estimating his share in the transaction, we must always bear in mind the peculiarly unfortunate construction of the established churches of England and Scotland, which gives alike to the high-toned nobleman and the speculating sherricks of the realm, complete control over religious worship in their several domains.

His reputation and his income were both augmented by a course of lectures, in which he popularized metaphysics. He had not a very exalted idea of his success in the attempt, and still less did he give himself the omniscient airs of the common popular lecturer. In a letter to Jeffrey, dated April, 1805, he says: "My lectures are just now at such an absurd pitch of celebrity

that I must lose a good deal of reputation before the public settles into a just equilibrium respecting them. I am most heartily ashamed of my own fame, because I am conscious I do not deserve it, and that moment men of sense are provoked by the clamor to look into my claims, it will be at an end."

These lectures have recently been given to the public, having been saved by his wife from the flames to which their author had condemned them. They still constitute the best popular view of mental philosophy in the English language. Not aiming at great profundity, yet far from being shallow; often earnest and eloquent, frequently witty and never dull, they fascinate every reader. And it is easy to imagine the excitement which such lectures would produce when aided by the author's sonorous voice and admirable elocution. "I was," says Mrs. Marcet, "a perfect enthusiast during the delivery of those lectures. They remain; but he who gave a very soul to them by his inimitable manner is gone! He who at one moment inspired his hearers with such awe and reverence, by the solemn piety of his manner, that his discourse seemed converted into a sermon; at others, by the brilliancy of his wit, made us die of laughing. The impression made upon me by these lectures, though so long ago, is still sufficiently strong to recall his manner in many of the most striking passages."

The success surprised no one more than the author. "All Albemarle street and a part of Grafton street," says an eye witness, "were rendered impassable by the concourse of carriages assembled there during the time of their delivery. There was not sufficient room for the persons assembling; the lobbies were filled, and the doors into them from the lecture room were left open; the steps leading into its area were all occupied; many persons, to obtain seats, came an hour before the time. The next year galleries were erected, which had never before been required, and the success was complete. He continued to lecture there for three consecutive years." "His success," says his friend Horner, "has been beyond all possible conjecture—from six to eight hundred hearers, and not a seat to be procured, even if you go there an hour before the time. Nobody else, to be sure, could have executed such an undertaking with the least

chance of success. For who could make such a mixture of odd paradox, quaint fun, manly sense, liberal opinions and striking language?" The proceeds of the lectures enabled him to furnish his new house, in Orchard street, where he lived during his stay in London.

His talents and character opened to him the best circles in the metropolis. In the famous coteries of Holland-house he was not only welcome, but was eagerly sought after. Between Lord Holland and himself a real friendship sprang up, which was only terminated by death, and which more than once benefited him in a worldly point of view. At Holland-house he became acquainted with the leading members of the whig party, and when, in 1806, a brief season of political power fell to their lot, these friends of his obtained from the administration the living of Foston-le-Clay, in Yorkshire, for him. When he went up to take possession, he immediately made an impression by his sound sense and brilliant wit. At the dinner table, in company with the archbishop, he shone conspicuously, and that functionary was pleased in spite of himself, for he could not understand how one of the inferior clergy could be so decidedly at his ease in his august presence.

In 1807 he gave his family their first taste of country life, and about the same time appeared the famous letters of Peter Plymley to his brother Abraham, on the Catholic question. In these he wields those weapons of ridicule, sarcasm and eloquent denunciation, which were so peculiarly his own, with tremendous effect. It is hard to tell whether he excels the more in dwarfing his opponents or in magnifying to a terrific extent the dangers to which the country was exposed. An impending invasion of the French, that standing bug-bear of English statesmen, is the great central idea around which his arguments and his satire are grouped. He endeavors to excite alarm by suggesting the possibility of the union of the shamefully oppressed Irish with their co-religionists, the French, against the government and the troops of England. It is the fashion now to sneer at these views as the idle fancies of an alarmist, for the very satisfactory reason that the dreaded event did not happen. It is, however, perfectly well known that the humiliation of England was long a cherished hope of Napo-

leon; that the invasion of Russia was regarded by that ambitious conqueror as a step towards the assault of Great Britain on the side of India; that the encampment at Boulogne-sur-mer was not a mere empty parade; but that, had a suitable opportunity presented itself and the pressure of continental affairs permitted, the French emperor would undoubtedly have pounced upon one of the British Islands. Had he selected Ireland; disaffected as that country was on account of the recent legislation of the British government, it can hardly be doubted that he would have met at least with the sympathy, if not the co-operation of Irish Catholics.

It was the clear perception of such facts as these which made these letters so popular. Immediately after their publication they were dispersed all over the country and eagerly read, alike by whig and tory. The pointed manner in which the absurdity of the laws against the Roman Catholics was held up to public ridicule produced its effect. Many opened their eyes to the folly of this misgovernment who had never seen it before, and it cannot reasonably be doubted that these letters had no little share in modifying the opinions of the English people in regard to the management of Ireland.

Although it was not till long afterwards that Smith acknowledged the authorship of this production, he was almost immediately suspected. Lord Holland and a few of his intimate friends were the only persons acquainted with the secret, and by them it was well kept.

In accordance with the bad practice of the day, Syney Smith was allowed still to reside in the city, on condition of appointing an efficient curate. In 1808, however, the passage of Mr. Perceval's residence bill created great alarm among the fashionable abbés of the English Church, and drove them grumbling from the town and the court to their remote and rude parishes. To such an extent had the evil of non-residence been carried, that many of the parsonage houses were in such a state of decay as to be absolutely uninhabitable. That of Fosten-le-Clay, consisting of a brick-floored kitchen, with a rickety room above it, had not seen a rector within its walls for a century and a half. It may readily be supposed, therefore, that the arrival of a fine gentle-

man from London, in a coach, created no little surprise in the minds of the rude peasants of a small Yorkshire village. Sydney Smith, however, was not merely a fine gentleman, and his people soon recognized in him something not commonly to be found in the foppish preachers from the metropolis. He set about his new duties with his accustomed vigor. The publication of his sermons afforded him the means of moving his family and his furniture to his new parish, a task which he accomplished in 1809. After several unsuccessful efforts to exchange for a more comfortable parish, he finally resigned himself to his fate. An edict had gone forth that the old parsonage houses should be repaired, the expense to fall upon that generation of parsons. He gives the description of his efforts in such a racy style that we should only spoil it were we to abridge it :

“A diner-out, a wit, and a popular preacher, I was suddenly caught up by the Archbishop of York and transported to my living in Yorkshire, where there had not been a resident clergyman for a hundred and fifty years. Fresh from London, and not knowing a turnip from a carrot, I was compelled to farm three hundred acres, and without capital to build a parsonage house.

“I asked and obtained three years’ leave from the archbishop, in order to effect an exchange, if possible, and fixed myself in the meantime at a small village, two miles from York, in which was a fine old house of the time of Queen Elizabeth, where resided the last of the ’squires, with his lady, who looked as if she had walked straight out of the ark, or had been the wife of Enoch. He was a perfect specimen of the Trulliters of old. He smoked, hunted, drank beer at his door with his grooms and dogs, and spelt over the country paper on Sundays.

“At first he heard I was a Jacobin and a dangerous fellow, and turned aside as I passed ; but at length, when he found the peace of the village undisturbed, harvests much as usual, Juno and Ponte uninjured, he first bowed, then called, and at last reached such a pitch of confidence that he used to bring the paper that I might explain the difficult words to him ; actually discovered that I had made a joke ; laughed till I thought he would die of convulsions, and ended by inviting me to see his dogs.

“All my efforts for an exchange having failed, I asked and obtained from my friend, the archbishop, another year to build in ; and I then set my shoulder to the wheel in good earnest—sent for an architect—he produced plans which would have ruined

me ; I made him my bow,—‘ You build for glory, sir ; I for use.’ I returned him his plans, with five and twenty pounds, and sat down in my thinking-chair, and in a few hours Mrs. Sydney and I had concocted a plan which has produced what I call the model of parsonage houses.

“ I then took to horse, to provide bricks and timber ; was advised to make my own bricks, of my own clay ; of course, when the kiln was opened, all bad ; mounted my horse again, and in twenty-four hours had bought thousands of bricks and tiers of timber ; was advised by neighboring gentlemen to employ oxen ; bought four—Tug and Lug, Haul and Crawl ; but Tug and Lug took to fainting and required buckets of sal-volatile, and Haul and Crawl to lie down in the mud. So I did as I ought to have done at first—took the advice of the farmer instead of the gentleman ; sold my oxen ; bought a team of horses, and at last, in spite of a frost, which delayed me six weeks ; in spite of walls running down with wet ; in spite of the advice and remonstrances of friends, who predicted our death ; in spite of an infant of six months old, who had never been out of the house, I landed my family in my new house, nine months after laying the first stone, on the 20th of March, and performed my promise to the letter to the archbishop by issuing forth at midnight with a lantern to meet the last cart, with the cook and the cat, which had stuck in the mud, and fairly established them before twelve o’clock at night in the new parsonage house,—a feat, taking ignorance, inexperience and poverty into consideration, requiring, I assure you, no small degree of energy.

“ It made me a very poor man for many years, but I never repented it. I turned schoolmaster, to educate my son, as I could not afford to send him to school, and Mrs. Sydney turned schoolmistress to educate my girls, as I could not afford a governess. I turned farmer, as I could not let my land. A man-servant was too expensive ; so I caught up a little garden girl, made like a milestone, christened her Bunch, put a napkin in her hand, and made her my butler. The girls taught her to read, Mrs. Sydney to wait, and I undertook her morals ; Bunch became the best butler in the country.

“ I had little furniture, so I bought a cart load of deals ; took a carpenter, (who came to me for parish relief, called Jack Robinson,) with a face like a full moon, into my service ; established him in a barn, and said, ‘ Jack, furnish my house.’ You see the result !

“ At last it was suggested that a carriage was much wanted in the establishment ; after diligent search, I discovered, in the back settlements of a York coachmaker an ancient green chariot, sup-

posed to have been the earliest invention of the kind. I brought it home in triumph to my admiring family. Being somewhat dilapidated, the village tailor lined it, the village blacksmith repaired it; nay, (but for Mrs. Sydney's earnest entreaties,) we believe the village painter would have exercised his genius upon the exterior; it escaped this danger, however, and the result was wonderful. Each year added to its charms, it grew younger and younger; a new wheel, a new spring; I christened it the *Immortal*. It was known all over the neighborhood; the village boys cheered it, the village dogs barked at it; but 'Faber meat fortunæ' was my motto, and we had no false shame.

"Added to all these domestic cares, I was village parson, village doctor, village comforter, village magistrate, and Edinburg reviewer; so you see I had not much time left on my hands to regret London. My house was considered the ugliest in the country, but all admitted it was the most comfortable; and we did not die, as our friends had predicted, of the damp walls of the parsonage."

Here the reverend wit reigned supreme, and his peculiar character tinged every thing with which it came in contact. As clergyman, pater familias, magistrate or companion, the same genial humor cast a warm glow over every thing he said or did. Though grave in the pulpit, yet fancy substituted the more jovial humor of the dinner table. As magistrate, while he enforced order and insisted upon decorum, he nevertheless found abundant room for the exercise of his distinctive faculty. To young delinquents especially, he was kind, but was fond of indulging in awful threats, to produce an effect. After reading them a severe lecture, if they still remained incorrigible, he gravely ordered out his "*private gallows*." This generally produced the desired effect, the culprit implored and was graciously, though with proper magisterial delay, pardoned.

In many respects, he was unsuited to country life. His extreme awkwardness as a rider, was one of these, and he made himself quite merry over this deficiency. "I used to think a fall from a horse dangerous," he writes, "but much experience has convinced me to the contrary. I have had six falls in two years, and just behave like the three per cents when they fall—I get up again, and am not a bit the worse for it, any more than the stock in question." He tells a ludicrous story of a quaker tailor from

a neighboring village who called shortly after the reverend gentleman had started on horseback for that place. Mrs. Smith, immediately supposing that he had come to announce some serious accident, if not death, as having happened to her husband, in consequence of a fall from his horse, rushed to the door demanding eagerly of the astonished tailor, to know the worst. The man, taken by surprise, and frightened almost out of his wits by her tragic manner, could not reply. This made her only the more vehement, and she adjured him still more earnestly. At last he managed to stammer out, "Why, please, ma'am, it is only thy little bill I want thee to settle."

His residence at Fosten was marked by no very striking events. He reared his children, he extended the circle of his acquaintance, he performed his duties cheerfully and systematically. The chief interest of this part of the story consists in the little episodes of fun which his daughter interweaves in the web of her story. One of the most amusing of these is the famous dog case.

"During one of his visits to London, at a dinner at Spencer House, the conversation turned upon dogs. 'Oh!' said my father, 'one of the greatest difficulties I have had with my parishioners has been on the subject of dogs.' 'How so?' said Lord Spencer. 'Why, when I first went down into Yorkshire, there had not been a resident clergyman in my parish for a hundred and fifty years. Each farmer kept a huge mastiff dog, ranging at large, and ready to make his morning meal on clergy or laity, as best suited his particular taste; I never could approach a cottage in pursuit of my calling, but I rushed into the jaws of one of these shaggy monsters. I scolded, preached and prayed, without avail; so I determined to try what fear for their pockets might do. Forthwith appeared in the county papers a minute account of the trial of a farmer, at the Northampton sessions, for keeping dogs unconfined; where said farmer was not only fined five pounds and reprimanded by the magistrates, but sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The effect was wonderful and the reign of Cerberus ceased in the land.' 'That accounts,' said Lord Spencer, 'for what has puzzled me and Althorp for many years. We never failed to attend the sessions at Northampton, and we never could find out how we had missed this remarkable dog case.'"

About the year 1825, he received the living of Londesborough, which, together with a legacy previously left him, added considerably to his income and raised him above the dread of debt. In

1827, a ministry having been formed, composed in part of his political friends, he naturally expected preferment, but was disappointed. The letter he wrote to Lord Brougham, on this occasion, is a better specimen of manly independence than even Dr. Johnson's famous epistle to Lord Chesterfield. Early in 1828, however, Lord Lyndhurst gave him preferment, in the shape of a stall then vacant at Bristol. His first sermon before the mayor and corporation took every body by surprise. Instead of the usual outcry against popery, it was a cogent appeal in favor of toleration, and wound up with Jeremy Taylor's famous Rabbinical story of Abraham and the fire worshiper. This brave and manly course naturally created a great sensation.

On his preferment to this stall, he went to court for the first time, and he gives an amusing account of what happened on the occasion.

"I found my colleague Tate, the other day, in his simplicity consulting the archdeacon of Newfoundland what he should wear at the levee—a man who sits bobbing for cod, and pocketing every tenth fish. However, I did worse when I went, by consulting no one; and, through pure ignorance, going to the levee in shoe-strings instead of shoe-buckles. I found, to my surprise, people looking down at my feet; I could not think what they were at. At first I thought they had discovered the beauty of my legs, but at last the truth burst on me by some wag laughing, and thinking I done it as a good joke. I was of course excessively annoyed to have been supposed capable of such a vulgar, unmeaning piece of disrespect, and kept my feet as coyly under my petticoats as the veriest prude in the country, till I could make my escape; so perhaps, after all, I had better have followed my friend's example."

In 1829 a severe blow fell upon him, in the death of his only son, Douglas, at the age of 24, a youth of great promise. This crushed him for a time. It was well for him, however, that a removal became necessary, since the stimulus to exertion was of great benefit to them all under so severe an affliction. He went to Combe Florey, in Somersetshire, a much more beautiful situation than that he left. In 1832 he received a further preferment, being appointed to a prebendal stall in St. Paul's.

In 1843 he sent a petition to our Congress, asking the federal government to pay the debts of the repudiating stocks. The

pungent sarcasm of that famous document will not soon be forgotten, nor will citizens of the repudiating States themselves now deny the justice of its denunciations, whatever they may think of the legality of the claim. That sharp phrase, which calls them "men, who prefer any load of infamy, however great, to any pressure of taxation, however light," was especially galling. Numerous very disreputable replies were made, and much abuse was printed in our papers, but after all, one disgraceful fact remained and could not be denied. The credit of the States had been pledged, they refused to pay the money. We do not desire to revive that old discussion, but we do think that Sydney Smith had good reason to be angry, and that, according to appearances at that time his resolution to "withdraw his money from American securities and to invest it in Tunis bonds of Algerine two per cents," was not a very rash one.

After this, he wrote but little. Long before he had withdrawn from the *Edinburg Review*, and the rest of his life was spent in the quiet performance of his clerical duties, in social pleasures, and in the enjoyment of the handsome property to which he had fallen heir at the death of his brother Courtenay.

In October, 1844, he was taken seriously ill, and removed to London, to be constantly under the care of his son-in-law. He bore his sufferings calmly and cheerfully, and endeavored to allay the anxiety of those around him. His brother Bobas was with him to the last, and only left his death-bed to lie down on his own. Years before, Sydney had written to this beloved brother on the occasion of his illness. "Pray, take care of yourself. We shall both be a brown infragant powder in thirty or forty years. Let us contrive to last out for the same time, or nearly the same time. Weary will the latter half of my pilgrimage be, if you leave me in the lurch." As though fate took pity on such fraternal affection, the elder brother was enabled to obey the injunction, and in less than a fortnight Bobas had followed Sydney.

Sydney's last hours were distinguished by an act of benevolence towards a poor clergyman, who, full of gratitude, begged to be allowed to see me. "Then he must not thank me," was the answer. "I am too weak to bear it." On the 22d of February, 1845, the Rev. Sydney Smith breathed his last. His disease was hydrothorax, consequent on chronic disease of the heart.

In estimating the character of this remarkable man, we must take especial care to secure a correct stand-point. To judge him or indeed any other man, by the standard of our own prejudices and predilections would lead us hopelessly astray. Especially is this true of his clerical character. If we suppose him to have regarded the sacred calling with that profound reverence which is inculcated upon us, we shall find it difficult to excuse him for having entered upon it. We shall feel that he laid unauthorized hands upon the ark of God, and was guilty of sacrilege. Whatever may be our judgment as to his actual qualifications, however, we must not make up our minds in regard to his moral responsibility without thoroughly acquainting ourselves with the views which not only he, but the great majority of the English people take of the position of a clergyman. There is by no means that awful sanctity attached to the office which is attributed to it by us. The church of England is a part of the State of England, and its officers are as much state officers as those of the custom house. It is true they are charged with the administration of a religion which denies all participation with the world, but practically the church is a branch of the government, with its ranks and grades of service and promotion, which are regulated wholly by men of the world. Under these circumstances, let the teachings of its ministers be never so sound upon this as well as upon all other practical questions, it is impossible that the people at large should regard its offices in any other than a secular light. We therefore find them training up their children for its pulpits just as they would train them for the army or navy, and looking forward to its promotions in precisely the same spirit.

Sydney Smith unquestionably did not rise above the common level of his countrymen's opinions on this subject. His religion had no lofty enthusiasm about it. We must not look to him for those raptures which ancient and modern saints record; we shall find in his experience no "exultation, gustation of God, ingression into the divine shadow," or other ecstasies of this nature. He belonged to the old school of divines who concerned themselves exclusively with the practical duties of life, and preached the morality of the gospel without rising into its higher regions of faith and speculation. He was a thoroughly sincere man, ardent in his

attachment to his church, faithful in the discharge of the duties of his station as he understood them. His whole demerit consisted in his imperfect conception of the character he had assumed. With his guilt or innocence before God in this matter, we have nothing to do. It is not our place to judge him. We can only determine the rectitude of his intentions by a survey of his life, and we are satisfied that no one, who divests himself of his prejudices, can rise from the perusal of these volumes without the full conviction that Sydney Smith was a thoroughly honest and consistent man throughout his whole career.

His humor was a part of his nature, hereditary, as we have already hinted. It assumed, in many instances, the character of eccentricity. He did nothing like any body else. He saved himself the trouble of going after his farm hands, by keeping a telescope hanging at his door to see what they were about, and a speaking trumpet to direct their labors. He had for rheumatism a sort of armor, consisting of double pieces of tin filled with hot water; two narrow buckets for his legs, a hollow tin collar for his neck, a tin shoulder-plate, like a fore-quarter of mutton, and a hollow tin helmet for his head. In this costume, let his suffering be what it might, he received his company, positively refusing to go to bed, or in any way to banish himself from the drawing-room.

Boisterous, gay and nonsensical at times, as this humor of his was, it nevertheless was not the mere froth of an idle or silly mind. No man had sounder practical good sense, and few more profound learning, or more extensive general information than Sydney Smith. His industry was untiring. He never undertook any thing that he did not prosecute with the utmost energy. The following plan of study shows how he tasked himself mentally.

“Write sermons and reviews, Monday, Wednesday and Friday; read, Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday. Write ten lines of Latin on writing days. Read five chapters of Greek Testament on reading days. For morning reading, either Polybius or Diodorus Siculus, or some tracts of Xenophon or Plato; and for Latin, Catullus, Tibullus and Propertius.

“Monday: write, morning; read Tasso, evening. Tuesday: Latin or Greek, morning; evening, theology. Wednesday, same as Monday. Friday, ditto. Thursday and Saturday, same as Tuesday. Read every day a chapter in the Greek Testament, and translate ten lines of Latin. Good books to read: ‘Terrasin’s

History of Roman Jurisprudence ; Bishop of Chester's Records of the Creation."

His business habits were exact and punctual. In the matter of debt, in which great wits so often err, he was blameless. No merchant could have been more exact in his dealings. He did not allow himself to be led, by the brilliant society he kept, into an expenditure beyond his limited means. "He never affected to be what he was not; he never concealed the thought, labor and struggle it often was to him to obtain the simple comforts of life for those he loved; as to its luxuries, he exercised the most rigid self-denial. His favorite motto, which through life he inculcated on his family in such matters, was, 'Avoid shame, but do not seek glory—nothing so expensive as glory;' and this he applied to every detail of his establishment."

He never professed any philosophical contempt for wealth which he did not feel. He labored zealously and honestly for a competence. "Moralists tell you," said he, "of the evils of wealth and station, and the happiness of poverty. I have been very poor the greatest part of my life, and have borne it as well, I believe, as most people, but I can safely say that I have been happier every guinea I have gained. I well remember, when Mrs. Sydney and I were young, in London, with no other equipage than my umbrella, when we went out to dinner in a hackney coach, when the rattling step was let down, and the proud, powdered red-plushes grinned, and her gown was fringed with straw, how the iron entered into my soul."

He labored hard, and was successful, but never, in his poorest moments, did he lose sight of the claims of others. Benevolence was a characteristic trait of his nature. In his early days, while at school or college, a friend wrote to him in great distress, beseeching a loan of five guineas. He had but four, and was on his way with them to the post office, when suddenly he saw shining on the road before him another guinea, he picked it up and inclosed it to his friend.

His manner of conferring an obligation added to its value. When he had once become convinced that a fellow-creature was in actual need of his services, he made his cause his own, and pleaded it with a warmth and earnestness that usually insured suc-

cess. An instance of the spirit with which he undertook such affairs is given by his daughter. He interested himself in behalf of a boy charged, as he believed unjustly, with stealing a handkerchief. With some difficulty he obtained of the magistrates a postponement of the case, "and then, with as much ardor as if his own life, and honor, and every thing he held most dear, was at stake, he wrote, he investigated, he cross-examined for nearly a week, and on the day appointed attended the trial. He secured the best lawyer he could find to conduct the cause; then, I believe, spoke for the boy himself; and, by the evidence he produced, succeeded in showing, to the satisfaction of all, that the handkerchief had been hid where the boy could not have hid it under the circumstances." The boy was acquitted.

We had desired to comment somewhat at length upon the literary labors of Sydney Smith, but have already exceeded our bounds.

ART. IX.—THE TEST OF TRUTH.

How far the doctrine of a final cause shall enter into, or be excluded from, natural and metaphysical investigations, is a question to philosophers of the greatest difficulty and embarrassment.

In investigations into the origin of truth, or into the end of truth, and into the test of truth, which latter question will be embraced in the observations which are to follow, it is impossible, literally, to escape from the consideration of the Author of truth, a superintending Providence. So obtrusive is this topic, that it is impossible for any well regulated or fair mind, without affectation, or without infidelity, to avoid the contemplation of it, when brought to reflect upon the end and design of the institution of truth, and particularly upon that subtle chain supposed to exist between truth and its cause, and between truth and the unity of truth. Considerations having reference to the origin of truth connect themselves much more closely with a final cause, or, what is the same thing, natural religion, or natural theology, than those in relation to the existence and operation of material substances. It has been remarked by Macaulay that "natural theology," which

involves the question of the existence of any final cause, "is not a progressive science." He thinks that "as respects natural religion, revelation being for the present left altogether out of the question, it is not easy to see that a philosopher of the present day is more favorably situated than Thales or Simonides. He has before him just the same evidence of design in the structure of the universe which the early Greeks had. We say just the same, for the discoveries of modern astronomers and anatomists have really added nothing to the force of that argument which a reflecting mind finds in every beast, bird, fish, insect, leaf, flower and shell. The reasoning by which Socrates in Xenophon's hearing confuted the little atheist Aristodemus, is exactly the reasoning of Paley's Natural Theology. In truth all the philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted without the help of revelation to prove the immortality of the soul, from Plato down to Franklin, appear to us to have failed deplorably. All the great enigmas which perplex the natural theologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity of a people just emerging from barbarism is quite sufficient to propound them. The wisdom of Locke or Clarke is quite unable to solve them."

It has always seemed to us to be quite a hopeless task to attempt to deduce a system of natural theology from the design and economy of the outer material world, aside from revelation. Nature presents two pictures of very dissimilar character. It is only from the light of revelation that we are able to elicit any shades of rationality from the dark side of the picture nature presents to us.

We may here incidentally say that it is to us indicative of shallowness of learning to introduce natural theology into every branch of science and upon every occasion, thereby not only unduly secularizing things holy, but checking the freedom and circumscribing the scope of human inquiry when the occasion arises for its proper display.

But there is a danger, upon the other hand not less perilous to the security of truths the most precious growing out of its studied exclusion from learned treatises, bearing upon the great ends and purposes of human existence.

It was just precisely in this spirit that the great Humboldt

excluded from Cosmcs all reference to any superintending cause in the natural world which he so elaborately surveyed.

We should not have at all quarreled with him had he excluded the consideration of natural religion from his great work, upon the ground taken by Macaulay, that it is impossible to solve, by the aid of the study of nature, the great enigmas which perplex the natural theologian.

With respect to moral questions, we think it may be safely admitted that nature in her material contrivance is silent, or rather is neutral. Indeed it is this very neutrality that opens the door for the introduction of the revealed will of the first great Cause of nature. Revelation would manifestly be useless just precisely to the extent of the moral voice uttered from the works of nature. Humboldt seems to deny the existence of nature's Author, and substitutes a primordial necessity in its stead, and writes in the spirit of M. Compté's Positive Philosophy, which teaches that "all real science is in radical and necessary hostility to all theology."

We blame no author of any treatise upon nature as mechanically contrived, who avoids reference to the doctrine of moral causes. But it becomes a very different question when the occasion is sought to confound nature with God, and thereby open the door for German transcendentalism and pyrrhonism generally.

The remarks of Macaulay are, we are not prepared to deny, just and true, when applied to the primary argument of Paley, but strikingly inapplicable to those who seek to build a system of natural religion upon the existence of truth and its office, and design in the economy of human life. The unity of truth is an idea dependent for its proof upon the fact that there is no unity in error. The proof of the permanency of truth is dependent upon the evidence of the inherent instability of error. Now, when philosophers are able speculatively to establish the unity of truth, from which follows the necessary and unavoidable *fact* of the instability of error, they are prepared to lay the foundation for such a system of positive philosophy, as was not dreamt of in the teeming speculations of M. Compté, or in the sober and practical good sense of the greater Paley.

The corner-stone for the building which Paley sought to erect

was looked for where it is not to be found. The stone which he assumed to find, the builders have rejected.

If we are ever to find, outside the pages of revelation, a stable foundation for a system of natural ethics, it is to be found, we venture to assert, in the proven german facts, that every human opinion is unsafe—is unstable—is unharmonious, is non-existent, unless it have truth for its basis, and that every human action is of evil or pernicious tendency, unless it have a true rule of existing right for its support, and that all truth exists external to man. These are the exclusive pillars of the true system of natural theology. They repose upon the existence of truth, the design of truth, and the test of truth. The tendency of man to err and the unity of truth constitute the key-stone of the arch. When we contemplate the varied drama of human life we are led to discover that man is a progressive being not only intellectually but *morally*. What does this lead us to infer? In the first place we here discover two classes of truths—those that we call intellectual and those that we call moral. Now if truth be “catholic, and nature one,” they must necessarily harmonize. If they harmonize, and man be liable to err in both regards, the non-existence of the one is as plainly true as the non-existence of the other, for they must stand or fall together, and man’s progress in the one is a proof of the existence of the other. So man’s moral progress is proof of the existence of moral truth and of its utility.

We are now prepared to draw the same conclusion, and make an argument analogous to that made by Paley, deduced by him from the design of nature’s structure. He argued that “the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicated the disposition of the Designer. Evil no doubt exists, but is never the *object* of the contrivance.” From this he draws the conclusion that the disposition of the Designer was benevolent. But his conclusion was evidently larger than his premises would warrant. The premises would only logically warrant the inference that the *predominant* character of the Designer was kind, leaving the inference a plain one that his *evil tendency*, existing in him, was only *less* than his benevolence. It by no means solved the question. But the thing is different when we come to consider the inference deducible from the existence and office of truth.

Truth must have an author. It must originate in some intelligent being, because it is evidently an effect. It must be either a cause or an effect. A cause is something distinguished by having effects. If a thing has no effects, we then say it is not a cause. Truth never does any thing of which we have any knowledge. It has no ability of independent action or motion, or dependent action or motion. If it be a cause, it gives no practical proof of it. What we do know of truth convinces us that its observance furnishes proof of its utility in the affairs of men. What we do know of truth furnishes us with proof that it is a law of the moral universe, lying outside of us, and is, therefore, a law relating to human conduct and human opinion, since human beings are liable to err. Now, upon the supposition of its existence outside of us, and lying between us and the supposed author of it, and not only relating to human conduct and human opinion, but bearing the relation of the greatest utility to them, we are led to infer that it *originated*, and originated in a spirit friendly to man. We now proceed to the conclusion. If truth originated, and existed external to man, and forms the exclusively true basis of all proper human opinions, and the true basis of all right human conduct, and constitutes the safety of those opinions and of that conduct, and has a tendency invariably beneficial, then we infer the moral disposition of the Originator to be truly kind.

We are here not reduced to the painful dilemma of contending that the *predominant* tendency of truth is beneficial. Truth can never lose its character, or ever cease to be beneficial. It gives out no uncertain sound. What it says once, it says all the time. What it says to-day, it said before human beings originated. And we must not confound the existence with the discovery or revelation of truth. If truth can never lose its character and never cease to be beneficial—if no human conduct is safe not founded upon it, and no human opinion any thing else than a human lie not based upon it—if we do not know any thing else to which it has any relevancy or pertinence than human conduct and human opinions—if it exists external to us, then its exclusive office and design *must be* to constitute the only ark of safety for human beings intrinsically liable to err from it in opinion and conduct. Now, we affirm that the existence of truth and the design of

truth, as a law of the moral universe, emanating from an antecedent cause, is an anomaly which cannot be explained upon any hypothesis which dispenses with a system of natural religion and a superintending Providence. At least Carlyle's theory, borrowed from Hegel, will not answer this purpose. The extract taken from Macaulay,* to the contrary notwithstanding, does not prevent him from saying elsewhere that "the truth is that every man is to a great extent the creature of the age. It is to no purpose that he resists the influence which the vast mass in which he is but an atom must exercise upon him. He may try to be a man of the tenth century, but he cannot. Whether he will or not, he must be a man of the nineteenth century. He *shares* in all the *motion of the moral* as well as in that of the physical world."

What is implied in the motion of the moral world in progressive improvement? Does it not imply that natural theology is a progressive science?

To us it seems to be impossible to conceive the idea of the progress of man in the moral department of nature, without at the same time necessarily conceiving the progressive nature of natural theology, unless we adopt the absurd supposition that moral laws have no existence independent of man, or confound moral with religious improvement.

It would be absurd to suppose that there is any such motion in the moral world as is implied in the idea that new moral truths are being added to the sum of the moral truth that constituted the pre-existing harmony of the moral world at the advent of time. Truth could hardly be a unit if it were being disturbed by the addition of new truth not harmonizing with that already existing. The motion of the moral world, in which each man of each century shares, and which, it seems, it is impossible for him to resist, must mean only human progress in the knowledge and observance of moral truths that lie at the basis of natural religion. Men may be said, with every propriety, to progress morally when they come to know and to obey moral laws that are older than the laws of nature; but this view would favor the idea that natural religion is a progressive science. But before we proceed farther in the investigation, and before we proceed to fix and

* Ranke's History of the Popes.

establish the test and criterion of truth, it becomes us to inquire what truth is. What is truth? If we were to define it to be the basis of all true human opinion and all right human conduct, we would be giving no information about truth itself. We would be just as ignorant of its intrinsic character after as before. Such a definition would be only saying what truth can do, or, rather, telling what office it discharges for the use and benefit of man. We candidly admit our inability to define it. But, then, we also admit that we are unable to define gravitation or attraction. We cannot define *any* natural law. What do we know about the laws of nature, one or all? For example, what do we know about gravitation? If gravitation be a law of nature, it must have originated when nature sprang into being. But the first intelligence we have of it is to be found in Newton's Principia. If gravitation was a law when nature sprang into being, then, at that time, the truth of its existence was undoubted. If it were not for the truth of its existence at that date, it would be a human falsehood to affirm it then to have existed. Every natural law must have truth for its basis, or it cannot be said with truth to exist. Hence, truth must necessarily precede the existence of natural laws. How do we know that truth is not a law of nature? Did nature originate truth? If it did, then the subsequent originated the prior. How do we know that there is such a thing existing as truth? This involves the question immediately on hand. How do we know that there is such a law in nature as gravitation? How do we arrive at the conviction of the existence of any thing outside us? We answer, by the observational method of human inquiry.

Nature provides many laws for the social relations of life. There are, for example, the reciprocal affection of parent and child, brothers and sisters, &c. We are daily and hourly in the habit of observing and obeying laws of health, which we call natural laws, relating to the human constitution. If we fail to observe them, we experience constitutional injuries, or, what is the same thing, we fail to procure the benefit resulting from the observance of laws of health. But there is no change in the laws of health. They have not been added to nor detracted from since their reign began with the beginning of nature. We are

also daily and hourly in the habit of using and observing the law of truth, by making it the basis of our opinion and conduct; and if we do not observe it, we find our social comfort and security imperiled and tending to ruin.

With respect to the laws of health, we never depart from the inductive process. But observation cannot tell us what a law of health is. It only tells us that our observance of it is beneficial, and non-observance injurious, to our physical constitution and personal enjoyment. 'This satisfies us. We do not question the accuracy of the process by which we fix and establish laws of health. But what can observation do for truth? Nothing. Why? Is not truth, like laws of health, outside of us? Certainly it is. Is not the observance of truth, as the basis of our ideas and the support of our conduct, beneficial in every relation of life, and its non-observance injurious? Certainly. No man questions it. Then, why look *within* in order to find the test of truth? Why consult consciousness?

By the observational method of human investigation we are to understand the method of looking outside of us for satisfactory conclusions, and, of course, for the test of those conclusions. The revolution effected by Bacon in philosophy is attributed to the supposed discovery of a new mode of philosophical investigation. Bacon wrote but little on moral subjects, and less in a speculative manner. "A few pages comparatively would suffice," says Morell, "to contain every thing he wrote of a strictly metaphysical character." The debt which posterity owes to Bacon arises as much for what he did not do as for what he did. In his converse with nature and morals he refused to look *within*, but looked *outwardly*. He did not fall into the silly conceit of German transcendentalism, of supposing the existence of a pure reason somewhere hid in the subjective receptivity of the *mind*. He paid no court to Kant's "forms of the understanding" and "primitive judgments." In order to know, he did not consider it necessary to take prolonged and scarcely intelligible cognizance of the operations of his own *mind*, the German's "fountain of true reason." He experienced his own ignorance, and, therefore, applied externally for information, to the most obvious sources and in the most obvious manner.

"Not upon stilts sought he knowledge."

"The inductive process," says Macaulay, "has been practiced ever since the beginning of the world by every human being. It is constantly practiced by the most ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless school-boy, by the very child at the breast."

Macaulay thinks the "key of the Baconian philosophy was utility and progress." We cannot think so. Utility and progress rather were consequences that followed upon the employment of the key to which he resorted. That key was the honest determination out of a heart loyal to the truth, and in honest pursuit of it, to seek it in the most obvious manner and from the most obvious sources, where it is only to be found, in the moral and intellectual department of *external nature*.

Why did "fruit" come at Bacon's bidding? Plainly because he did not ask amiss; and not because he, in contradistinction from his predecessors in the field of science, aimed at fruit, aimed at utility and progress. They all aimed at fruit. They all aimed at utility and progress. They all adopted the inductive method. Bacon did not do what Kant did, and his countrymen are ready to canonize him. Kant looked inwardly and Bacon outwardly. The great philosophers regarded intellectual and moral "fruit" as of greater utility and more conducive to human progress than physical enjoyments. And so did Bacon. Undoubtedly Bacon directed his attention to the wisdom of natural rather than speculative science, but it would be a slander upon his great name to say that he attached more importance to physics than morals. Plato and Aristotle and Seneca were men of great practical wisdom, considering the age in which they lived. It is very true, as Macaulay says, that they preferred the satisfaction and enjoyment resulting from true nobility and true security of soul to the physical comforts of life. Bacon did this in his writings, if his conduct belied his profession. "Knowledge," says he, "is a rich storehouse conducing to the glory of the Creator and the *relief of the human soul*." But Plato did not do in metaphysical research what Bacon did, or rather did what Bacon did not. He speculated on ontology unreasonably. He indulged in flights of fancy with respect to the science of being. He left the earth where Bacon remained. He is therefore the prototype of Schilling and Fichte. Plato and Aristotle and Seneca felt what all men feel. And that

is, the support of truth for their opinions and conduct. They yearned in soul for its security. They panted for its stability. They craved moral safety. But they did not crave, neither did Bacon, in order to procure this kind of security of soul, the wealth and honors of the world. They knew their insufficiency. A fine house, and a fine pair of shoes, though conducing to animal enjoyment, do not quell the soul's thirst for the truth, nor give the quietude the truth can *alone* impart. "For our part," continues Macaulay, "if we were forced to make our choice between the first shoemaker and the author of the three books on Anger, we pronounce for the shoemaker." For our part we prefer to go barefooted with honest poverty than wear shoes with unbridled license. We prefer with Seneca, to live in the forest according to the primitive maxims of nature in the company of men, schooled to restrain their passions, rather than in palaces in company with debauchees and assassins.

"It is not the province of philosophy," says Seneca, "to make men mechanics, but it is higher and more ennobling. Philosophy reaches a wound that lies *deeper in* than physical wants. The prime object of her lessons is *to fortify the soul*." It is not our wish to disparage physical advantages. Indeed very much of the moral improvement of mankind is directly traceable to their advance in material comforts. But the slavery of the soul to falsehood, whether in the moral or intellectual department of external nature, is the most frightful and debasing species of servitude. Any remedy for that is more to be desired than all the animal pleasures it is in the power of the world to bestow.

But it is time now that we return to the question more immediately on hand.

With respect to the test of truths, there are three parties in the philosophical world, to wit: the Germans, who hold that the test of truth lies in the pure reason evolved in the inner and subjective operation of the mind. They look inwardly for it, and hence deny the logical possibility of an extra organic world; the English, who hold to the existence of a faculty in man which they call consciousness, distinct and separate from the mind, which is able to be the test of some truths which reason cannot prove to be true; and the French, who have adopted what they call an eclectic

school, choosing the good out of the other two, and rejecting the infirm.

In our judgment, the point of departure from the true philosophy which characterizes the three schools, occurs at the very beginning of their several systems. It occurs in their erroneous conceptions of the primary quality or characteristic of man. The Germans assume that man has a mind as a distinct faculty; the English that he has not only a mind as a distinct faculty, but also another distinct faculty of the mind, called consciousness; and the French agree with the latter. Now, all that can be said of man truly, is, that he is a being of motion primarily, and *inherently thinks*, intrinsically takes in truths from the several departments of truth that exist outside of him, and there forms his own opinions. Hence there is no original or underived science of mind. The process of action and thought is extremely simple and uninvolved. Man has neither mind as a distinct faculty, nor consciousness as a distinct faculty, because, being himself capable of reasoning and being himself conscious, he has no use for them. They are obviously supernumerary. Kant would never have fallen into the error which disfigures his philosophy had he not fallen into the error of regarding man and mind as terms of distinct signification, thereby laying the foundation for the forms of the understanding, his primitive judgments, and the science of being. He makes mind the fountain whence issue originally, the stream of pure reason. He never would have had a starting point for his philosophy had he regarded man, as he really is, not a reasonable being primarily, but a being of motion endowed with a natural capacity to think, and thereby only acquiring truths that lie outside of him. He only becomes rational upon the acquisition of reason. Were we called upon to cite the words that had been of the most pernicious tendency to speculative science, they would be the "*mind of man.*" They form a theory, and one of infidel tendency, because they interpose a thinking power in man, an innate laboratory of reason, between him and external moral and mental phenomena. In proportion as we assign the distinguished prerogative of thought to any supposed faculty attached to man, or belonging to him, and yet distinct from him, we make *him* dependent upon that faculty or power for *his* ability to be

rational, or his ability to be a free *moral* being. In proportion as we assign to *man* the power of original or independent thought, we elevate *him* in the scale of being, and render useless and super-numerary any faculty possessed of original or independent power of thought constituting a fountain of reason distinct from man, a place for Plato's connatural ideas. There would be no objection to saying that man had a mind, if we thereby only meant to convey the idea that he has had bestowed upon him, by the hand of nature, a capacity to think, to reason, to be rational, or reasonable by the aid of outside reasons acquired or learned.

It would be just as sensible to say that man had intelligence and that his intelligence was a distinct faculty endowed with independent and original power of acquiring true or rational ideas. Then in this case it would also follow, were we to say that man's distinct faculty, called *intelligence*, acquired ideas for him from the various departments of nature where they exist, that his freedom of conduct and excellence of character were wholly dependent not directly upon him, but upon this distinct faculty assumed to be aside from him.

We should not object, were it affirmed that man had an understanding, if thereby it were only attempted to convey the idea that he was naturally endowed with a capacity which enabled him to be an understanding being, leaving it to be inferred that he pre-existed; had a being antecedently to the development of this capacity of his being; leaving it to be inferred that this understanding capacity was the power and prerogative of his being, not constituting a power of intelligence distinct from him, but inherently characterizing his original and antecedent existence or being. We have no objection to having it said that man has original qualities, but then we do not want *man* to be lost sight of, when we come to inquire into and define *his* qualities. We are in the habit of saying that iron is hard, lead heavy, water liquid, and so long as we regard these qualities as characterizing the several existing substances to which they relate, the language is entirely proper. But it would be altogether wrong and unphilosophical to say that liquidity was a thing distinct from water, and possessed the independent and original power of being liquid, or that hardness was a quality of iron, and existed as a distinct

thing from the iron and was possessed of the distinct and original power of being hard, or that heaviness was a characteristic of lead, which characteristic had itself a quality characterized by heaviness as distinct from the lead.

We are perfectly willing to say that man is an intelligent being, but in what sense are we willing to say it? We are willing to say it in the same sense that we say that a horse is sure-footed, or that he has an ability to eat corn, or that a dog has the capacity to follow upon the trail of the fox, or the fox the capacity to elude his pursuit, superior to that of all other animals. This sure-footedness of the horse, this capacity of the dog, this sagacity of the fox, are not distinct faculties. They are *inherent* qualities or characteristics of these several animals. But a dog could never run upon the trail of the fox, unless in the course of his life, and *in the process of time*, and posterior to his being or existence, he were brought into communication or contact or acquaintance with the pre-existing trails, just as a man never can be rational unless brought into acquaintance with pre-existing reasons or truth; outside science in general.

The process of time that intervenes between the dog's running upon the trail of the fox, is precisely analogous to the time intervening between the existence of man in his infant state and the after contingency of his being brought into contact and acquaintance with reasons or truths that alone and exclusively make him reasonable. A dog could not be called a *fox-dog*, or a *deer-dog*, or a *bird-dog*, *until after* he had been brought into acquaintance with the trail of those animate objects which he is endowed by nature with instinctive capacity to follow, because it is possible that he might be defective in the organs of smell, or sight, or hearing, or all of them. The probabilities may be a hundred to one that a dog will make a *fox-dog*, but certainly his making a *fox-dog* and his capacity to make one, convey very different ideas. The probabilities are that a man will be a *reasonable* being, but his being a reasonable being, and his capacity to be one, are as distinct and different as a dog's instinctive capacity to be a *fox-dog*, and his being one. A *fox-dog* is one which has been brought into contact and acquaintance with the trail of the fox, and has exercised his natural capacity, and by the conjoint

use of his natural capacity and the existing or rather pre-existing trails of the fox, he becomes learned, so to say, in that vocation. He becomes a *fox-dog*.

A *rational* man is one who has been brought into contact and acquaintance with pre-existing truth, and thereby, by the use and aid of these truths, or reasons, and the exercise of his natural capacity to acquire reasons, he acquires the added character of a reasonable creature. But what was he before he was brought into contact and acquaintance with reasons or truths? Was he not a being? Was he not a being of motion? Did he not indicate will, purpose, determination, and was he not, as a being, prepared to give an exhibition of actions, practices, conduct? Certainly he was.

If the chances are a thousand to one that the pointer dog will make a *bird-dog*, it does not, therefore, follow that he is a *bird-dog* *until* he has a trial in the process of time happening between his being or existence, and the occasion when tried. His becoming a *bird-dog* is dependent upon contingencies. If all the birds were to be destroyed, for example, and the pointer still remain with us, we would cease to have *bird-dogs*, although we might have dogs capable of making *bird-dogs* whenever the proper occasion presented itself. But they could not be called *bird-dogs* until that occasion *did* present itself. They would only be dogs prepared by nature to become *bird-dogs*. And so with man and truths.

Upon the supposition that truth has an author with whom it originated, then certainly a time existed anterior to its origination. During this time, that is to say, pending the time when truth did not exist, posterior to the existence of the author of truth, a reasonable being would have been just as utter an impossibility as the existence of *bird-dogs* during the non-existence of birds.

Suppose we were to go into the nursery, would we not see the infant man in a state of being or existence *anterior* to the development of intelligence, mind, or rationality? There is evidently an I, an ego, a me, an existing being, that in process of time is to become rational, or reasonable, or intellectual, and how? Why, by the apprehension of outside truth. There is a time in the history of every *rational* human being, intervening between his orig-

ination and existence as a human being, and his apprehension of truth. Then, does it not follow, as plainly as the night the day, that rationality, mind, understanding, intelligence, reasonableness, (all which words convey the same idea,) are acquisitions of that something that had existence and origination antecedently to its apprehension of truth? This something, we find existing in the material body of the infant-man, exhibiting conduct, practice, will; exhibiting grief, distress, sorrow; exhibiting joy, gladness, tranquillity; exhibiting fear, apprehension; exhibiting temper, disposition; feeding, and sustaining life thereby; sleeping, and obtaining rest thereby; shrinking from external injury, observant of glaring objects, startled by noises, does all this, too, anterior to the introduction of true ideas or reasons or truths, to its natural capabilities of apprehending them. To be sure, it has a natural capacity to apprehend them, but here is a time *during its existence* and *after* the beginning of its life, when it manifests that being or existence, by the exhibition of will, determination, conduct *anterior* to the apprehension of a reason that is manifestly external to it. Does it not, therefore, follow that will is the *me* of *man*, that will, or a capacity of motion, or an ability to have conduct, is the prior germ of man, that mind, understanding, intelligence is the quality or characteristic of that primordial element of man's character.

The question involved is the one upon which every system of philosophy reposes. It is as to the primary element which constitutes man as an immortal being. It has, therefore, no reference to man's body or material structure. Of necessity, man, as an immortal being, is a unit. The question, then is, what is that unit, and what its character? It cannot be both mind and will; intelligence and a principle of motion; rationality and a being of activity. If it were both, man would be a compound being, under the government of two principles, both being elementary, and neither of which could be regarded as primordial. Whatever description we give of the primary principle in man, whether we call it soul or will, or mind, we are compelled to regard his subordinate qualities as the subordinate qualities of this principle. If, for example, we say the *primary* principle in man is *will*, then we are compelled to regard intelligence as a characteristic of that qual-

ity, and, therefore, subordinate to it. So, also, if we regard the primary principle in man as *mind*, then, since it is necessary to make him a unit, it is necessary to regard *will* as a principle of activity, as a quality of that primary mental principle. This is a very important consideration, and worthy of our most serious examination. It would be merely absurd to say that man was any thing else than a unit *primarily*. Any other supposition would involve us in endless confusion and contradictions. If, therefore, man be a unit primarily, (and we can come to no other conclusion without involving ourselves in endless absurdities,) we must not only seek to comprehend what that unit is, but we must regard every other quality or characteristic belonging to him as a quality or characteristic of the primary unit, because otherwise we would be reduced to the unavoidable alternative of denying to man any primary quality at all.

We wish the reader to understand that we regard the primary quality, constituting the immortal principle in man—not as mind—but as a principle of motion inherently capable of being intelligent, when reasons which are outside of it reach it, and are by it apprehended. We regard man as inherently a being of motion, and, therefore, we variously denominate that principle or being as soul, spirit or will. We, therefore, do not consider man as indebted to his mind, or to reasons, for his motion, (and under motion we include conduct and practices,) but as being moved to action by the resistless hand of nature. He moves because it is the good pleasure of God, his creator, that he shall have power to move. This is the primary principle of his nature. God has made man a being or principle of action. It is, therefore, *after* motion that he is brought into acquaintance with reasons. Man does not perceive any difference in time between his ability to move, and his existence as an immortal being. The very moment he has existence, as an immortal spirit, he has motion, or an ability to move, in virtue of his existence as an immortal being. His motion or ability to move, and his existence as an immortal being as man, are essentially cotemporaneous, because the power to move is the primary element of his nature. The first evidence he gives of existence—existence as a man in embryo—is motion or an ability to have conduct. The reason why mind is not the

primary element of the character of man is, that a man may be either reasonable or not, but he cannot be inert and motionless and not inert and motionless. *He* cannot move or not move because nature causes his motion. He moves at the birth of nature in virtue of fixed natural laws. But he does not evince intelligence in virtue of fixed natural laws, as the primary indication of his existence. He exists *first*, and *afterwards* indicates his intellectual capacity. We regard man—considered as an immortal being or existence—as primarily a moving principle, inherently capable of intellectual operations. This immortal being or principle we call the soul, and the first indication it gives of its existence or being is a power or ability to have conduct. So when a child is introduced into this world, it first has conduct, and *then* afterwards it has *rational* or irrational conduct. He has rational conduct when his conduct is based upon reasons which lie outside of him and are foreign to his nature. There is a wide distinction between a man's nature and reasons, (by which he is enabled to be rational,) but there is manifestly no wide distinction between man's nature and his ability to move or have conduct. His motion is the act of nature. But his being *rational* is not the act of nature, for nature allows a man to be rational or not just as he happens to base his conduct upon true or false reasons. A man's rationality depends upon education and circumstances. A man's conduct is not rational when it is opposed to reason. Its very opposition to reason is the thing which makes the conduct irrational. Conduct can only be called rational when based upon reason; and irrational when not so sustained.

There are certain qualities of the soul of man that are by no means mental. The feeling of fear, for example, is a quality which the soul exhibits before it has any ability to be rational. Before an infant has any capacity to apprehend reason, if you take it and hold it in a position favorable to the development of this feeling, it will exhibit alarm, too plainly to admit of any doubt as to its being alarm or not. It will do this, even when held in the arms of its mother, from whom, *reason* would tell it, it should apprehend no danger. Its alarm is evidently irrational—not based upon reason—or for which no true reason could be assigned. Such conduct is evidently irrational, if we are justified in regard-

ing that conduct as irrational which *reason* condemns. Now here we have a being or existence, inhabiting the material framework of the human body, properly called the soul of man, or the spirit of man, or the will of man, or the immortal principle of man, as a being of motion, which indicates the feeling of alarm, dread, apprehension, fear, before he has any ability to apprehend the reasons for or against the indulgence of the feeling. This shows us that the soul has an existence first, and indicates that existence by the feelings of fear, and also, we may add, of the feelings of joy, anger, pain of body, &c., before it has any rationality, if rationality be the product of reason, if to be rational requires the presence and support of sustaining reason.

What is it that makes human conduct at all rational? Can it be rational when there is not only no reason in favor of it, but when it is opposed to reason? We should certainly say that it could not be. Then it follows that the fear of the infant in the arms of its mother, when there is not only no reason in its favor, but when it is opposed to reason, was irrational. Now it follows, beyond all doubt, that this fear is a manifestation of the feeling of the soul of man, anterior to the development of mind. If it be, then it follows that *mind* is an endowment of the *soul*, and that *the soul is a principle of motion primarily, and therefore the cause of action*. Mind, then, comes upon the soul as an after accomplishment; or, in other words, the soul itself thinks, and *that* is the seminal principle of its rationality. When it thinks in conformity with reason, it is then reasonable, or rational; and when it thinks without this conformity, it is then deficient in rationality, or is unreasonable. The reason why this question is so important and so interesting to every lover of a consistent philosophy, is, that it is utterly impossible to conceive or comprehend the moral or intellectual freedom of man if we allow man to be the creature of reason, which we are compelled to allow if mind be the *primordial* element of his character, and mind be subject to reason.

The argument runs to its conclusion in plain and absolute denial of man's free agency, if mind be the principle in man which causes action, if mind be moved by reasons, and if reasons emanate from the Creator of man.

Let me state the argument differently. If God be man's creator, and man be mind, and mind be moved to action by reason, and God be the author of the reason that moves him, then God is the ultimate cause of man's action. This destroys man's moral freedom.

If, also, God be the creator of man's mind, and man's mind be moved by reasons, and God be the author of the reasons, then God is the author of man's rationality. This destroys man's intellectual freedom.

There can be no proposition more undeniable than that man is not free to act if his conduct springs from mind as the primary and leading element of his character, and if mind be the creature of reason. If mind be not the creature of reason, then it would follow that mind is a power to be rational in the absence of reasons. The theory which we here recommend is open to no such objection.

We hold that moral truth and reason lie outside of man, but that man is a being of motion intrinsically or aside from these outside reasons and truths. If, therefore, the query be propounded to us, what causes man to act? we do not reply, mind, or reason, or truth; but we say, he moves intrinsically, primarily, originally, intuitively, moves independently of reasons, but that reasons enable him to act rationally, and that moral rules of conduct only enable him to act morally. If it were not for reasons that emanate from God, he could not be rational; if it were not for moral rules of conduct, he could not be moral in his conduct. But still he would have conduct if there were no truths, and he would have conduct if there were no moral rules for its regulation.

If the Creator be the cause of man rationally, by the exercise of any direct agency in that regard, then his not being rational, if such a thing were possible, would be because his Creator failed to make him so, or did not educate him. This is the lion in the path of those who contend that mind is the primary and leading element of man's immortal nature or character.

If any American reader desire to find the thread that will lead him into the secret of the mysticism of German metaphysics, he will find it in the theory above stated, and which we are now combating. They are unable to perceive how a man can be a

free intellectual or moral being, if *mind interpose* as a thinking agency between *him* and the *reasons* of the objective world. This mental agency between man and truth is the creature of reasons, emanating from a supposed Creator. Then, argues German transcendentalism, it is folly to contend for any moral or intellectual freedom in *man*,—in *man* standing behind his *agent*, the *mind*. If A be indebted to B for reasons moving to action, and B be indebted to the author of reasons for their origination and moving influence, how can it have any freedom independent either of B or of B's creator? This is the perplexing enigma of German transcendentalism.

"The last resort," says Locke, "a man has recourse to, in the conduct of himself, is his understanding; for, though we distinguish the faculties of the mind and give the supreme command to the will, as to an agent, yet the truth is, the man, who is the agent, determines himself to this or that voluntary action, upon some precedent knowledge or appearance of knowledge *in the understanding*. No man ever sets himself about any thing but upon some view or other which serves him for a reason for what he does; and whatsoever faculties he employs, the *understanding*, with such light as it has, well or ill informed, *constantly leads*. The will itself, how absolute and uncontrollable soever it may be thought, *never fails* in its *obedience* to the *dictates* of the *understanding*."

He makes the will of man a subordinate faculty of the mind, or understanding—makes the will obedient to the dictates of the mind—makes the mind interpose between man and the truth and the objects of the material world; and yet what? pretends to escape from necessitation? Indeed he does not. He is as much a necessitarian as Leibnitz or Edwards; for he says a man is only free when he is governed by reason. He makes human freedom consist in obeying reason, and the more immediate and uncontrollable the obedience, the greater the freedom! He regards the will as "a *power in the mind* to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest."

Leibnitz, in one of his essays upon Locke's "Conduct of the Human Understanding," says of the mind, that it is the *fountain* of all human knowledge, for it is the key to every department of knowledge.

Dr. Thomas Brown, in his second lecture, undertakes to point out to us "how essential a right view of the *science of mind* is to every other science, even to those sciences which superficial thinkers might conceive to have no connection with it." He also regards it as "*the intellectual medium, through which alone* the phenomena of matter become visible to us." He also regards the mind as an "*agent operating* in the production of new results, and employing for this purpose the known laws of thought." He clearly makes the mind the agent, operating between us and the thoughts and objects of the material world; thus depriving us of all agency, directly or indirectly, in the office of rationality, conferring rationality upon our operating agent and divesting us of it.

It is utterly unphilosophical to distinguish between man as an immortal being or soul, possessed of a natural power of motion, and any such supposed distinct faculty as will, whose office it is adjudged to be to direct man to motion or rest. Man, as a soul or spirit, has an intuitive power of acting or not, moving or not, &c.; therefore no collateral or additional faculty to do that is needed. The will of man therefore conveys the same idea as the soul or spirit of man. There is but one principle in the body of man that moves, and that is the immortal soul; and this immortal soul, in addition to the intrinsic power of moving, has a natural capacity to think, or to apprehend truths, compare reasons, contrast truth, deduce conclusions, true or false; or, in other words, the acting soul of man itself thinks, and thinks rationally or not as it happens to think in conformity with reason or not,—acts rationally or not when it happens to have reason for the rule of its conduct.

We now proceed to inquire into the test of truth. The hypothesis which it is our purpose to recommend is, that truth itself is the test of truth, and the only test. The extracts taken from the lecture of Dr. Thomas Brown show that he and his adherents regard mental philosophy as the test. In this opinion German writers concur. If the mind be the intellectual medium through which, as through an alembic, truth reaches us, then the science of mind is the door to truth, and the criterion of its authenticity, and fountain of its origination. In inquiring into the test of

truth, there are three important or primary considerations to be carefully noticed: 1. The inquirer, man, with all his constitutional characteristics; 2. The truth as it exists in the various departments of nature where it is to be found; and 3. The thing to which we are to resort in order to know. We are also to bear in mind that the phrase "to know," as applied to man, the inquirer after truth, and the phrase to, "know the truth," convey the same identical idea. It is impossible for man to know unless some truth lies at the bottom of his opinion. To know, and to have an opinion, convey very different ideas. A man may have an opinion, and that opinion may have a truth or truths for its basis, and yet it does not follow that the man knows that his true opinion is the truth. To know, or, in other words, to know a truth, depends not upon the sincerity of the conviction, or of the inquirer, nor upon the truth of the conviction, but upon the thing, whatever that is, (and that now constitutes the subject-matter of our present inquiry,) which tests the truth, that thing which is the criterion of the truth, that thing with which the inquirer compares the conviction, that thing to which the inquirer resorts for his proof and evidence of the truth of his opinion of the truth. It is entirely possible for a man to utter a true opinion, and yet be unable to know whether his opinion be true or false. If a child sees a spoon upon the table, and affirms the spoon to be upon the table, he gives utterance to a conviction; but does he utter *knowledge*? How does he, or any body else, *know* the spoon to be external to him? How does he *know* but that all that appears to be a spoon is his own subjective image of the reason? How does he *know* that there is an extra organic world? A Berkleyan philosopher insists that he cannot *know* it, because the opinion upon which he relies is subjective, being within the mind, the agent interposing between him and the spoon. He can have no *direct* knowledge, if the *mind* be his informant, and if the mind interpose, as his truth-acquiring agency, between him and the outside world. Indirect information is not knowledge. It partakes of the nature of hear-say testimony. The child is dependent for his information upon the interposing mind, and this mind is dependent upon sensation for its beliefs, and hence sensation, (or the senses of feeling and

sight, &c.,) being liable to be imposed upon, constitute the second impenetrable obstacle in the way of the direct perception of the child. The child's knowledge must partake of the infirmity inherently attaching to the two interposing *instruments*, or *mediums*, through which and by which he is brought into supposed acquaintance with a supposed spoon upon the table. In the first place, argues the Berkleyan, the senses are imperfect witnesses, because they have no intuitive intelligence and are liable to imposition. We all know from experience that we are liable to be imposed upon by the senses. The child's *mind* lies behind the senses, dependent upon them for its opportunity to exercise *its* agency in the process of conveying information to the child. The child's mind then, after it has received the report of the purblind spies upon which it depends for its ideas, has to exercise *its* agency, which we know from experience to be prone to come to false conclusions, (the chances being in favor of false conclusions,) and the child behind the mind has then to exercise *its* agency, when we all admit man by nature to be a fallible being; and yet the opinion of this child, thus circumstanced, is by wise philosophers called *direct knowledge*, mental science, immediate perception, unincumbered apprehension! In other words, the *child*, thus circumstanced, is said to *know* that the spoon is on the table. Would it not be more proper to say that sensation, or the sensational faculty, knew the spoon to be on the table, and that that faculty imparted *its knowledge* to the faculty of the *mind*, and that the faculty of the mind then imparted it to the child?

German writers contend for a faculty called reason, hid away some where amid the convolutions of the brain, where they locate the intellect. They therefore deny all immediacy of perception, all direct knowledge, all knowledge at all, and therefore deny the logical possibility of the objective world.

Mr. Causen says there is a faculty within us called reason, which *marks its office* or rather discharges its functions under the eye of consciousness, and that it is *this faculty* which takes direct cognizance of truth and of the existence of an extra-organic world. Hence he inquires in the "History of Moral Philosophy," whether "this faculty is any less a truthful faculty because it falls under

the eye of consciousness? Who has shown that consciousness not only looks upon that which it sees, but has the surprising quality of changing it by this its magical look and so to impose upon it its own nature. Reason is not struck dumb or blind, because it acts under the eye of consciousness. It does not therefore alter its nature. It does not lose the divine force belonging to it, and the wings given to it, by which it is able to acquire knowledge and so rise to him who is its author. Consciousness attests to this grand development of reason, but does not make it or alter its decrees."

"The fundamental principle of knowledge," says he, "and intellectual life, is consciousness. Life begins with consciousness, and with consciousness it ends, in consciousness it is that we apprehend ourselves; and it is in and through consciousness that we apprehend the external world. Were it possible to rise above consciousness, to place ourselves, so to speak, behind it, to penetrate into the secret workshop where intelligence blocks out and fabricates the various phenomena, there to officiate, as it were, at the birth and to watch the evolution of consciousness, then might we hope to comprehend its nature and the different steps through which it rises to the form in which it is actually revealed. But as all knowledge commences with consciousness, it is *able to remount* no higher. Here a prudent analysis will therefore stop and occupy itself with what is given."

The evident result of this philosophy is to make *all our* beliefs depend upon faith, and faith upon the general consciousness. It dispenses with any other test of truth than an ill defined, indefinable, contested, doubtful and unreasoning unintellectual faculty, distinct from reason, independent of the intellect, and yet *within us* some where, whose precise locality no human eye has ever detected. The philosophy of Kant is of very difficult comprehension.

He is however under the impression that there are two sources of knowledge interposing between truth and us, to wit: the senses and the intellect. By the senses we are impressed by external objects. These are called impressions. By the intellect we are enabled to think with regard to these impressions and to draw conclusions, which conclusions are the subjective images of the intellect. The images of the intellect lie behind the impressions

of the senses, and are thereby and therefore disconnected from the external world. Hence we cannot be assured by the intellect of the existence of external objects. Now, therefore, the existence of an objective world, not being deposed to by the mind, cannot rationally be said to exist, and therefore should not be credited by rational men. The intellect is regarded as a *constructive* faculty, and what appears to us to be an external world is merely the constructions of this faculty, having no real counterpart in the world outside of us. It is with respect to the constructions of the intellect, that German transcendentalism takes its loftiest flights into the airy regions of doubt and infidelity.

Kant thinks the mind has three leading and primary powers, 1, pure reason, (*reine vernunft*;) 2, a practical reason, (*practische vernunft*;) and 3, a faculty of judging, (*eine urtheils-kraft*.) Fichte, finding this multiplication of faculties burdensome to him, sought to reduce them to one, *within which* all knowledge is to be sought. This is his hypothesis of the *me* (*das Ich*.) This *das Ich*, or *me*, constituted in his language, "the kingdom of our subjectivity," "*Im Bereiche unserer subjectivitat*." Our knowledge is exclusively within the kingdom of our subjectivity, and that hence there could be no existence out of us, that the supposed outer world was merely an impression, analogous to thought generally, reflected from the mirror of the mind like the images made upon a material mirror. The *me* being the *fountain* of all knowledge, and all knowledge *arising there*, all knowledge must only exist there. There is no other place for it to exist, as there is no other place for our thoughts and ideas to dwell. The image of our mind has no objectivity until we place it out of us by the exercise of mental construction, that the supposed material objects of nature are nothing but the reflex thoughts or images of our minds, being a mere appearance, being but the mind's representation, &c. The reader will perceive that this German philosophy is built upon the English or Lockean theory of the *science of mind*, that theory that teaches, in the language of Locke, that the "ideas and images in men's minds are the *invisible powers* that constantly govern them." The science of mind is only another form of words to convey the idea of mental philosophy, or the mind's original principles, or the "powers," consisting in "ideas and images,"

dwelling in the mind and there arising, and arising, too, not from any direct contact with the external world, but disconnected from it by organs of sense, that have no power of reason. What does the *mind* know of the external world? Nothing, it is contended, but what it learns through an unreasoning medium, a medium that is itself matter—a medium that is known to be mendacious, and a medium that manifestly has no rationality, a medium which has no ideas or images, that has no power, visible or invisible, to convey an idea or image, for it possesses none. As rational beings, says Fichte, and by rational beings he means, those who are willing to submit to the *science* of mind, however it may be in opposition to the seeming appearance and seeming impressions of mere bodily organs which have no mental science, we are compelled to regard the external world as “nothing more than sensual perception of our own creation, according to certain laws of our mental nature. It is mere intelligence with inconceivable limits in which we are inclosed.”

Man, say philosophers, is dependent for his conclusions upon the science of mind. Very well. Now if the science of mind lie between the external world and man, and man depends upon this science for *his* opinions, must he not exclude the senses from the category of his informants? Of course, to be consistent he should, and if he does this, he thereby cuts off the only outlet there is to an extra-organic world, and hence is compelled, logically to chime in with the transcendentalism of Fichte. There is obviously no other rational alternative. There is another alternative we admit, and that is, to listen to the voice of the senses in opposition to the science of mind, but, then this would be to act irrationally, if it be only rational to obey the science of mind, or mental philosophy. What right have philosophers to call science of any kind mental? Science is external to man, and is matter of mental acquisition. We acquire philosophy. Hence it never becomes mental. It would be just as sensible to say that we had a mental Washington, a mental Bacon, or a mental Plato, and that they constituted a *portion of the mind's* history or its historical knowledge, and having no other existence than in the science of mind. We believe in the infallibility of truth, because we believe truth to have an infallible author, but we know therefore, of no

mental science but that science which is foreign to it, of no mental philosophy which would not still be philosophy if all minds were destroyed. The history of Plato and Bacon is no mental history. It exists, and exists independently of the mind. Does this not show us that we must not erect any mental faculty into a standard by which to test the truth? We do not appeal to consciousness in order to know whether Bacon accepted bribes or not, or whether Plato was a visionary or not. We should not therefore refer to it in order to know whether the houses and the trees we see before us are really external to us, or, as Fichte says, only within the "kingdom of our subjectivity."

This whole difficulty, in our judgment, has arisen from the cardinal error of regarding mind as a distinct department from man, wherein the science of nature locates its habitation. The error into which Steward and Reid fell of regarding *conscience*, as a distinct faculty, and from which later philosophers have successfully routed them, is of precisely the same nature, and only open to the same objections that can be urged against the theory of regarding mind as distinct from man's capacity to think.

Sir William Hamilton, probably now the greatest living philosopher, does not regard conscience as a distinct faculty, nor does he, like Steward and Reid, regard consciousness, which he contends is the "test and criterion of truth," as a distinct or special faculty, holding co-ordinate rank with other powers of the mind, but as the general condition of all reasoning beings, sustaining every mental action, and contributing the ground-work and fundamental substratum of all human reason. But still it is a standard erected *within* the mental constitution of human nature; still its voice proceeds from the Delphic oracle located some where within us, still it demands the sacrifice of the observational method of human investigation, still it fails to make truth the test of its own vitality and the criterion of its existence, and still forms a platform for the flighty gyrations and dazzling heights of fancy that we owe to German transcendentalism.

Now, to us it seems to be utterly unphilosophical to hold that the soul has a distinct faculty denominated consciousness, if the soul itself be conscious. It would be just as philosophical to say that iron had weight as a separate quality, and that to this heavi-

ness belonged the principle of weight; just as sensible to say that water had a faculty called liquefaction, to which faculty we are indebted for the liquidity of water. It would be just as sensible to say that the soul has eyes, and that it is the eyes that see and not the soul; just as philosophical to say that the soul inhabiting the body of man has material organs called legs, and that it is the legs that walk about and not the soul; just as proper to say that the soul of man has an organ called the brain, that thinks, and that the soul is not intelligent, but that the brain is.

How much more proper, how much more simple, and how much more philosophical is it to hold that there is an immortal principle of motion placed within the material frame-work of man, constructed for its use, and that it is this moving soul that is conscious, that is thoughtful, that is capable of rationality, and that it is this soul that looks out of the material eyes of the body made for its use and employment, that it is this soul that hears, that smells, that feels, that lives, that dies, and that is the subject of moral approbation, or disapprobation, that constitutes the *I*, that constitutes the ego, that constitutes the me, that constitutes the immortal, ethereal principle familiarly called man.

Now we say when a child sees a spoon on the table and says it is a spoon, and believes it to be a spoon, that it is the soul, or the spirit, or the will, or the moving principle in the body of the child itself, that performs the three several operations of looking, uttering and believing, by employing its bodily organs, and thus without the intervention of any distinct faculty called mind, or any other distinct faculty called consciousness, or any other distinct faculty than its own inherent conscious and thinking capacity. Nothing, therefore, intervenes between the child and the spoon but its own bodily organs. The eyes are employed by the soul, and they are sustained in their testimony by the hands or feelings, and their testimony is carried to the laboratory of the brain, where it undergoes examination in the light of reason, or the process of thought, by which it is compared with other truths of less difficult attainments. We thus get rid of the idealism of Berkley; of the infidelity of Hume, built upon the philosophy of Locke, and the idealism of Berkley; of the faculty of Pure Reason of

Kant; and of the consequent transcendentalism of Germany; of the highest truth organ of Cousin; and the not less dangerous Eclecticism of France; and of the Immediacy of perception of Sir William Hamilton.

This brings us to perceive that there are two, and but two, classes of truths that can be brought to the consideration of man. If the child sees a spoon on the table, and by striking the table and eliciting a noise, comes to the *conclusion* that if he strikes it a second time, a like noise will be produced, we have presented to us the two classes of truths, the not reasonable and the reasonable—a primary truth and a dependent truth—a first principle and a secondary deduction—a truth not sustained by reason and a truth dependent upon reason for its support.

We are to bear in mind, in this connection, that we can only have knowledge of the existence of an object, but can have no knowledge of the object. A human being cannot be said to know a tree, but he may be said to know that a tree exists, and exists in certain relations, and exists with certain qualities. All therefore, that we know concerning an extra-organic world is with *respect to some truth*, connected with external objects. These truths are by philosophers called the qualitative properties of bodies, or substances of the natural world. The first converse that we hold with nature is, with respect to truths that are unsupported by reason, or other truths. These are called the direct exercises of the mind. That knowledge which comes from reflection is called the reflex or indirect; and is really indirect, because not elementary—not primary—but dependent upon other truths for their rational support.

The child that sees the spoon and believes it to be an object external to it, exercises the direct capacity of the mind, and this truth thus not reflected is elementary, because it is not dependent upon another truth for its reasonable foundation not deduced—not reflected. But after the child has seen the spoon and has believed it to be an object external to it, and has, by it, struck the table, and elicited a noise, it then, when from reflection it concludes that if it strikes the table again a like noise will be elicited, exercises the deductive faculty—the reasoning faculty—its rational capacity, and has a conviction that is reasonable, because

dependent upon another and precedent reason or truth for its support, a conviction for which a reason can be rendered, and therefore not first or elementary. Our knowledge of personal identity is also a first, or elementary, or uncompounded, or non-reasonable truth, because there can be rendered no reason in its favor. A non-reasonable truth differs from a not reasonable or unreasonable proposition in the particular that the first is true, but not dependent upon another reason for its support, and the latter is untrue because opposed to a reason or truth.

Our personal identity cannot be reasoned about, because it is essentially elementary, and, therefore, either a self-evident proposition or untrue. This is the test of all uncompounded truths. They are either self-evident or they are false. But compounded propositions are never self-evident. It were a contradiction to say they were reasonable and yet self-evident. Because a proposition is not sustained by reason, is no proof that it is not true. It is no proof either way. The only way, therefore, to prove a proposition to be false, is to show that it is opposed to reason, or is unreasonable. This brings us to our main conclusion. All propositions that are not self-evident are necessarily to be tested by other reasons. There is no other rational alternative. It would be an abandonment of reason to refer non-elementary or compounded propositions to any faculty supposed to be connected with man, unless we had some mode to guard that faculty against a natural proclivity towards unreasonable convictions or opinions.

We are firmly impressed with the conviction that the rock upon which Sir William Hamilton founders, consists in referring to consciousness (an unreasoning faculty) the question of man's moral freedom and the foundation of vice and virtue, when it is beyond question true that they are either reasonable or untrue—that they are not self-evident, but dependent upon other truths for their rational support. Certainly it is a clear admission that the argument from reason is against the proposition that man is a free moral agent, if learned and sincere men are willing to withdraw the debate from before the tribunal of argument and logic, and refer it for a final settlement to what people generally feel to be true in virtue of their internal convictions. We all know how prone men are to give credence to those opinions which chime in

with the natural propensities of the heart, and how true it is, that the wish is father to the thought in matters especially connected with moral responsibility. We do not very well perceive how any man, who is disposed to defer to the tribunal of reason all opinions which depend upon argument for their support, can depend upon faith for their truth. Faith may supply the place of reason. This we by no means deny. Faith is a very important aid in man's moral support, and a highly useful auxiliary help to reason; but, then, its office never *conflicts* with reason. It only suffices when reason is out of, or aside from, and not relevant to, the question in issue. It would be thought to be highly derogatory to the steadiness of any man's rationality were he to credit the truth of any of the propositions of Euclid upon faith merely, in the absence of the demonstration upon which they rely for their truth.

But it may be inquired of us as to the test of those truths which we admit to be true, and which we also admit to be true aside from reason, independent of other truths, and about which we cannot reason, and which we are therefore prepared to credit upon faith. Such, for example, as the existence of human opinions, the idea of personal identity, the external locality of the material world, the power of memory, &c.

We answer, there is no test of these phenomena;—and why? Because they are *self*-sustained. That is the distinction between them and reasonable truths. It were absurd to say reasonable truths could be self-sustained, when they are sustained by reasons. Elementary truths do not depend upon the consciousness of men, or upon *any* faculty of man for their support; nor can *any* faculty in man be the test of their truth, for then, if it were so, they would cease to be *self*-sustained and become sustained by human testimony in their behalf. Were this ground generally taken by men who believe in the moral freedom of man, and in the existence of vice and virtue, the battle with their infidel opponents, it seems to us, would be easily won. What can infidelity do with regard to *self*-evident truths, were it generally admitted that they did not rely upon any faculty in man for their support? They must certainly admit them to have originated, and to have originated in a wise and good First Cause.

ART. X.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Principles of Chemistry, Illustrated by simple experiments. By Dr. JULIUS ADOLPH STOCKHARDT. Translated by C. H. PIERCE, M. D. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1855.—This excellent treatise has been for several years before the American public. It is peculiarly valuable to that large class of students of chemistry who are unable to provide themselves with costly apparatus for purposes of illustration. It contains minute directions for making experiments with cheap and simple combinations. Its descriptions of chemical re-actions are lucid, and, altogether, it is one of the very best text-books we possess.

Modern Mysteries Explained and Exposed. By Rev. A. MAHAN, First President of Cleveland University. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co. 1855.—It is a painful evidence of the extensive spread of the absurd superstition of spiritualism, that so stout a volume as this has been deemed necessary for its demolition. The reverend author is very much in earnest. He explains the phenomena of the rappers on the hypothesis of animal magnetism, and of Reichenbach's od-force, and expends much labor on the demonstration of the inconsequential character of spiritualistic logic. If any believer in the modern humbug can be prevailed upon to read this book, it may open his eyes. To us, however, it has very much the air of leveling the broadside of a seventy-four at a musquito.

The Christian Life, Social and Intellectual. By PETER BAYNE, M. A. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1855.—Mr. Bayne has entered into a magniloquent dissertation on certain features of Christianity, has undertaken the defence of philanthropy against the success of Thomas Carlyle, and has vehemently assaulted Pantheism. He has also given us verbose but readable biographies of Howard, Wilberforce, Chalmers, Foster, Arnold and a thriving English merchant named Budgett, whose career we do not find interesting.

The Elements of Character. By MARY G. CHANDLER. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1855. This little book attempts, as its name implies, to classify and describe the elements of character. It is a compilation of virtuous common-place, very well put together. There is nothing new to be said upon the subject, and our author has not attempted it.

The Beginning and Growth of the Christian Life, or the Sunday school Teacher. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1855.—This little book comes out under the auspices of the Sunday School Society. It discusses the objects, aims, results and management of the Sunday School, and can hardly fail to prove acceptable to the class for whom it is designed. The mechanical execution is very superior.

Polyglot Reader and Guide for Translation, consisting of a series of English extracts, with their translation into French, German, Spanish and Italian; the several parts designed to serve as Mutual Keys. By J. ROEMER, A. M., Professor of the French language and literature in the New York Free Academy. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1855. Under the above title we have received three neat little volumes, containing, respectively, the English Text, and the German and French Translations, of certain extracts from our own literature. The plan of the work is a modification of the system commonly known as Hamilton's method of teaching languages.

The absurdity of the old grammar and dictionary system of learning a language was well shown up by the Rev. Sydney Smith, in his witty article on the Hamiltonian method, in the *Edinburg Review*. The unnatural character of the old plan is apparent to every body. It seems to be an effort to deviate as widely as possible from the manner in which languages are commonly learned. The child acquires a knowledge of his vernacular by hearing it constantly used and by making repeated efforts to use it himself. The sounds of the words, their combination into phrases, the union of these last into sentences, and finally the full control of the language is acquired gradually, and, as it were, by successive stages of elevation in knowledge, the horizon of his information widens.

Afterwards, however, when he is sent to school, every thing is changed. He is introduced to Latin, for example, through the medium of a perplexing maze of declensions, conjugations, rules and exceptions. He clammers blindfold up the height of Parnassus to get a confused and unintelligible view of the wide landscape at its base, and then is compelled to descend again, in order to verify, by close personal inspection, the character of each of its individual features.

This might do very well for the days when a knowledge of Latin and Greek constituted an education, but now we have no time for such slow advancement. We need a more rapid method, and the Hamiltonian system supplies it. The defect of that plan consisted chiefly in the stiff, formal, literal translations of its interlineations. The present modifi-

cation obviates that difficulty. The pupil has good English, which is rendered into good French and German, and his teacher supplies the necessary information in regard to idiomatic differences. The grammar is acquired gradually, and may be introduced to suit the learner's convenience, or may be entirely postponed till he reads fluently, a feat, which, we venture to say, he will accomplish before he has completed his course of text-books. This done he can, at his leisure, accomplish the critical study of the language, a task which will be greatly facilitated by the knowledge previously acquired. We cordially recommend both the system and the text-books before us.

Sallust's Jugurtha and Catiline; with Notes and a Vocabulary. By NOBLE BUTLER and MINARD STURGUS. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1855. We have always thought that Sallust was very improperly forced upon school boys at too early a stage in their studies. So philosophical and idiomatic a writer cannot be readily understood by those who are required to read him, and consequently much time is wasted without an equivalent benefit to the pupil. Sallust ought, according to our notion, to be read just before Tacitus; the student will then be better able to appreciate the philosophy of his stately prefaces, and the force and pathos of his inimitable speeches.

If he is, however, to be read by school-boys, we think this task may be very well accomplished by the book before us. The notes are not by any means profoundly critical, but subserve the purpose of a school-boy well enough. The vocabulary is equally insufficient for a critical study of the author, but we have no right to try the book by this test. It is a good school edition, and renders the reading easier by the omission of the archaisms, though this modification by no means recommends the text to a scholar.

Rudiments of the Greek Language, arranged for the students of Loyola College, Baltimore. Upon the basis of Wettenhall. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1855. This neat little volume is an excellent introduction to the study of the Greek Language. It is a compendium of the most important points in the grammar, and contains more valuable information, for its bulk, than any similar book with which we are acquainted.

Elements of Physical and Political Geography. Designed as a Text Book for classes and academies, and intended to convey just ideas of the form and structure of the earth, the principal phenomena affecting

its outer crust, the distribution of plants, animals and man upon its surface, together with its principal political divisions. By CORNELIUS S. CARTEE, A. M. Boston: Hickling, Swan & Brown. 1855. This is a good move in the right direction. Hitherto our school books have been lamentably deficient in that most important and interesting branch of study, physical geography. Indeed, we may safely say no attention has been paid to it. The book before us remedies that evil. A very good abridgment of the present state of our knowledge has been made by the author, and he has illustrated his teachings by wood cuts, &c., representing the rain zones, the courses of the winds, &c.

We are sorry to see, however, that his tendency to generalization has, as usual, led him into error. For example, he tells us that "it is a singular fact, whatever the cause may be, that the Celts are invariably Roman Catholic, while the Teutonic population is inclined to Protestantism." This is in the face of the fact that a large part of Germany is still Catholic, and likely to continue so, and that some of the most decided Calvinists in the world are to be found among the Scottish Highlanders and the Welsh. A broad generalization is almost always false.

Elementary Algebra. By B. SESTINI, S. J. Second revised and enlarged edition. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1855. The student is here introduced to the elementary principles of Algebra. There is no unnecessary verbiage in the volume. The demonstrations are succinct but satisfactory, and the student is not asked to believe a thing before it is proved to him. The problems are sufficiently numerous to exercise the pupil in the knowledge he has acquired, and the work is a useful addition to our list of text books.

A Treatise on Algebra. By B. SESTINI, S. J. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1855.—This work is put out as a sequel to the one last named, but does not necessarily presuppose an acquaintance with that volume. It is an independent treatise on Algebra. The demonstrations are original, and remarkably clear, and a great deal of information is conveyed in a very small compass. The student is conducted as far as Logarithms and Series. The same thoroughness and simplicity which characterize the last named volume are to be found in this, and the two constitute a good introduction to the study of the science of which they treat.

An Easy Introduction to the Science of Geography. Designed for the instruction of children in schools and families. By S. AUGUSTUS

MITCHELL. Philadelphia: A. Cowperthwait & Co.—1855. This is a neat little volume illustrated by numerous wood cuts and colored maps. It is what it professes to be, a Primary Geography, and appears to be well adapted to the elementary instruction of children in that science, as at present conducted.

Waikua, or Adventures on the Mosquito Shore. By SAMUEL A. BARD. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855.—So much stir has been made, and so many hard words bandied between the English and Americans concerning the Mosquito king and his territory, that we are naturally curious to know something about it. To gratify us in this desire, Mr. Bard steps upon the carpet and gives us the benefit of his experience in an extremely readable volume. He seems to be one of those restless, reckless seekers of adventure with whom our country abounds—men ready for any thing, so that it be wild and daring, with sufficient spice of danger about it to give it interest and piquancy.

An artist, he wandered off to Jamaica, with the expectation of rendering himself famous by studying nature in the wild scenery and brilliant atmosphere of the tropics; but being disappointed in his pecuniary expectations, concluded to wander off to the Mosquito kingdom, as a necessary prelude to getting home again. Here he saw all the lions, including his majesty, George William Clarence, king of all the Mosquitoes, a likely young negro, whom his irreverent republican mind valued at about twelve hundred dollars in the New Orleans market. He then rambled into Central America, cruising first about the lagoons, among the Sambos of the coast, and then going into the interior to visit the pure-blooded Indians. Of the latter he speaks with great respect, as a cleanly, handsome, virtuous and dignified race. The former he pictures as disgustingly filthy, obscene, vicious, diseased and degraded.

There is plenty of wild adventure, perils from the elements and also from the fury of the coarse savages of the coast. There is a spice of romance, too, in the volume. Antonio Chul, a handsome, mild-eyed Indian boy, a perfect Pythias to our roving Damon, is represented as on a grand tour, rousing all the native tribes of Central America to a general revolt against the Spaniards, and is said now to be the dreaded chieftain who leads the fiery attacks upon the Nicaraguans. Another Indian boy and two or three witches also figure in the story, casting a weird light over a portion of the narrative. Whatever may be thought of this part of the story, the rest has an air of probability, and, making the usual allowances for a traveler's exaggerations, seems a reliable account of affairs in that interesting portion of our continent. The

machinations of the English are well shown up, and our government is rebuked for what the author considers the Greytown blunder.

Veva, or the War of the Peasants. An Historical Tale. By HENDRICK CONSCIENCE. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1855.—Hendrick Conscience is a Belgian novelist, whose works have attracted no little attention. A series of them is now in course of publication by the enterprising firm of Murphy & Co., under the title of the “Amusing Library.” They are neatly gotten up, as indeed is every thing which those gentlemen undertake.

The scene of the present story is laid in Belgium, during the brief and unsuccessful revolt of the peasants against the French republicans. There is plenty of incident; though the plot is simple, there are some startling dramatic positions and a good deal of minute painting of familiar scenes. Indeed, Portmartin’s estimate of the character of the style is very fair: “It is Flemish painting entering the domain of literature.”

Notes on Duels and Dueling. Alphabetically arranged, with a Preliminary Historical Essay. By LORENZO SABINE. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1855.—Mr. Sabine is already known by his work on the American Loyalists. In the volume before us he has undertaken to exhume the records of numerous bloody single combats. We have quite full accounts of the famous duels of Hamilton and Burr, Decatur and Barron, Clay and Randolph, Cilley and Graves, &c. To those who like details of this kind the book will prove interesting.

Japan as it Was and Is. By RICHARD HILDRETH. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1855.—Mr. Hildreth has used no common industry in the collection and collation of authorities for this volume. From the days of Marco Polo Ferdinand Mendez Pinto down to February, 1855, no writer of any note who has treated of this remote but interesting region has been neglected. The book appears to us eminently impartial and reliable, and is the fullest history of Japan ever published.

Christian Theism. The Testimony of Reason and Revelation to the Existence and Character of the Supreme Being. By ROBERT AUSTIN THOMPSON, M. A. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855.—Mr. Burnett, a gentleman who died in Aberdeen in 1784, left a permanent fund, to be judiciously invested, in order that its proceeds should be distributed every forty years to the authors of the best and second

essays on the Existence and Nature of the Divine Being. These premiums of successful religious authorship are named, after him, the Burnett prizes. This is the second time these prizes have been awarded, the first competition having taken place in 1814. In 1854 a number of essays were handed, and to the present was adjudged the highest prize. The very high character of the gentlemen who passed this judgment would be sufficient to command public attention to the treatise, even if it had not the high merit which it actually possesses.

Panama in 1855. An account of the Panama Rail Road, of the cities of Panama and Aspinwall, with sketches of life and character on the Isthmus. By ROBERT TOMES. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855.—Mr. Tomes was one of the party of invited guests who crossed the Isthmus, on the occasion of the celebration of the opening of the railroad from ocean to ocean. His book is a pleasing, gossiping story of his adventures, and seems to be free from exaggeration and misrepresentation. He gives a satisfactory though not a detailed account of the origin and progress of the great enterprise which connects Aspinwall with Panama, and dwells upon the difficulties of keeping the road in repair, arising from the destructive power of the climate, the parasitic plants and the boring animals of the region it traverses. Some interesting episodes concerning Morgan and his buccaniers, and a mysterious sprig of British aristocracy who formed part of the excursion, enliven the narrative and relieves the monotony of tropical travel.

Letters to the People on Health and Happiness. By CATHARINE E. BEECHER. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855. Miss Beecher belongs to one of the mystical *pathies*, a sort of compromise between hydropathy and common sense, invented, it appears, by one Ling, who is not, as his name would seem to imply, a Chinese, but a Swede. The lady has had large experience in various health establishments, and decides positively in favor of the system of *Ling*. She is evidently profoundly absorbed in the care of her health, and this volume communicates the results of her experience to the world at large.

She is very severe upon calomel, quinine, “*et id genus omne*,” and gives recipes for various drenches and douches of cold water, the modes of application of which seem to have some peculiar adaptedness to the various affections of the “debilitated American constitution.” Her physiology is remarkably shallow and trite, and in some instances decidedly erroneous; and many of her anatomical illustrations are laboriously and ludicrously absurd. Still, with all this nonsense, there are

some good things in the book, not the least of which is the demonstration of the fact that ill health is lamentably on the increase among American women, and the pointed denunciation of some of the methods of living and dressing which have led to such melancholy results.

NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

McNally's system of Geography—Davies' Intellectual Arithmetic—Youth's Manual of Geography combined with History and Astronomy, by James Monteith—Davies' Primary Arithmetic and Table Book—Davies' Authentic Analytical and Practical First Lessons in Geography, by James Monteith. Brookfield's First Book in Composition, on a new plan. A. S. Barnes & Co. New York: 1855. Davis & Peck's Dictionary of Mathematics. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1855. 8vo. pp. 292. Harper's Story Books. By Jacob Abbott. Timboo & Fanny—Harper's Establishment—Franklin—New York, Harper & Bros. 1855.

Annals of San Francisco, containing a summary of the History of the first discovery, settlement, progress and present condition of California, and a complete history of all the important events connected with its great city, including biographical memoirs of prominent citizens. By Frank Soula, John H. Gion, M. D., and James Nesbit. Illustrated with 150 fine engravings. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1855. 8vo. pp. 824.

Olie, or The Old West Room. The Weary at Work, and the Weary at Rest. By L. M. M. New York: Mason Brothers. 1854. 24mo. pp. 525.

Oakfield, or Fellowship in the East. By W. D. Arnold, Lieutenant Fifty-eighth Regiment, B. N. J. Boston: Tickner & Fields. 1855. 12mo. pp. 444.

The Story of the Campaign; a complete narrative of the war in Russia, written in a tent in the Crimea. By Major E. Bruce Hamley. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1855. 24mo. pp. 184.

The sounds of English Words and Phrases, so classified and arranged as to facilitate the expression of ideas and assist in literary composition. By Peter Mark Roget. Revised and edited, with a list of foreign words defined in English, and other additions. By Barnas Sears, D. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1855. 16mo. pp. 228.

Pictures of Europe, Framed in Ideas. By C. A. Bartol. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1855. 12mo. pp. 407.

Christianity, its Essence and Evidence, or An Analysis of the New Testament into Historical Facts, Doctrines, Opinions, and Phraseology. By George W. Burnap, D. D. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1855. 12mo. pp. 410.

Ella, or Turning over a New Leaf. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1855. 16mo.

The Araucanians, or Notes of a Tour among the Indian Tribes of Southern Chili. By Edmund Ruel Smith, of the U. S. Astronomical Expedition in Chili, with illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855. 12mo.

Thackeray's Newcomes. Memoirs of a most Respectable Family. By Arthur Pendennis, Esq. Illustrated. 2 vols. 8vo. New York: 1855. Harper & Brothers.

Mexico and its Religion, with incidents of travel in that country during parts of the years 1851-52-53-54, and historical notices of events connected with places visited. By Robert A. Wilson. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855. 12mo. pp. 406.

Lily, a Novel. By the author of "The busy moments of an Idle Woman." New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855. 12mo.

Works of Charles Lamb, with a sketch of his Life and Final Memorials. By Sir Thomas Noon Talfourd. 2 vols. 12mo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855.

The Works of Horace, translated literally into English prose. By C. Smart, A. M., of Pembroke College, Cambridge. A New Edition, Revised, with a copious selection of Notes. By Theodore Alois Buckley. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855. 18mo. pp. 325.

Cæsar's Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars, including the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish Wars. Literally translated. New York; Harper & Brothers. 1855. 18mo. pp. 572.

Xenophon's Anabasis, or History of the Expedition of Cyrus, and the Memorabilia of Socrates. Literally translated from the Greek. By the Rev. J. S. Watson, M. A., M. R. S. L. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855. 18mo. pp. 518.

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